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ORAL-DIGESTIVE SUPEREGO AGGRESSIONS AND ACTUAL CONFLICTS IN PEPTIC ULCER PATIENTS

By

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In two articles published in this journal, after mentioning other theories, such as those of G. Draper, F. Alexander, R. W. Pickford, T. Szasz and G. F. Mahl, I developed my own theory about the genesis of peptic ulcers. Very concisely, it could be referred to as the theory of a bad internalized mother acting aggressively upon an individual in oral-digestive regression.[1]

This theory holds that when an individual is in partial oral-digestive regression because of the complications in his childhood instinctive evolution and happens to be living in a harmful environmental situation (a frequent example is love-dependence upon an aggressive person who does not satisfy sexually), then the internal aggressions of his representations of a bad internalized mother (maternal superego) against his ego and his id are intensified in him. Because of the oral-digestive regression in this individual, the aforementioned aggressions preferably take on unconscious oral-digestive aspects, such as sucking or biting (' re-morse ', from ' mordere, mors '—to bite) the digestive tract. Besides, the representations of a bad internalized mother in his superego force this individual to the masochistic behaviour of provoking alimentary disorders and of ingesting indigestible or insufficient food. This food may harm him by itself or through the psychic cathexis he places upon it, or upon the alcohol or tobacco he consumes. All this, acting locally or through nervous and hormonal processes, may give rise in the stomach and duodenum to chlorhydropeptic hypersecretion, hyperperistalsis and muscular spasms, stasis and vascular spasms, a decrease in the efficiency of the gastro-duodenal mucous barrier, lack of certain amino-acids and antiacid hormones, and other organic disorders, that finally lead to peptic ulcer.

The intention of the present paper is to go deeper into the understanding of the oral-digestive internal aggressions of the representations of the bad internalized mother in ulcer-patients, and how they are reactivated by actual conflicts. Therefore I will first of all describe the pathogenesis of a typical case of gastric ulcer.

Case 1

The patient is a 45-year-old man with an ulcer in the lesser curvature of the stomach, visible under X-rays. In situations of conflict, such as that brought on by the frigidity of his wife, he was inevitably afflicted with heartburn after meals, besides helping to bring it on by ingesting food difficult to digest or by smoking excessively.

His family had become bankrupt, and during all his childhood he was forced to depend upon some miserly relations. On the other hand his mother, although apparently very fond of him, was really much more interested in herself and her personal satisfaction and forced him to work for her.

The *pathogenesis* of his heartburn could be traced to the fact that the painful environmental circumstances he had had to accept acted against him just as if they were indigestible food he had had to swallow and which attacked his stomach. He said that what had caused his ulcer and kept it going was that he had ' had to swallow the rotten

[1] I use the term oral-digestive, more far-reaching than simply oral, because since Freud demonstrated that the instincts of the ego are also sexual instincts, everything that happens in the mouth, stomach, and intestine should be included in the first stage of the libidinous organization, the finality of which is the assimilation of food. This inclusion is indispensable for the understanding of psychosomatic digestive disorders.

years ' of his painful childhood, and that both then and now ' owing to his character, he had to swallow annoying things ' in his environment. Not only that, but he himself, with his neurotic behaviour ' sought nails ' which hurt his stomach inside.

This pathogenesis also came up in his dreams. Thus, one day he had heartburn because his wife reacted with frigidity during sexual intercourse. This reactivated conscious and unconscious memories of other frustrations and aggressions suffered previously, and subsequently he dreamed of ' two black wooden balls covered with snow '. His associations showed that the cold snow symbolized the frigidity of his wife, and that the black wooden balls stood for his wife's two ' cold ' breasts behind which was the image of his mother's breasts considered bad because of her lack of affection towards him and also because of her aggressions. Finally, and connected with a recent ingestion of harmful food, the balls of his dream represented some bad-tasting hamburgers he had eaten in a restaurant on that day, which had harmed him by very reason of the painful situation with his wife at that time. This whole group of bad stimuli brought on chlorhydric hypersecretion and a great sensitivity of his stomach to digestive juices which he perceived as heartburn.

Hardly concealed by their manifest contents, in many other dreams typical masochistic regressive oral-digestive latent contents were found. They could be summarized as follows: ' I had to go and eat with my aunt, and this prevented me from joining my wife.' Joining his wife symbolized his genitality and well-being in life; on the other hand, having to eat with his aunt stood for his subjection to her and even more to his own mother. Owing to his oral-digestive regression, the patient felt forced to eat the food his mother and aunt gave him, which was sure to upset his stomach because of the unfavourable psychic cathexis he had put upon it. In other of his dreams the oral-digestive regression did not exist, and individuals representing his aunt and his mother appeared in them, castrating him genitally in a symbolic way.

The patient suffered the consequences of his oral-digestive masochistic reaction not only in his stomach, but also in another digestive organ—his mouth. When he started his psycho-analytical treatment, almost all his teeth were missing, and his false teeth were so ill-fitting that they produced the sensation of a strange, pernicious body in his mouth, suffocating him. The need of having to have his teeth extracted symbolized a genital castration. The castration, displaced to his mouth by an oral-digestive regression, was like the one he experienced when dreaming of his aunt. The troublesome set of teeth in his mouth was a symbolic representative of his annoying relatives, principally of his bad internalized mother who, he felt, was provoking his indigestion from his inside and also harming his digestive tract.

The patient experienced painful psychic situations as if they were harmful food attacking his stomach. He often favoured this displacement by eating food that was difficult to digest or by smoking excessively. In the first place, the really harmful food, or the food he imagined to be harmful, stood for the persons who at present behaved badly towards him, who in turn represented his aggressive, covetous aunt and, lastly, his own mother, above all in her bad behaviour during his childhood. In his psycho-analytical associations the bad mother was usually screened by his bad aunt, who was less difficult to criticize.

Psycho-analysing with greater detail his reaction to painful circumstances and also his subjection to his bad internalized mother who forced him to the ingestion of harmful food, it was found that he unconsciously felt he was being sucked, bitten, or pierced by his mother or her substitutes, who quite often were other relatives.

For instance, he could not stand the presence of people who ate greedily, chewing noisily and showing their teeth, because this made him feel as if they would devour him. Something similar happened in his dreams. In one of them some Indians, to whom he was chained, pursued him, and other persons representing him, with spears; later on the Indians changed into bats which circled around them as if they wanted to suck their blood. The Indians with spears symbolized his relatives who came from the north of the Argentine (where most of the population is Indian), but principally his aunt and his mother who were aggressive in a phallic way and who sucked as bats do, and to whom he felt chained by strong infantile bonds, symbolized by the chains of the dream.

The patient complained of spermatorrhoea when defecating or of losing a whitish liquid—which he believed was semen—with his urine. He also fancied it was blood his relatives drew out of him. In a certain way his aunt had actually taken blood from him, because he had had to give it for a transfusion after she underwent an operation. He did so urged on by his mother, who repeated continuously to him how grateful he ought to be; with this his mother referred indirectly to herself.

The submitting, harmful, and traumatic fixation of the patient towards his mother and her later substitutes (his aunt and his mother-in-law) also appeared in another of his dreams accompanied by pollution. (Dreams with pollution appeared in him when he had a genital excitation with masochistic contents). In one of them, he dreamed that in his aunt's house he touched the breasts of an old woman who was with a man, or that he rubbed his penis against her buttocks and so had a pollution. The old woman was his ' old woman ', i.e. his mother, to whom he was masochistically fixated. That is why the pollution happened when he dreamed about her instead of dreaming of a more attractive woman. This was also indicated by the

fact that he dreamed of his aunt's house, i.e. he considered her a harmful maternal substitute.

The harmful fixation of the patient to these relatives made him accept their disagreeable behaviour which, owing to his oral-digestive regression, was for him like eating harmful food from these relatives, and suffering consequent digestive troubles. In view of this basic unconscious psychic situation it is logical that the patient consciously aimed at provoking the opposite attitude in his relatives, of giving him food that would not upset him, in order to feel better. This, of course, was a fantasy of only partial liberation, because even with good food the patient maintained a harmful oral-digestive fixation and neither solved his conflicts nor achieved adequate social or genital behaviour.

The patient satisfied his oral-digestive ambition of good food principally with his mother-in-law. For instance, following a quarrel he was often able to relieve his heartburn by eating, apparently with great pleasure, the meals she gave him; she thus once gave him fritters that were usually indigestible for him. On another occasion, when he was full of anxiety and had a stomach-ache because of the presence in his house of people he could not compete with, he felt better after doing something like having a good meal; he joined his wife in the kitchen whilst she prepared lunch. When the patient realized the meaning of all this, he stated that he had sought this food as someone who ' takes a sedative that stupefies '. When giving it to him, his relatives behaved towards him as if he were a child ' to whom one gives a disagreeable laxative hidden in tasty food '. For this reason he also liked strongly seasoned food, typical of the region from which his parents came and which harmed him digestively.

These unconscious contents of being sucked, bitten, pierced, deprived of good food, or forced to eat harmful food, alcohol, or tobacco by the internalized bad mother are found more often in psycho-analytical treatment of ulcer patients than in that of other neurotic or psychosomatic patients. They are also very frequent in pseudo-ulcer patients, that is to say, those who have ulcerous symptoms but no visible organic lesion. (See, for example, the case described on pages 63–71 of my book: *Génesis psicosomática y tratamiento de las úlceras gástricas y duodenales,* or case 4 in my paper: ' The Internalized Mother as Harmful Food in Peptic Ulcer Patients ').

Moreover, it often happens that the aforementioned oral aggressions by the bad internalized mother are more easily visible in pseudo-ulcer patients than in ulcer cases. An important confirmation of this is the noteworthy study of J. L. Halliday on Thomas Carlyle, who for sixty years suffered from peptic ulcer pains without having an ulcer.

Halliday shows very clearly how Carlyle's digestive pains were provoked by his representations of a bad internalized mother who sucked and bit his digestive tract and forced him to eat food that did not agree with him digestively. According to Halliday, ' Carlyle had eaten and swallowed his mother . . . who was a bad thing within him, that tormented him constantly and that gave rise to the symptom of a nightmare in which " a rat would be gnawing my stomach ".' Carlyle ' was extremely frugal ', depriving himself too much of good food. Besides, as he himself describes it, he ate harmful food; ' If I could stop taking medicines for three months I would feel perfectly right, but as I soak myself in castor-oil and other abominable things, I have to be weak and feeble.'

In spite of these aggressions of a bad internalized mother, pseudo-ulcer patients do not actually have an ulcer. Contrary to what one might suppose this does not seem to be due to a diminished intensity of their psychic conflicts, but more likely to a lower intensity of the repression of those conflicts. Consequently they are better able to defend themselves against them and, as is undertandable, also from psychosomatic issues such as ulcers. In pseudo-ulcer patients, the repression of symptoms previous to the ulcer, for example pain, is also less than in ulcer patients. Owing to this repression the latter very often start an ulcer without any conscious digestive antecedents. Finally, in pseudo-ulcer patients there is often a decreased localization and exclusion to the digestive sphere of the aggressions of their superego, for in these cases it also extends on to other organs.

Similarly to those of any neurosis, the factors of peptic ulcer may be classified, somewhat arbitrarily, as predisposing and precipitating ones. I have described a harmful psychic constellation that, according to my experience, is very important, and frequently found to precipitate and reactivate peptic ulcers. This *precipitating factor,* which may also be called an *actual conflict* in ulcer patients, since it is this very factor that precipitates the ulcer through the reactivation of childhood conflicts, consists above all of *a love dependence upon and lack of genital satisfaction with a person. To this is added an excessively exacting professional activity,* which does not allow the patient a healthy emancipation from unpleasant psychic tension.

Sometimes the person on whom the patient

depends genitally is not aggressive but only frustrating; but a frustration is also an aggression for the unconscious, since the satisfaction of any instinct requires the adequate behaviour of the external object. Expressing this on the regressive oral-digestive level of ulcer patients, we may say that a mother who feeds her baby with inadequate food is as aggressive as another who undernourishes her child.

An example of this type of conflict and its influence upon the precipitation and pathogenesis of the ulcer is the following case of gastric ulcer.

Case 2

The patient was a man about 40 years old. Among his family antecedents we find that one of his grandmothers had attacks of angina pectoris from which she eventually died, and that his father had gastric troubles.

He was a manifest homosexual with the typical background of parents who did not get on well together, who frustrated him, were aggressive towards him, constantly kept him at home, and feminized him in every way.

Owing to her work in the family business, his mother could not take care of him between his breast feeds, and left him in the hands of several successive nurses. As a boy his mother forbade him any affective manifestations towards her, telling him that it made his father feel jealous, and, on the other hand, forced him to pay a lot of attention to his father and obey him in everything in spite of the father's harshness with the child. The mother combed and dressed him in a girlish way and, as he had a beautiful face, he provoked the admiration of many women who sought to caress him. All this annoyed him intensely, because it emphasized his feminine trends.

His mother scolded him severely because of his masturbation and punished him physically if he referred to genital subjects. Even when he was 15 years old, when his mother beat him with a belt, he took it to be a punishment for his masturbation and not, as she intended, for his having played truant from school.

Several incidents during his childhood strengthened his castration fears; among them was an appendectomy when he was 7 years old and several infections on the scalp. His memories dating from before his operation included that of his father's not allowing him to play with toys and his habit of kicking him on the buttocks. Immediately after the operation he had nightmares about dogs that bit him.

He was forced by his father to work in the family business, and by both parents to accompany an older sister to parties and with her beaux; this forced him to an identification with her.

He felt a strong aversion for furs of certain animals and for certain fruits, such as peaches, that have a downy skin and a kind of external incision; these things symbolized for him the feminine genitalia.

After puberty he started his homosexual activity with intense remorse. Connected with this is his memory of an acquaintance who threw himself into the sea from a cliff because of his homosexual anxiety. The patient saw him still alive, beaten against the rocks and pecked at by seagulls. He compared this scene to the attacks and aggressive words against homosexuals from people of his environment.

Principally during summer-time he had strong headaches, with sharp pains in one of his eyes, as if something were encrusted in the orbit and were bursting it, and with cold in the stomach and diarrhoea. These headaches started when he was 12 years old, one day when his parents obliged him to stay at home, painting the walls of a room. This was a screen memory for masturbation, which was symbolized by painting with a brush, i.e. a phallic symbol.. His parents left him no option but to masturbate because they forbade heterosexual activity. He masturbated with unconscious phantasies of homosexual subjection to his father.

In his headaches the orbit with the eyebrows symbolized for him the vagina with the mons veneris and, regressively, the anus into which the father's penis entered, bursting it.

His headaches used to start when he was out in the cold, when he ate cold food, or when he caught cold. Cold unconsciously made him feel more castrated and subsequently more submitted to his father's aggressive penis in a homosexual and masochistic way. Hence his headaches were relieved when he applied heat and not cold, which is the usual means of obtaining relief.

The genesis of peptic ulcer. The patient's digestive troubles were a consequence of his unconscious regressive digestive wish for homosexual objects. As is always the case with homosexuals, he wanted not only to enjoy them but also to be genitally harmed by them, in a regressive digestive way. His ulcer was the final result of this behaviour.

There was a strong tendency in the patient towards the oral-digestive regression of his genital drives, and therefore his genital thoughts took on digestive aspects. For example, the aforementioned regression could be clearly noticed in his dreams. Thus, at a time when he was attempting to approach a woman, he dreamt that he had to sell wine in Formosa (' Formosa ' is an Argentine province; its name is similar to ' hermosa ' meaning ' beautiful '). In another of his dreams ' he had to go to a fishmonger's to sign an agreement with a woman and drink wine '; this meant the acceptance of the female sex and having heterosexual intercourse. In another of his dreams ' his mother forbade him to eat partridges ', which meant the

prohibition of women and heterosexuality. In still another dream ' a friend, whose gatepost was bigger than his own, received sweetmeats he himself could not get ': because his friend's penis was larger than his own, he could get women.

When he spoke of his digestive troubles, the patient was at the same time referring to his homosexuality. When he was 14, he felt very attracted towards a schoolmate, whom he kissed and embraced. At the age of 16 he sucked the penis of one of this boy's relatives. He reacted with a persistent bad taste in his mouth ' as of blood and metal ' which he usually felt around the molar region.

The most important unconscious meaning of this symptom was that his homosexual behaviour castrated him, and the boy's penis, acting against his mouth like a sharp knife, wounded it until it bled. The bad taste was localized around his molars because these bite, and his feelings of remorse, as indicated by the etymology of this word, were sensations of being bitten from within.

This meaning came up repeatedly in his associations and dreams. Thus, in one of them, ' he went out of a black building where he was choking and was much annoyed at having to keep in his mouth some small hemispherically shaped stones with traces left by teeth on them '. The black building symbolized not only the belly of a bad mother, but also the anguishing, disagreeable and reprehensible homosexual activity towards which he was unconsciously compelled and which he could not renounce. The small hemispherically shaped stones stood primarily for the glans penis of his schoolmate and, more profoundly, for his mother's breasts as he perceived them, frustrating, aggressive, and injuring. They bit his mouth and also, as was later deduced, other regions of his digestive tract.

At the age of 18, for one year, he lived in a situation of intense love dependence ; he acted passively in coitus, performed fellatio, and had strong fits of jealousy towards another man who treated him badly. As a consequence, the bad taste in his mouth grew so annoying that he tried to overcome it by continuously sucking peppermints. After some time, these sweets brought on sensations of cold in his stomach and finally gastric pains.

The patient felt very disgusted after this painful love affair and for the next ten years limited himself to masturbation. When he was 27, owing to excessive drinking and smoking with a friend, the bad taste in his mouth came back together with his gastric pains. He could not tolerate many kinds of food, and had diarrhoea up to five or six times a day. He also spat up some blood, which made him think he had become a victim of tuberculosis. In one of these drinking orgies he was able to have his only heterosexual intercourse with a woman who, only a few moments before, had been intimate with his friend.

He then decided to live with his mother because of his gastric disturbances. She fed him on cream and curdled milk. But as his mother did not have for him the meaning of a person who was good for his genitality, she could not endow the food she gave him with good qualities. He felt better only after he had left her and changed his job.

When he was 29, he felt attracted towards one of his employees and, while both were drunk, performed fellatio on him. As from the following day, his employee continued to carry out his duties faithfully but, constantly reproachful, did not talk to him, not even to greet him. This provoked such intense remorse in the patient that he became genitally impotent ; it also gave rise anew to his gastric pains and to intolerance of some kinds of food, in this case bread and coffee.

Feeling very ill, he moved to another city, where his condition again improved. But he once more felt attracted towards one of his employees. As he remembered his painful previous experiences, his gastric disorders reappeared, even before genital approach.

One day he ate mutton, which he had never liked, just as he disliked his passive homosexual behaviour. After eating it, he had the sensation of something hard in his stomach—symbolizing a penis in his mouth—together with strong intestinal pains, diarrhoea, and a passing of red blood. On subsequent days, his digestive symptoms were those of a case of gastric ulcer, with pains and heartburn after his meals, and nausea, gastric spasms, and intolerance of any milk food.

In spite of these forebodings, he grew intimate with his employee, who was cruel to him, forced him to passive homosexual activities, and also made him feel jealous. With all this, his ulcerous troubles persisted and under X-rays one could already observe a niche in the lower part of the lesser curvature of his stomach.

Pathogenesis of the ulcer. The patient's ulcer was a consequence of the aggressions he received owing to his masochistic homosexual behaviour. These external aggressions, internalized and reinforced by his superego, were directed towards his stomach and also against the rest of his digestive tract by means of food, such as the aforementioned mutton, which the patient endowed with a psychic cathexis unfavourable for a good digestion.

The masochistic way in which the patient reacted went against his digestive tract because of his instinctive oral-digestive regression, which made him perceive his genital conflicts in the guise of digestive troubles. This regression dated from his earliest childhood ; from the age of 4 or 5, he already remembers having been caught and scolded by some aunts—his mother's substitutes—because of sex play with other children ; he had an intense sensation of cold in his stomach that must have been caused by vascular gastric spasms. The psychosomatic genesis of this reaction must be due to a

displacement onto his stomach of his fear of phallic castration. A confirmation of this interpretation was found in the simultaneity of similar reactions on the skin under analogous circumstances. Thus, whenever he looked at a peach that, as already pointed out, symbolized for him in an oral-digestive regression, the anguishing and castrating feminine genital organ, he shivered all over, got ' gooseflesh ' and, just as on his skin, he felt cold in his stomach.

The pathogenesis of the patient's ulcer could be deduced during his psycho-analytical treatment from the facts above-mentioned, such as the bad taste of metal and blood in his mouth as if he were being wounded with a sharp metal knife after having sucked his schoolmate's penis, his intolerance of food that symbolized his unpleasant homosexuality, the masochistic ingestion of other food like the great amount of peppermints that finally harmed his stomach, or dreams such as that of the small stones in his mouth, standing for the frustrating maternal breasts which bit him from within.

There were also other data in connexion with his feeling that food was something aggressive in situations of genital conflict. For example, some kinds of food or drink, such as beer, agreed with him when he was in pleasant company; but on the other hand, when he had beer with a friend of the cruel lover of his youth, he had strong digestive disorders, above all if he had any external difficulties. So, on one occasion, after a bad business deal, he drank two glasses of milk, which unconsciously symbolized for him the two aggressive maternal breasts, and gave rise to intense gastric pains and diarrhoea. He smoked and drank coffee excessively in situations of masochistic subjection to men, whereupon these stimulants harmed him digestively. Once, when in a situation of this kind, he felt sick after eating strawberries. During the psycho-analytical session immediately after, he spoke of a film he had seen, in which a woman who was not allowed to eat ' hard food ' because of her heart trouble was given raspberries to eat by her husband so that she might die. The woman represented him in his passive homosexuality, and the harmful raspberries the harsh treatment he received from his homosexual partners; hence the strawberries he had eaten had upon him the effect of poisoned food.

To sum up: As a consequence of his oral-digestive regression the patient experienced his actual conflict of a love-dependence upon an aggressive and genitally unsatisfactory person as a castration displaced on to the stomach and duodenum, as being bitten and pierced in the digestive tract, and as harmful food whose ingestion harms the digestive tract because it reactivates childhood situations of being ill-treated and, above all, badly breast fed and ill fed by his mother.

The precipitating factor of a love-dependence on a person and lack of genital satisfaction with her does not often become apparent during the first psychic explorations of ulcer patients, because they try to appear, before themselves and others, to be having an apparently good and even exaggerated genital activity. A fellow investigator even expressed astonishment when I pointed out to him this precipitating factor of genital dissatisfaction, because in his experience of such patients he seemed to have observed the opposite; he had interviewed many, but had had only a few sessions with each of them. For instance, one of my cases made his ulcer and subsequent haematemesis depend on his ' sexual excesses '. But a deeper investigation showed that the cause of it all was just the opposite, namely having been abandoned by women with whom he was very much in love at an age when he already doubted his ability to succeed in love.

Alexander makes the ulcer depend on a repressed alimentary wish towards the mother, which in turn would be a regressive expression of another repressed wish to be loved by and live in dependence on her. In his view, this repressed alimentary wish would give rise to hypersecretion and nocturnal chlorhydropeptic secretion. When these are not neutralized by the desired food, which the future ulcer patient does not allow himself in his eagerness to pretend to be independent of his environment, they would end up by ulcerating the stomach or duodenum.

For Alexander, the oral-digestive aggressions of the bad internalized mother would only be a reactive consequence of the frustration of the alimentary wish, and not one of the factors, or only a very secondary one, in the genesis of ulcers.

Regarding this theory one may point out, above all, that for many gastro-enterologists the chlorhydropeptic secretion seems to be only a secondary factor in the genesis of the ulcer. So much so that it has been suggested that the medical adage ' without acid there is no ulcer ' should be forgotten, the term ' peptic ulcer ' discarded, since both lead to misunderstanding of the pathogenesis of the ulcer, and the ulcer should be called ' neurocirculatory ', bearing in mind its more probable organic pathogenesis.

There are many ulcer patients, such as those with gastric ulcers, which according to autopsies are slightly more frequent than duodenal ulcers, who seldom show any increase in their chlorhydropeptic secretions. On the other hand, duodenal ulcer patients often have a continuous

increase of gastric acidity and a tendency to a continuous gastric secretion, above all during the night; but it also happens that their acidity and nocturnal hypersecretion continue after the ulcer has been cured, and that there is no change in their intensity previous to the patient's ulcer relapses. Usually there is no correlation between the intensity of their acidity and that of their symptoms, and the treatment of their hyperacidity does not give constant results in the evolution of their ulcer.

Neither do the theories on ulcus based upon chlorhydric acidity explain why the ulcers appear in circumscribed gastroduodenal areas or why they are exclusive, since the action of the acid would surely affect all the gastroduodenal mucosa, or at least harm this mucosa evenly in places where it acts with greater intensity.

Experimental ulcers also speak against the acid-peptic theories of ulcers. Even if, as an average, the duodenal ulcer patient has an acidity three times higher than that of a normal individual, this hyperacidity is only the fifth part of his maximum capacity for producing acid. From experience with animals it can be deduced that this hyperacidity is not by itself enough to produce an ulcer.

In the psycho-analytical treatment of ulcer patients, after a first psychic layer of apparent independence from the mother or her substitutes, one may find what Alexander points out, that is to say, the repressed wish to receive good food as a substitute for love. But this, in turn, is only a screening up or masking of another deeper psychic layer, which is more important in the genesis of ulcers, namely that of receiving bad food from the mother or her substitutes, the bad food being the digestive representative, imposed upon the patient by his oral-digestive regression and superego, of all kinds of aggressions against his instincts.

Like other ulcer or pseudo-ulcer patients, the aforementioned cases, and Halliday's study of Carlyle, do not seem to confirm Alexander's theory. According to them, we should be more inclined to think that the ulcer is not provoked by a wish for alimentary well-being, but by the opposite masochistic wish to ' swallow ' the environment and childhood aggressions of the mother as if they were bad food. This has an unfavourable influence upon the assimilation of certain kinds of food or the patient's digestive functioning.

This is what the first ulcer patient described above realized when he felt that within him there was an apparent wish for good food prepared by a relative, but that this was like seeking ' to swallow bad laxatives disguised in good food '. In other words, it was an apparently good pretext to continue subjected, in a regressive oral-digestive way, to all the familiar frustrations and aggressions against his instincts.

Among the oral-digestive aggressions of the bad internalized mother (maternal superego) against the digestive tract of ulcer or pseudo-ulcer patients are the prohibition of good food and the forcing of bad food upon them. These oral-digestive aggressions can frequently be observed in the manifest behaviour of these patients who, obeying these unconscious motivations, seek, or have sought, insufficient or bad nourishment and excessive drinking or smoking.

The attacks by being sucked, bitten or pierced, to which ulcer patients unconsciously feel they are exposed, can easily be perceived when they describe their symptoms. Thus it is common for them to complain of having something in their stomachs that bites like a wolf. gnaws like a rat, or pierces like a knife. The wolf, the rat, and the knife are images or symbols of a bad internalized mother. These fantasies are also found in pseudo-ulcer patients, thus showing that these sensations are not a consequence of an ulcerous organic lesion.

These last digestive aggressions of being sucked, gnawed, or pierced are strange, and also difficult to understand in their mechanism. They are carried out by the psychic complex of a bad internalized mother which influences the emotions of the individual and acts through the nervous and hormonal systems, thus provoking excessive tonic and peristaltic muscular gastro-duodenal contractions, chemical chlorhydro-peptic actions, and vascular spasms and stasis in the gastro-duodenal walls. To this is added the traumatic action of bulky food not thoroughly chewed in the mouth; it acts traumatically upon the frail and engorged mucous membrane of the stomach of the patients in emotional stress.

That the stomach has activities like sucking and biting itself, although these activities are ascribed rather more to the mouth, will not sound so strange if we bear in mind that the stomach is the primitive organ and the mouth merely a specialized part of it. Both in ontogenesis and in phylogenesis the digestive tract was primitively the gastrula which, as the name indicates, is a stomach. In some animals this

primitive stomach has a mouth by which food enters and a cavity that digests it by mechanical and chemical action. With the development of the species the mouth has become independent of the stomach, taking upon itself the harsher mechanical function.

When considering the objection that it is hard to conceive how the psychic complex of a bad internalized mother performs activities against the stomach and the duodenum that are really carried out by the mouth, there comes to one's mind an expression commonly used when food is highly seasoned or tobacco too strong: we say that it 'bites' the tongue. Now highly seasoned food does not really bite either the tongue or the stomach, but it irritates the digestive tract chemically because of the spices used to season it and the chlorhydropeptic juice it forces the stomach to secrete. Why, then, do we say that it bites? Probably because when harmfully irritated, the sensations of the stomach are not perceived so clearly as those of the mouth, and the speaker uses terms pertaining to sensations in the mouth to express himself more clearly, though not correctly, because he is more conscious of his mouth than of his stomach. For the same reason, in Spanish one says that an acid 'corrodes' something, that is to say that it bites as rodents do, instead of saying that it 'digests' the object, which would be more exact.

It becomes more understandable that the ulcer patient feels himself bitten instead of digested, because these oral wishes are only a conscious and superficial expression of other more important deep and unconscious wishes, those of receiving, digesting, and assimilating milk and other foods in the gastro-intestinal tract. Bearing all these considerations in mind, we should translate from oral into gastro-intestinal language everything that the ulcer patients state. When, for example, they complain of pains as if from being bitten, we must suppose that their pains are of being digested or burned chemically.

If we continue reasoning thus and seeking always to express ourselves correctly, we should also have to say that the ulcer-producing aggressions of the psychic complex of a bad internalized mother would not be the oral aggressions of sucking, biting, or piercing the stomach or duodenum, but rather the corresponding gastro-duodenal aggressions of emptying these organs through hunger, of squeezing them with tonic and peristaltic contractions, of harming them with bulky food, or of digesting and burning them chemically. The last-mentioned sensation is at times perceived consciously by the patient when he has heartburn.

Confirmation that these are the most profound aggressions of the psychic complex of a bad internalized mother can be found in children's stories or in narratives of primitive people, where the heroes, representing the children, are in peril of being digested within the stomach of real or fantastic beings. This is what happens to Pinocchio in the fish or to Jonah in the whale. Similarly, in narratives of heroes who battle against fire-spitting dragons, these monsters symbolize the mother whose spittle is capable of burning, i.e. her gastric and duodenal juices are capable of digesting the children who dare to oppose her.

The organic treatment of ulcers is of a symptomatic kind. Among others, Browning and Houseworth point out that the medical treatments do not cure ulcer patients, and that surgical ones, such as the brutal method of subtotal resection of the stomach, even though they cure the ulcer, do not modify the personality, and the patients subsequently have other and different symptoms, as annoying as those produced by the ulcer. Thus, one of my patients was cured of her ulcer by a gastro-enterostomy, but owing to her previous psychic conflicts she suffered later from arterial hypertension, and this was worse than her ulcer.

The treatments by diets based on milk, sops, and thick soups improve the ulcer patient's condition by treating him as though he were a child, in order to free him of his conflicts of adult genitality, which are those that force him to the oral-digestive regression in which he behaves masochistically.

The ulcer patient's hyperacidity is an attempt to overcome his conflicts in the oral-digestive regressive situation. It is brought on because he has to digest complicated food which his bad internalized mother forces and at the same time forbids him to eat, either because it represents genital or aggressive objects or because he has cathected it unfavourably in some other way. For this reason, the anti-acid treatment of the ulcer patient has the same meaning as making a neurotic individual refrain from masturbating or from carrying out inadequate aggressive activities against an environment that ill-treats him.

The aetiological treatment for the ulcer patient is psycho-analysis, and the patients react well to it. According to Alexander, ulcer patients often develop dependence on the analyst

during the treatment which hinders them from progressing, and he therefore suggests long intervals between the psycho-analytical sessions. My own experience is in accordance with that of the hospitals during World War II, when dealing with ulcer patients. It is pointed out that these patients often give up the treatment prematurely, when they have already achieved a certain comfort that allows them to continue their difficult struggle for life. This behaviour is a consequence of their coming from an environment that forces them to carry on with effort and instinctive suffering, and they unconsciously seek a repetition of this in the transference of their psycho-analytical treatment.

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UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS A DEFENCE TECHNIQUE IN THE NEUROSES

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Utilization of social institutions as a technique of defence is a particularly thorny problem in the treatment of the neuroses. To the usual difficulties concomitant with analysing any defence are added the special problems of dealing with one into which has been incorporated a socially accepted institution. In this paper I am especially concerned with the specific utilization of social institutions by certain neurotic individuals in their attempt to ward off anxiety. I shall attempt to correlate the structure and function of the social institution with that of the individual, in so far as this seems pertinent to my major thesis. I shall then attempt to illustrate the use of a religious institution as a means of defence by an obsessional neurotic, and thereafter illustrate my opening remarks by a further examination of this institution.

A social institution may be defined as (11) ' any association, custom or relationship consciously approved by a society and organized and maintained through prescribed rules and agencies.' As may be seen from this definition, there is emphasis both on the consensus established by the group and on established rules for the perpetuation of the institution. We view the social institution as ' external reality ', but in our dealings with our patients we also view it with respect to its symbolic intrapsychic value and anticipate that they will make varying use of it. As Hartmann so well puts it (7), ' Society is not a projection of unconscious phantasies, though it offers many possibilities for such projection, and their study reveals to us the influence of unconscious factors on man's attitude to society. We must accept social reality as a factor in its own right; certainly most analysts do not attempt to interpret human behaviour exclusively in terms of unconscious drives and phantasies. This " reality aspect " is an intricate topic and has manifold connotations; *we are quite aware that the same institutions can be used to canalize a great variety of tendencies.*' (Italics mine.)

I am of opinion that we are entitled to draw certain cautious comparisons between the operational techniques of the social institution and those of its individual members because of the interplay between these. I believe that the social institution has special properties peculiar to it, and that in a sense, like its individual members, it has an organic character representing something more than the sum of its parts. It would not be germane to the major thesis of this paper, however, to consider further whether a group mind or other such phenomena exist. But with this in mind, and with due regard for the fact that this sphere of investigation is the realm of the sociologist rather than of the psychoanalyst, we are entitled, as psycho-analysts, to certain views regarding social institutions. Fenichel's comment is pertinent in this regard (3): ' Every mental phenomenon is explicable as a resultant of the interaction of biological structure and environmental influence. Social institutions act as determining environmental influences upon a given generation. The biological structure itself has evolved from the interplay of earlier structures and earlier experiences. But how did the social institutions themselves originate? Was it not, in the final analysis, through the attempts of human beings to satisfy their needs? This is undeniable. The relations between the individuals, however, became external realities comparatively independent of the individuals; they shaped the structure of the individuals who then through their behaviour again altered the institutions. This is a historically continuous process.' I realize that such teleological thinking is frowned upon by some modern anthropologists, who describe it as unscientific. They maintain that we should limit ourselves to the data immediately observable, and therefore to viewing the social organization as ' external reality ' in so far as the individual members of the group are concerned without regard for the genetic and future evolutional aspects of this ' historically continuous process '. While it is true that we are driven to the

formation of hypotheses if we deviate from this position, such formulations offer us the opportunity to explore the admitted interplay between the individual and the social institution to which the individual must certainly have been and is a significant contributor.

The inference may be drawn that the origins of social institutions depend on man's attempt to cope with his inner impulses and his external physical environment, and thus to attain some measure of security. It is clear that social institutions may deviate from their function, and, in effect display characteristics closely resembling the neuroses. I would question, however, whether this is a primary property of the social institution. I believe that we are warranted in assessing social institutions in terms of their intent with full realization that, as in the individual, deviations in one or another direction may occur. This would establish the same frame of reference for the social institution, as a unit, as for its individual members.

Emotional disorders have in common the property of interfering with the interchange of feelings and ideas by the affected person with other individuals and groups. The process of interchange of such feelings and ideas is called communication. In psycho-analysis we have concerned ourselves with such disorders in communication to a marked degree. This is true both in the actual analytic situation and in the patient's individual relationships outside it. There have also been in psycho-analysis, at a more theoretical level, attempts to correlate both the impact of sociological forces on individuals and the impact and formative influence of individuals on the form and structure of social institutions.

There is a striking contrast between the social institution and the neurotic defensive system in so far as their impact on communication and hence on object relationships is concerned. In the former the intent is to canalize instinctual energies into sublimatory, group-approved activities, and thus to enhance object relationships. In the latter the reverse is true, and these energies tend to make for isolation, non-communication, and interference with object-related activities. In this respect one might equate the operation of the social institution with that of the non-neurotic or genital character. In the neuroses, a segment of the total social institution may be incorporated into the neurotic defensive system. In so far as this happens, the social institution, intended as it is to foster sublimation, no longer serves this purpose, but is employed in the service of the non-sublimating neurotic pattern. To the degree that this occurs, it represents a defensive pattern particularly difficult to shatter, since by this manoeuvre the defence becomes rationalized by the neurotic as an expression of the social institution and accordingly assumes an investment of virtuosity and righteousness.

I shall now attempt to illustrate the incorporation of a social institution, in this instance a religious one, into a neurotic defensive system. This case lends itself particularly well to my purpose, since the religious group in question is a highly structured one, and since I have been faced with an equivalent problem in other patients, and I gather from other analysts that it is a fairly common problem in treatment in our cultural group.

The patient was a young man in his mid-twenties who complained of intense anxiety associated with a lump in his throat, abdominal tension, and sporadic attacks of diarrhoea. He was highly perfectionist and on entering treatment presented a familiar type of obsessional neurosis. I shall limit myself here to his defensive usage of religion, as this is my primary concern (9). In our first interview the patient told me of his religious problems along with certain historical data, his numerous entanglements with girl friends, and his many physical symptoms. He told me that he was a Catholic and had ' a strong conscience '; also that until recently he had never missed Mass, but that lately he had been ' slipping '. Of some interest as regards his religious preoccupation was also his compulsive wish to play the church organ. In this initial interview he described the difficulties he had had in arranging to do this, and attempted to enlist my help in gaining access to an organ.

Much time was spent during his first interviews in describing his numerous involved relations with girls, as an attempt, I think, to convince me of his potency. During his schooling prior to the fourth year of high school, he said, he had had little or no contact with girls, and was ill at ease with them. He attributed this to the fact that he had attended Catholic schools. He further said that he had had no sexual education and had had to find out ' the hard way '. He had ' discovered ' about masturbation from a neighbourhood boy at the age of 15. This boy had masturbated in his presence and had induced him to do the same. He expressed some repulsion at the crudity of this, and then told me that he had thereafter begun to masturbate him-

self. On his return to school in the fall he had had ' some kind of a homosexual experience '. From 15 to 19 he had masturbated a lot and felt that it was wrong, and in fact he occasionally slipped and masturbated now, and then felt guilty about it.

I accepted these data as so much factual material and encouraged him to continue telling me about his experiences. I did not challenge his need to experience guilt. With this attitude, he spontaneously told me one day that shortly before seeing me he had been to see another psychiatrist at the school doctor's suggestion. He had told him about his masturbation, and the psychiatrist had said there was nothing wrong with masturbating, whereupon the patient felt that he could never return to ' anyone who contradicted the Church '. He stated that he had really not felt that anything was acutely wrong, though he had felt some guilt about his sexual experiences, until his experience with one of the Brothers at the high school he attended. One day he fooled around with another boy and was seen by the Brother, who said nothing about it, but the patient felt that he began ' playing father to me. He wanted to direct me away from homosexuality '. This feeling was based on the fact that the Brother became very interested in the patient's going to confession regularly. He would go to confession and state that he had ' sinned ', but would never explain the specific character of his sinning with other boys. To this he added that he had seen a number of homosexuals in the Army and that he detested them; they made his blood boil. He went on to describe his fear of impotence as a result of masturbating. He informed me that in the Army he had made many sperm counts on himself; on occasion the result had been low, and he was worried. I commented on this in a factual way, that masturbation had no known physiological ill effects.

In his fifth interview he returned to the theme of the Church, introducing this by telling me that he had had diarrhoea for the past few days, and also ' heartburn ', which he had never had before. He had been trying to get to church for the past week, and never succeeded. He was concerned because for the past two weeks his ' conscience ' had not bothered him. In the Army his conscience bothered him about taking a little laboratory material, and more recently it did so especially about sexual intercourse and masturbation. He was concerned about losing his conscience, describing this as being unfaithful to the Church, and at the same time he was worried because he feared ' rough handling ' by the priests. He then said that several of his worries originated in the Church's teaching, but hastened to add that he was not denouncing the Church. He felt that one should be able to go to confession and be relieved of guilt, and was upset because he was not. He was uncertain whether this was due to a defect in the Church or a ' poor confession '.

In this period he continued to express a great deal of anxiety, telling me that on one occasion he felt that a man followed him part of the way home from my office and that on another he felt that people were staring at him all day. Despite this, however, he continued to enlarge on his past experiences, and in doing so described what he felt had been the punitive attitude taken by the Sisters at the private school he had attended. He told me of the difficulties he had had in taking part in aggressive sports, of his attempts to do so, and of the Sisters' ridicule of his attempts.

Towards the end of this early phase he showed considerable ambivalence in his relationship to me by expressing his feelings about ' Jews '. This occurred at a time when his anxiety was decreasing somewhat. It defined itself as a feeling of unity with the Jew, a member of a minority group as was he, a Catholic, and at the same time as a feeling that Jews would throw him out because he was a Catholic. Along with this he expressed his dislike of the Jewish boys at school because they ' chatter too much ', but ' when they grow up they lose that '.

It seemed that whenever his anxiety in relation to me flared up, he would inform me that he was struggling with the idea of going to confession. This occurred in our twentieth hour, when he described a sense of greater closeness to ' the Jewish boy in the dormitory room next door to mine ', his numerous disagreements with his father who felt he was always right, and then went on to protest against a school requirement that he report to the school doctor each week. He concluded this train of associations by telling me rather apologetically that he had wanted to go to confession, but it was impossible, he was too busy. He then added that he really needed to go to church to get strength to fight his sexual inclinations ' especially towards women '. For the first time I responded that he need not make excuses to me, that I was not the Church. He countered by telling me that he was torn between his ' normal impulses ' and ' the Church '. I replied that he was here for us to see if I could help him get his troubles straightened out, that

he need not feel guilty in relation to me, that I wondered if he were not putting off a lot of guilt on the Church as he seemed to be doing on me, and that perhaps we could use our time better by trying to find out where this guilt really came from. He responded that if he relaxed he was apt to sin, and that he was afraid he would be punished by God; that he would be struck by a flash of lightning.

Thereafter followed several interviews in which he seemed to feel much less need to project his problems, talked in rather more human terms of his aspirations, of envying others, of his tendency to ' brag and make enemies ', and reported that he had had an ' argument ' with several other fellows about masturbation and found that he ' wasn't so bad after all '. In the next interview he again enlarged upon his anguish about the Church and its rules. He felt that if he fell into temptation it was his own fault and meant that he hadn't prayed enough. He then talked of his fear of confession, which he dated back to an incident that occurred in his sixth year, about the time of his first confession. He recalled that a woman had started to leave the confessional thinking that absolution had been given her, and was called back in a loud, gruff voice by the priest, who reprimanded her for leaving too soon. The patient then expressed great animosity towards the Brother who had caught him at homosexual play in high school and had been so insistent that he go to confession, stating that he had wanted to tell the Brother that it was none of his damned business.

At this point in treatment, the patient developed an increasing fear in his relationship with me. This took the form of an expression of his anti-Semitism in general and of his relations to a Jewish professor. He vacillated between numerous hostile comments about his parents, his father's unreasonableness, his mother's isolating herself and holding dad down, and an identification with his parents in a hostile world. This latter was concerned particularly with mother's maltreatment by her doctors.

It was at this time that he produced two important pieces of information. One was that he had been particularly interested in defecation since the age of 5 and used to defecate with a boy friend of his so that they could observe each other. He then informed me that ' rectal manipulations ' by inserting foreign objects or by masturbating while his anus was distended with faeces was an intrinsic part of his masturbatory pattern. The other was the first emergence of ideas that he might have a ' scrupulous conscience '. He told me that a priest had once told him that his conscience was over-working and that he wondered if his conscience were ' giving him the run-around '. I made extensive use of this henceforward, when he expressed intense guilt at violating what he looked upon as the Church's precepts, siding with the priest who had taken issue with his conscientiousness.

At this time I began to interpret his guilt as a technique for re-establishing himself in the good graces of his God-figures by punishing himself, and to define his masturbation as a response to anxiety. This was the first attempt to offer him something more than a moralistic basis for his symptoms, and he avidly accepted this idea. Shortly after this he correlated his passive aims with the Church by disclosing that the Church looked on the aggressor in sexual activities as the more sinful of the two. It was only some months later that he came to realize that his presumed passivity in his sexual activities was really a façade behind which he was being quite active, and this knowledge held for him a considerable gain of self-esteem.

Throughout these early months he had been much concerned about his school work. It eventually became clear that this followed a pattern. He would get very good grades in a subject, become anxious, and then for a time do poorly. He eventually correlated this by telling me that he felt that God was punishing him for his sins by pushing his pencil the wrong way. We then discovered that he would frequently put down the right answer and then become anxious and change it. I began to be much more open in my interpretations of his masochism and his need to ingratiate himself by displaying his humility and denying his capabilities. I now tended to define this as not being peculiarly related to the Church, and referred to the similar pattern in his relation with me and then with his parents.

His distorted religiosity now began to recede, and with it he freely expressed his fears of God and of dying in a state of mortal sin and going to the ' hot place '. I took occasion at this period to refer to his alternating use of me as a prohibitor like the Church and as a seducer equivalent to his own inner impulses of which he was afraid. He seemed to gain more insight into this particular use of the Church as he began to correlate it with his utilization of me and of his father, telling me ' I ask someone like father and hear something contradictory to the Church. I'm not able

to make decisions for myself, since when I did so in the past I've always been wrong. I know God doesn't shove my pencil the wrong way, but it's a deep-seated idea. I know I set you up like the Church, but I can't understand why.'

About five months after treatment began he produced the following: 'According to the Church, people who suffer on earth have a better chance to get to heaven.' He has thought many times that his suffering now might help, but he is mostly discouraged that this will work. He feels that if he makes a slip, he is inclined to 'go all the way'. He has got to be 'perfect or a son of a bitch'. He then said, 'I have the same feeling coming here as I do going to confession; I wonder whether it has to do with the unknown. It's hard to talk. I'm scared to death. It has to do with this "insertion business". If you don't give me hell for it, I tend to take for granted it's O.K. and do it for sex pleasure." I referred again to my rôle as his physician, and suggested that we look further with the intent that he should develop a more adult sexual pattern. For the next few months the patient did not go to confession and seemed to work along fairly constructive lines in the direction of defining his dependence needs in relation to me and to his parents, and his own participation in avoiding more self-expression.

He then went to confession again and reported to me that it had not been a good confession. He had forgotten to tell the priest about talking back to his mother and father, and his anxiety was worse after confession than before. He said, 'The more I thought of it, the more sins I thought I had committed'. He then speculated that he was anxious because he came to me, and that if he stopped coming to me his anxiety would go away. Almost immediately after this, however, he presented his first frank statements of departure from his compulsive religiosity, telling me, 'My ideas have changed some, since the Church and I have pulled apart a bit. It's all right to have relations with a girl if you don't use liquor.' He expressed the feeling that his anxiety was not entirely due to the Church; there must be something else. In mid-September he made an impulsive trip to his Catholic grade school. He was well received there, and returned full of ambitious plans to increase his social and extra-curricular activities.

Some ten months after treatment began, his use of the Church as a problem in analysis ended. I date this from the time when he reported that, after debating the matter for some time, he had had an interview with a priest he had recently met. The patient said that the priest had 'agreed with your diagnosis of my troubles'. The priest had said that he had a scrupulous conscience and that his masturbation was due to psychological things. The patient said, 'He advised me to get among people instead of isolating myself and praying.' The priest had said that it was important for him not to put himself 'in the way of sin', but since he was human, he would probably fall from time to time. He had advised him to pick a kindly priest for confession and not go to a 'Hell raiser'.

Though I have not mentioned it here, there was much actual reason for intense insecurity in his relations with his parents. As opposed to them, the Church offered him a fixed, reliable, not unkindly, socially acceptable authority which they denied him. As with his parents, he tended to buy his security at the price of his own sexual and aggressive strivings, and was constantly torn between his passive submissive trends and his inner necessity for giving more expression to his instinctual needs. At this phase of his treatment things had taken on a much more workable form, and his use of his religion as a defence had ceased.

The resolution of his neurotic utilization of the Church as a security measure did not, of course, solve his problems. It permitted him, however, to move a step nearer to recognizing and dealing with the dynamic factors which had made him ill and had inhibited his capacity for self-expression. Inasmuch as he then saw in me a source of security like the Church, we were in a somewhat better position to work out the complex inter-relationships that faced him relatively free of the Church's moralistic philosophy, which in a compulsive character of this kind lends itself to the most striking misuse which is neither to his own benefit nor to that of the Church. He continued to identify himself with the Church, but with a considerably less 'scrupulous conscience'.

A particular problem which I feel applies in this instance and is also commonly seen in other areas of analytic practice is the tendency on the part of the patient to reject with hostility the once favoured institution or individual. This tends to occur, as in this patient, as a kind of interim stage during the giving up of the institution or individual as a major source of security. It would seem that this hostile use of the institution is a further elaboration of the original problem which it is important for the therapist to be

aware of and to deal with, since it suggests that while the patient has given up much of his peculiarly obsessive use of the institution, he is not free as yet from a neurotic, potentially destructive tie to it. This seems to have been especially true in the patient now in question, since my orientation was not towards ridding him of his tie with a socially acceptable institution, but towards helping him to free himself from his neurotic use of it. It seems to me, in the light of this patient's position in our culture, that there is much to recommend a continuing more 'normal' use of the Church. Consistent with this, at the beginning of his second year of treatment, situations arose in which I responded to his trends toward a rejection of the Church by clarifying some of its more kindly and useful aspects.

There are a few points regarding my own position which I may not have sufficiently emphasized. The early use of my relationship to him as physician permitted me to define the physiological aspects of his masturbation symptoms without setting myself up in opposition to the Church. I felt that by reason of this differentiation in function of physician and Church I could establish myself as having a somewhat different quality, one more helpful to him. This could be based, not on any opposition to his religious trends, but on the fact that he was ill and came to me as a physician in the hope that I could free him from his illness.

In my early dealings with him I did not take issue with his urge to experience guilt. While there seems no question that he was carrying out a highly masochistic performance, yet the compensatory narcissistic gain was of major importance for him. It is my impression that to interrupt this masochistic pattern before the patient has attained sufficient narcissistic satisfactions by other means is to invite a degree of anxiety which he will deal with by terminating the treatment, or, in some instances, by psychosis. It is thus my impression that the 'need to experience guilt' was more or less specifically determined and was not in itself a diffuse disorganized anxiety response, but a defence against such a catastrophe.

When the patient turned to the Church for security, he found no solution, but only intensified his anxiety and hostility, since, from the masochistic position, he could experience the Church only as the parents who prohibited his instinctual needs and punished him for them through his guilt and its projections into the outer world. He could thus not experience the tender, loving aspects of his relation to this authority. Since it was inevitable that some of his aggression should find discharge in connexion with the then threatening Church, it was possible for this to come about through the implied hostility and mockery of 'scrupulous conscience'. In this regard I may mention another of my patients who developed an intense religiosity during his pubertal period, and by means of it was able to give vent to the most extreme aggression towards his father under the guise of converting him to a more 'religious' life.

In view of the magnitude of this young man's fixation at a homosexual level, it is not surprising that there is a substantial correlation between his attitude towards 'God' and his attitude towards a forbidden yet desired sexual object. In his attitude towards 'God' there is visible the intensely ambivalent position one might anticipate. His love object was also intensely hated and feared, both through fear of punishment and through fear that his love would not be reciprocated, and he was in a constant state of dread. This, I believe, was reinforced by the particular nature of the impulse, a homosexual one, which was disguised in it.

To sum up, the technique I employed in dealing with this problem was essentially similar in character to the classic analysis of a distortion of this kind, namely by :

(*a*) Initial refusal to play out the rôle of the priest, and maintaining my position as a therapist;
(*b*) a refusal to establish myself in opposition to the Church;
(*c*) an interpretation of his distorted use of the Church;
(*d*) a gradual interpretation of the patient's efforts to transfer his neurotic use of the Church to me; and
(*e*) a terminal interpretation of his attitude towards the Church as transferred from his earlier attitudes toward his family.

The factors of timing and dependence upon a developing rapport with the patient were probably of prime significance in the successful outcome of this particular problem in treatment.

I should like to deal briefly with this problem as seen by the Catholic Church in so far as it seems to throw further light on this patient's difficulty. The two fields on which I wish to comment are certain sects which broke off from the Church, and the Church's current attitude towards the obsessional.

Of the former, I may mention as an example, the heresy of Encratism (2). This heresy set itself against any indulgence in or enjoyment of natural pleasures. The current view holds that it is false to say that the Church ever taught that there were sins beyond her power of forgiveness. It is looked upon as an error on the part of the first Christians that they demanded even of the weakest the realization of the highest ideal. The Church seems at an early date to have mitigated this requirement, and it was in regard to sins of the flesh that the discipline was first relaxed. The Bishop of Rome decided that such sins could be remitted after a more or less extended period of penance.

In the Church's rejection of this heresy can be observed the efforts of a social institution to maintain its rules at a level at which conformity is possible. When social institutions set up a degree of rigidity which rivals that of the obsessional neurotic, and their punitive attitude denies to the individual members the fulfilment of instinctual needs to too marked a degree, they invite destruction. The Church seems to have anticipated this danger, and to have insisted on an appropriate modification of the rules, turning its censure in this instance on the excessively punitive and rigid tendencies rather than on their opposite. The successful social institution must constantly maintain such plasticity if its social utility is to survive.

As concerns the problem of the obsessional, I will quote from the book, *Priest and Penitent—A Discussion of Confession,* by John Carmel Heenan, D.D. (8). ' A person with a scrupulous conscience is unable to make a right decision either regarding the morality of an action which is only contemplated or regarding the morality of an action which has been accomplished. Scrupulous persons suffer from defective vision in the moral sphere. They cannot distinguish between what is important and what is of no significance. Their normal state of mind is one of torture and doubt. They are never happy in their actions and never satisfied in their considerations of past behaviour. To cure a person of scruples is one of the most difficult tasks which the confessor has to face. First of all, he must decide whether a person is really scrupulous, or whether he is actually unscrupulous and merely posing as one with a conscience which is overtender. A truly scrupulous person will scarcely derive any benefit from this or any book on confession. The reason is that the scrupulous person is almost always intolerably proud. To a moral cowardice which prevents him from bravely facing the issues, there is added an arrogance which refuses to accept priestly advice. The scrupulous person will never believe that the priest has understood his case. However often the confessor may repeat his assurance that the penitent has said all that is required, the latter will persist in the exposition of spiritual ailments. The priest may give his word that all responsibility in the sight of God devolves upon him, the Father Confessor. He will lay down stringent rules not only regarding a manner of living, but also regarding habits of prayer, self-examination and actual confession of sin. But the scrupulous penitent knows better than the Church and better than any confessor. Until he has learned the lesson of humility and learned to obey the confessor, he can have no peace of mind.'

I gather that there is a significant variation within Catholic circles as to the appropriate handling of scrupulosity, at least of a severe degree. By some it is felt to require the active collaboration of a psychiatrist and is looked upon as an emotional disorder (10). It would appear that in this instance the Church, and I should be willing to extend this to all social institutions, is constantly faced with the dilemma of dealing with individual members who are prone to misuse the institution in this obsessive manner, and such utilization is certainly commonly to be observed in the individual relationships of the obsessional neurotic.

The problem of obsessional acts as related to religious practices was, of course, early emphasized by Freud, who stressed the correlation of the obsessional practice as a private religion as opposed to religion as a group variety of obsessional practice. In the particular problem posed by this patient a fusion of these two themes seems to be presented. I feel that the peculiar use of religion in his case differed from the group phenomenon recognized as religion in so far as it tended to divorce him from the group rather than to integrate him with it. In his case the problem therefore presented itself of the push of his obsessional practices away from sublimatory use of formalized religion and the pull of his need to use the gregarious institution; both security measures, but oriented in different directions and to a marked degree mutually exclusive.

Freud, in his paper ' Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices ' (5), emphasized certain points of difference between these two activities.

With regard to religion he postulated the lesser degree of individual variability, the public and communal nature of religious observance, and the differing instinctual origins of religious practice. The first and second points refer to the important element of communicability and socialization allowed by religion, the last marks an interesting departure on Freud's part. To quote : ' The structure of a religion seems also to be founded on the suppression or renunciation of certain instinctual trends; these trends are not, however, as in the neurosis, exclusively components of the sexual instinct, but are egoistic, anti-social instincts, though even these for the most part are not without a sexual element '.

Since that article was written there has been a shift in psycho-analytic thinking in the direction of assigning a far greater rôle to the aggressive instinct. Nevertheless, this differentiation seems still to be pertinent. Freud's examination of the origins of religion traces it to the primal horde and to the solution of the oedipal dilemma. In his consideration of it as a social institution, as a part of the reality with which our patients have to deal, he was inclined even at this early date to lay stress on aggression, seeing the mixture of libidinal and aggressive strivings as the reverse of that in obsessional neurosis.

Freud elaborates on the contribution of libidinal energy to the formation of groups at some length in his ' Postscript ' to *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (6). His thesis is that the inhibited sexual aim lends itself to the creation of social ties, while those sexual instincts which are not inhibited and are thus capable of complete satisfaction incur a loss of energy with each satisfaction which reduces the energy available for such ties. With the conclusion that directly sexual tendencies are unfavourable to the formation of groups, he makes some interesting specific references to the Catholic Church. ' In the great artificial groups, the Church and the Army, there is no room for woman as a sexual object. The love relation between men and women remains outside these organizations. Even where groups are formed which are composed of both men and women, the distinction between the sexes plays no part. There is scarcely any sense in asking whether the libido which keeps groups together is of a homosexual or of a heterosexual nature, for it is not differentiated according to the sexes, and particularly shows a complete disregard for the aims of the genital organization of the libido.

' Even in a person who has in other respects become absorbed in a group, the directly sexual tendencies preserve a little of his individual activity. If they become too strong, they disintegrate every group formation. The Catholic Church had the best of motives for recommending its followers to remain unmarried and for imposing celibacy upon its priests; but falling in love has driven even priests to leave the Church. In the same way love for women breaks through the group ties of race, of national separation, and of the social class system, and it thus produces important effects as a factor in civilization. It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual tendencies—a remarkable fact, the explanation of which might carry us far.'

The group character of the socially approved ritual seems to possess a quality for which I could find no equivalent in the ritual of the obsessive-neurotic. Evidently, as brought out by the practices of such a group as the Catholic Church, the group is at considerable pains to protect itself against individual deviations from the fixed ritual. The group defines what is to be carried out as established ritualistic practice, and condemns not only the delinquency of not carrying out the ritual, but also that of over-conscientiousness in carrying out the established pattern. It is in this latter regard that the group recognizes in its ritualistic performances the danger of the destructive spread of obsessive acts which is so crippling to the individual obsessive neurotic. I have been impressed with the considerable pains to which the group goes to countermand effectually this tendency to spread. This may throw some little light on the relative longevity and cohesiveness of certain ritualistic group practices as opposed to others. In this regard the Catholic Church has demonstrated a somewhat superior capacity, with its considerable skill both in demanding obedience to the ritualistic performances and its constant recognition of and dealing with the danger of the obsessive spread which would eventually destroy it. This argues a certain non-obsessive malleability in an otherwise highly structured group system as suggested in the above-mentioned concept of the ' scrupulous conscience ' and the Encratite heresy.

The question arises whether it is possible to complete a psycho-analysis and have the patient retain his religious beliefs. This issue should be clearly differentiated from another, the scientific investigation of religion as a sociological pheno-

menon and as a systematized ritualistic performance full of cogent symbolism. This latter issue has to do with the justifiable privilege enjoyed by psycho-analysis, as a scientific discipline, of exploring religion as a manifestation of man's activities and using its conclusions to benefit mankind through its discoveries both in the broader sense and by means of their application in therapy. It would appear to me that it is quite another matter when the question is one of individual therapy and of what philosophy of life a patient adopts in order that we may consider analysis at an end. Even if it be proposed that religion is a mass neurosis of world-wide distribution, it is certainly doubtful whether we might reasonably look for cure in our patients in terms of non-participation in this ubiquitous activity. Freud in *The Future of an Illusion* (4) compares religion to a childhood neurosis and states that at some future undefined date man will emerge from it. In his very definition of our current cultural place he accepts the essential normality of this phenomenon and assumes our need to accept it as a legitimate frame of reference in current individual therapy.

If we suggest that religion represents a reasonable reaching out on man's part for a socially acceptable and integrative solution for his oedipal dilemma and his dependence needs, consistent with the current stage of human development, then no issue would be taken with his religious participation. While psycho-analysis does not particularly advocate passive compliance with social forces, it does not on the other hand advocate revolution against existing social institutions. In my opinion, therefore, the retention of religious beliefs and practice would not in itself warrant the conclusion that psychoanalysis had not been successfully completed. Brierley (1) takes a similar position, positing the potential sublimatory value of religion.

'It is important for the psychologist to become fully informed of the archaic-infantile content of dogma and ritual, but this should not lead him to overlook the provision made in ritual and prayer for the satisfaction of impulse and the recovery of otherwise lost instinctual energy in the believer. It soon becomes apparent that Chistianity caters not only for obsessional characters but also for a much greater variety of psychological types. As will be seen later, it can be argued that to a person of truly religious temperament his religion is a sublimation rather than a disease.'

The difference between her view and that of Freud is, however, more apparent than real, since sublimations must inevitably be established with due regard to the stage of man's development and thus for his social institutions at any given time.

Freud closes *The Future of an Illusion* (4A) with the statement, 'No, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what it cannot give us.' This comment presumes that in the ultimate sense there is no substitute for 'knowledge'. While this may be true, it is unlikely, notwithstanding Freud's optimism, that at any conceivable future date sufficient knowledge will be available. Moreover, we cannot assume, in view of our present concept of man, that knowledge in and of itself will ever supply him with enough relief from anxiety to make it unnecessary for him to have illusions, or, as I prefer to call them (4), constructive delusions. Such illusions have the prospects of wider usefulness through structuring into social institutions.

To summarize, I should wish to emphasize again the thesis that the particular use of a social institution by the neurotic individual may be a problem in therapy and should not be confused with the aims of that institution itself. In this paper I have attempted to illustrate the manner in which the tenets of the social institution differ from the distorted use of them as a technique of defence by the individual neurotic. Issue is not taken here with the legitimate rôle that psychoanalytic research plays in the exploration of social institutions. I wish to stress, however, that such research is quite different from the study of the use of such institutions by the individual neurotic in psycho-analytic therapy. It is my hope that some light has been thrown on this critically important distinction.

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DREAM INTERPRETATION IN THE TALMUD

(BABYLONIAN AND GRAECO-ROMAN PERIOD)

By

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In surveying the scientific literature on dreams Freud remarked on the attitude toward dreams which prevailed during classical antiquity: 'They took it as axiomatic that dreams were connected with the world of superhuman beings in whom they believed and that they were revelations from gods and daemons' (1). In the present study I wish to present the thinking of the Hebrews of that same period with regard to the meaning of dreams. Their attitudes and beliefs about the origin, meaning, and interpretation of dreams are embodied in the Babylonian Talmud, which was compiled during the period extending from 200 B.C. to about A.D 300, which may be referred to as the Graeco-Roman Period.

The Talmud is a compilation of the contributions of over 2,000 scholars from various countries, principally Palestine and Babylon. These contributions date from 450 B.C. to about A.D. 500. The Talmud, containing some 6,000 folio pages, is divided into the Palestinian and the Babylonian Talmud. These two separate sets of books are referred to collectively as the Talmud. The Palestinian Talmud is the earlier; the Babylonian was compiled about 200 years later and is considerably larger than the Palestinian.

The Talmud consists of two parts: the Mishnah, containing the first codification of Jewish law since the Bible, and edited by the Patriarch Rabbi Jehuda about 200 B.C.; and the Gemara, which is a commentary on the Mishnah. The scholars of the Mishnah are called the teachers (Tannaim), and the scholars of the Gemara are known as the interpreters (Amoraim). From the literary point of view, the Talmud is composed of two main parts: the Halakah and the Haggadah. The Halakah deals with law. The Haggadah contains metaphysical, theological, philosophical, and historical material; in addition it contains a great deal on traditions, astronomy, mathematics, botany, medicine, psychology, demonology, and dream interpretation.

According to Freud, Herophilus, the Greek physician who lived under the first Ptolemy, around 320 B.C., was the first to speak explicitly of dreams as deriving from wishes. Freud also refers to the Dream Book of Artemidorus of Daldis who lived in the second century A.D. Artemidorus' book he considers as the most complete study of dreams and dream-interpretation as practised in the Graeco-Roman period. In referring to the Hebrew sources of dream interpretations, Freud mentions the biblical dream of Joseph; no reference, however, is to be found in his writings to the extensive dream literature in the Talmud.

In preparing this study, a careful examination was made of the volumes of the Babylonian Talmud and the various extensive writings based on it, yielding no less than 217 references to dreams in the Talmudic literature. These references cover the Hebrew's thoughts about the origin of dreams, their purpose and meaning, wish-fulfilment in dreams, the relation of dreams to reality, the technique of dream interpretation, etc. (2). If assembled in a separate volume this Talmudic material would make a quite impressive Dream Book.

In writing on the origins of the dream theories of the Hebrews, one cannot omit the period of history preceding that of classical antiquity in which the Talmud originated. This pre-history of the Hebrews with its myths, religious beliefs, and customs entered into and influenced later formulations which finally found expression in the Talmud.

The pre-historical period of the Hebrews can be traced back to about 1000 B.C., when David conquered Jerusalem. With this conquest the Hebrews gave up their nomadic life and settled down among the Canaanites, Assyrians, Baby-

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lonians, and Egyptians. The religious doctrines and mysticism as well as the social and cultural life of the surrounding peoples influenced the Hebrews' mode of life and customs. This influence, of course, extended also to their concept of dreams. They were particularly influenced by Babylonian customs and traditions, and by Greek and Roman culture.

The sages of the Talmudic period, who understood their people well, knew how to use this mystical material to shape Hebrew life. Dream interpretation was used by the sages and rabbis for that purpose; dreams were interpreted as having ethical and religious significance as well as prophesying the future, and thus were used to mould religious, social, and political behaviour and thought. Dreams became a source of guidance for the heads of the colleges in making decisions on moral and spiritual matters, and were used quite frequently in this manner. Teachers were able to appeal to the popular imagination through dream interpretations.

This dream literature in the Talmud clearly bears the marks of Babylonian, Greek, and Roman influence, as indicated earlier. Many passages in the Haggadah describe dialogues between the various leaders and princes of the Hebrews on the one hand, and the Caesars, Cleopatra, and Ptolemy on the other.

The Hebrew conceptions must also have influenced Artemidorus' ideas about dreams. In his wide travels, Artemidorus collected many ideas on the subject. He cites many dreams, along with their interpretations, which are similar to the Talmudic dream interpretations. The symbols which Artemidorus uses are identical with those which appear in Talmudic dreams, but their meaning and the interpretation of the symbols are frequently not identical.

In general, ancient peoples believed that dreams were sent by the gods to guide human beings in their decisions and actions. Moreover, they regarded dreams as either favourable or hostile manifestations. This belief was held by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, and especially by the Babylonians, with whom the Hebrews had so much contact, especially during the Diaspora, and from whose culture they borrowed so extensively. The Haggadah contains many references to the divine nature and prophetic significance of dreams, as well as to their wish-fulfilment aim. In addition, the Hebrews considered the antagonistic forces in the human mind to be a source of dreams. Among the supernatural powers which may be the source of dreams, they included evil spirits, daemons, the returning dead, and the wandering soul (3).

The wandering soul was described as consisting of two parts—Ruach and Neshomo. Neshomo departs in sleep and travels all over the world. What it sees and experiences forms the content of the dream. Emissaries of the supernatural power may appear to the dreamer, the emissary being either an angel or a daemon. They appear to help, to warn or to punish. Sometimes a dead father will appear to his son in a dream to advise him in the solution of a difficult problem (4). Many examples of such dreams are cited in the Haggadah. Living persons may also appear in a dream for the above purposes, but in the literature they appear to do so less frequently.

Artemidorus also believed in the divine origin of dreams and considered daemons instrumental in their production. Socrates thought of dreams as originating from the gods, and thus ascribed a prophetic meaning to them.

The influence of Graeco-Roman dream concepts and theories is clearly shown in the Talmud in connection with the Hebrews' visits to dream oracles in cases of sickness, and also their indulgence in divining and probing dreams stimulated artificially. We find many instances of warnings and prohibitions against such practices on the part of the teachers and the heads of the various academies.

It was probably under pressure of the custom prevalent among the general population of imitating the Greeks and Romans that the Hebrews also visited the Temple of Aesculapius in order to practise incubation for provoking dreams, the purpose of which was the healing of the sick. The repeated warnings and prohibitions indicate that the artificial provoking of dreams was widely practised.

We find occasional expressions of opinion on the part of some Rabbis that dreams have no meaning. Rabbi Meir, for example, was of this opinion; Rabbi Nathan, on the other hand, believed that they do have meaning (5). Later, however, Talmudic sages completely accepted the idea that dreams have meaning and that they can be excited artificially, but it was strictly forbidden to use artificial means such as incubation (6).

We can ascertain two trends according to which the origin of dreams is explained in the Talmud : first, dreams have an *external* source —they come from higher powers, from God or

His angels (prophetic dreams), or from daemons (warning, threatening, and punishment dreams); second, they have an *internal* source : they have a psychological origin. Rabbi Jonathan expressed this as follows : ' The man is shown in the dream what he thinks in his heart ' (7). There are references to dreams originating from mental activity, the inner powers of the sleeper. In this category the Talmud places dreams originating from the thoughts of the day, and cites as an example the case of Rabbi Joshua and the Emperor Hadrian. The Emperor asked the Rabbi, ' Of what shall I dream tonight? ' Rabbi Joshua told him that he would dream of how the Persians would mishandle him. The Emperor Hadrian thought about this the whole day and did dream about it at night (8).

In ascribing the origin of the dream to the individual's inner powers, the Hebrew concept was and is that there is always a struggle in man's soul between two inclinations—the good, the higher ambitions (Yetzer Tob) and the impulses which are immoral and impure (called Yetzer Hara). This struggle finds expression in dreams.

The various references to dreams in the Talmud can be grouped under the following categories : the origin of dreams; the purpose of dreams; prophetic and wish-fulfilment dreams; nightmares and erotic dreams; punishment dreams, expiation, and changing bad dreams to good; and the technique of dream interpretation. In addition to these topics there are also discussions of the relation of the dream to reality, dreams without meaning, and the problem of not dreaming.

As to the purposes of dreams, the Talmud considered them important in influencing the life and behaviour of the individual. Mention is made, for example, of the importance a king's dream has, which will concern the whole world, i.e. the king's action as a result of the dream may have a great influence on the world situation. This has its parallel in Artemidorus' description of the importance of a ruler's dream. The Talmud further enumerates dreams with political content, which may have the effect of influencing politics; dreams which may influence an individual to change his religion; dreams which may make one remember important rulings and laws —for instance, the dream of Rab (9), who was reminded of a forgotten Halakals (Law) in his dream.

The Talmud attributed many meanings to a dream, just as our present concept attributes several wish-fulfilment elements to the same dream. The general Talmudic opinion added to this the belief that no dream is ever fully realized, whether good or bad, because every dream contains both truth and untruth. The Talmud compares it to rye which does not exist without straw; in the same way, no dream exists without being partly worthless (10).

The dreams in which a wish is most likely to be fulfilled are the early morning dreams. This realization of the dream wish is especially emphasized in the relationship of dreams to sickness. Rabbi Abraham (11) enumerates the following bodily activities as good omens for recovery when they occur in sickness : sneezing, perspiration, sleeping, dreaming, and seminal emission. This is paralleled by Aristotle's contention that dreams show signs of what goes on inside the body; he cautions physicians to take careful account of their patients' dreams.

The belief that dreams foretell the future led people to try to produce dreams by means of incubation. These magical ways of producing dreams are given special attention in the Talmud. As mentioned above, the Rabbis preached against it, but it was practised nevertheless; as time went on, however, it became a partly approved practice. The Talmud mentions that Rabbi Jose, who lived during the reign of Diocletian, fasted eighty days in order to see the dead Rabbi Chiyya the Great, who finally appeared to him. The practice of incubation was due to the influence of the Romans and Greeks, who frequently consulted oracles of the dead. In the tractate *Sanhedrin* it is mentioned that one may sleep on the grave of a dead person so as to dream and receive some message from the dead (12). But sleeping on a grave was considered dangerous because of the evil spirits which hover over the graves (13). Artemidorus held a contrary belief, that one cannot ask the gods for a dream, nor can dreams be artificially produced. According to his theory only unexpected or unlooked-for dreams can be considered as of divine origin.

Another method of producing dreams, according to the Talmud, is to pray for good dreams or for the nullification or changing of bad dreams. Prayers against bad dreams were established by Rabbi Jona. Rabbi Jehuda's advice was to ask God for good dreams. He remarks that one should wish for three things which are of great importance : a good king, a good year, and a good dream. Before going to sleep one

prays for peaceful sleep and also asks not to be troubled by bad thoughts or bad dreams (14). One should pray for good dreams because dreams always deal with the future (15). This custom has survived up to the present. On the High Holy Days, when the *cohen* blesses the community during service, the community prays for the elimination, nullification, and changing of bad thoughts and dreams. In *Berakoth* (16) we read, 'If a dream spirit tells a man "Tomorrow you will die", he should not despair. Prayer and good deeds help.'

The custom of praying for dreams probably derived from the Babylonians, who had prayers for good dreams. The Greeks offered sacrifices for good dreams: they offered sacrifices of wine, etc., to Hermes in order not to have bad dreams.

Another mode of changing bad dreams to good was suggested by Rabbi Huna, according to whom a disturbing dream should be told to three persons, who then pronounce, 'It is good and will remain good. God will turn it into good.' Among the Greeks an individual told his bad dreams to the Sun, for the belief held by the Greeks was that the light breaks the bad spell and disperses the demons of darkness.

Rabbi Chisda believed that a bad dream is worse than being punished by beating. Good dreams were important because, as the Talmud puts it, good dreams were considered the cause of happy feelings. Whenever the Talmud refers to bad dreams it also refers to demons who appear in these dreams, and who torture the sleeper (17). The Talmud has many references to fights between human beings and demons, and these were looked upon as punishment dreams. They frighten the dreamer, and the fright itself is a punishment. Dreams in which one is tortured by demons or evil spirits can be influenced by prayer and good deeds as well as by fasting (18). One may also pray to forget a dream (19), but the strongest antidote to bad dreams is fasting (20).

Nightmares the Talmud connects with sexual sensations and excitement. The demon who causes erotic dreams is described in the Talmud as hairy and resembling a goat (very much like the faun of the Romans. Another well-known demon who causes such erotic dreams is Lilith. The Talmud believes that she attacks those persons who sleep alone in the house (21). Lilith may take on a masculine or a feminine form. She appears in a female form when approaching men and in a male form when approaching women (22).

Lilith was probably taken over by the Hebrews from the Babylonians (23) ('Lilu' and 'Lilitu' in Assyrian and Babylonian). The Greeks knew her under the form of Empusae (forcers-in) = Incubus.

These demons torture the sleeper with erotic feelings, especially during afternoon sleep. The Rabbis of the Talmud made provisions for the dreamer of such erotic dreams so that he may not feel guilty. They declared that seminal emissions as a result of such dreams were not the responsibility of the dreamer. Rabbi Huna states, 'Even if the emission is connected with feelings of gratification, the dreamer is not responsible, because it was not real sexual intercourse.'

The symbols in the Talmudic dream interpretation correspond to the symbols which appear in the proverbs in Hebrew folklore and myths. A woman was symbolized in a dream by a house (24). The door of the house also symbolized a woman. A dream of Raba (25) is as follows: 'I saw the outer door of a house collapse.' Interpretation: a woman will die.

Teeth in a dream refer to members of the family (26). Birds in a dream refer to human beings, and may also function as sexual symbols. Pigeons in a dream always represent women; for example, a man tells a dream in which he saw a pigeon returning to his bed; interpretation: the man had intercourse with many women (27). The raven is usually a male sexual symbol. A dream is told in which someone sees a raven return to his wife's bed. Interpretation: the woman had sex relations with many men (28). Artemidorus also refers to the raven as a wrecker of marriages and a thief; this interpretation is suggested to him by the black colour of the raven and by the changing of his voice. The owl and the bat appear in the Talmud as bad omens because they are night birds and prey upon other birds. They were thought of as the embodiment of the spirits of the dead. The snake in the Talmud, however, was a good omen. This interpretation was shared by the Greeks and the Romans, for whom snakes were household gods. Artemidorus speaks of snakes as dangerous, but at times he considers them to be of good omen. The hen in the Talmud refers to fertility, suggested by her many eggs.

The various fruits and plants had symbolic sexual significance. A dream in which a man poured oil on an olive tree was interpreted to mean that he slept with his mother in the dream (29), a tree branching out representing the

woman, and the oil having its obvious significance. (This is one of many incest dreams mentioned in the Talmud.) Another dream is cited in which a man saw the shadow of a myrtle tree above him as he was lying under the tree. Interpretation : he slept with a woman in the dream, the woman on top and the man underneath. In general, the myrtle symbolized the engaged girl, because of its universal use for the bride at weddings. The grapevine also symbolized woman because of the vines pregnant with grapes, the grapes referring to the breasts.

Oedipal and incestuous dreams were well known and were correctly interpreted. A dream in which a man slept with his mother is interpreted euphemistically : ' You slept with rationality ' (30). This interpretation attempts to spare the dreamer's embarrassment and possible sense of guilt. The interpretation refers to a Biblical verse which reads : ' Call rationality Mother.' In the same fashion, a dream in which a man sleeps with his sister was interpreted by citing the Biblical verse : ' Speak to wisdom—you are my sister.' The dream then would mean that the dreamer will be wise, just as in the first dream the dreamer will be rational.

He who dreams about sleeping with a married woman will have a share in the hereafter; this applies only if he does not know her and did not think of her in the evening. The interpretation refers to the belief that sexual intercourse constitutes a sixtieth part of the pleasures of Paradise. Artemidorus considered such dreams as of evil intent because they may lead to the breaking up of a marriage (31).

To be nude in the dream meant to be without sin, the nudity probably symbolizing the purity of the new-born baby. The moon always symbolized a woman, just as for the Romans the moon was feminine and the sun always represented a man.

A man came to Rabbi Ishmael and said : ' I dreamed that one of my eyes kissed the other eye.' The Rabbi replied : ' You should be dead; you slept with your sister ' (32). According to Artemidorus also, the right eye symbolizes the son, brother, and father; the left eye symbolizes the daughter, sister, and mother.

Dreams with castration content are also mentioned in the Talmud, the loss of parts of the body—hands, legs, teeth, or hair. These were interpreted in a euphemistic way. The general interpretation was that a person afflicted by such a loss in his dreams would have an easier life. If one has no hands, one will not have to use one's hands for work and struggle. If one loses a foot, he will ride on a horse or be carried about, which also will make his life easier.

The dream interpeters in the Talmud sometimes used anagrams or plays on words, and at times interpreted from the double meaning of a word. In order to find a meaning for a dream, a word was divided into parts, or the interpretation was taken from the sound of the word in the dream. Interpretation through play on words : Bar Qappara said to Rabbi Jehuda ha-Nasi (compilator of the Mishnah), ' In my dream I saw that my nose fell down.' Rabbi Jehuda answered, ' Violent anger was diverted from you.' ' Nose ' in Hebrew, ' ap '—also means ' anger ' (33).

Dreams may mean the opposite of their manifest content. Rabbi Chisda says : 'A bad dream is better than a good dream ' (34).

The interpretation was always provided solely by the interpreter, and not through the dreamer's associated thoughts. Talmudic and ancient interpretation in general was based on the associations which the dream evoked in the interpreter's mind.

Aristotle in *De Divinatione per Somnum* states (as quoted by Freud) : ' The best interpreter of dreams was the man who could best grasp similarities; . . . the most successful interpreter is the man who can detect the truth from the misshapen picture ' (35).

The Talmud makes a distinction between good and bad interpreters, and mention is made of the great number of interpreters in the same community. *Berakoth* (36) notes that there were twenty-four dream interpreters in Jerusalem at one time, and Rabbi Bana stated that he visited all of them. He remarked, ' What one did not interpret to me the other did, and all interpretations were realized in the end.' The Talmud advises that the interpreter should be paid lest he be influenced in his interpretation.

The interpreter's rôle was important because his interpretation might have an important bearing on the subsequent actions of the dreamer in waking life.

The dream interpreter is advised by the Talmud to consider the dreamer's personality, his various life circumstances, his age, his occupation, economic circumstances, state of happiness or unhappiness, how troubled or relaxed he was at the time of dreaming, etc. The dream can then be interpreted from many angles and in different ways. For instance, the occupation of the

dreamer is important because the dream may be interpreted in relation to it (37). Naturally, the interpreter must be well versed in the various languages which the dreamer speaks, so that the idioms of those languages will be known to him.

The Rabbis advised that some dreams should not be interpreted at all, because they might contain some unfavourable predictions.

The outstanding characteristics of Talmudic dream interpretation were to prophesy the future and to serve the wish-fulfilment function. Both contain much truth. As Freud said, ' . . . The ancient belief that dreams foretell the future is not wholly devoid of truth. By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are, after all, leading us into the future. But this future which the dreamer pictures as the present has been moulded by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of the past.'

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(1) FREUD. *Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., Vol. I, p. 2.

(2) Particularly valuable sources of reference are: the *Monumenta Talmudica*, and the five volumes of *En-Jacob*, which is a compilation of the Haggadah of the Babylonian Talmud, by Rabbi Jacob ibn Chabib.

(3) *Shabbath*, 152B; *Hagigah*, 5B; *Berakoth*, 55B.

(4) *Shabbath*, 11B.

(5) *Horayoth*, 13B.

(6) *Sanhedrin*, 65B.

(7) *Berakoth*, 55B.

(8) *Berakoth*, 56A.

(9) *Sanhedrin*, 81A; 82B.

(10) *Berakoth*, 55A.

(11) *Berakoth*, 57B.

(12) *Sanhedrin*, 65B; *Berakoth*, 18B.

(13) *Gittin*, 71; *Niddah*, 17A.

(14) *Berakoth*, 60B.

(15) *Berakoth*, 55.

(16) *Berakoth*, 10.

(17) *Shabbath*, 30B.

(18) *Berakoth*, 51 and 55.

(19) *Berakoth*, 55B.

(20) *Shabbath*, 11A.

(21) *Shabbath*, 151A.

(22) See also references *Gittin*, 68A, and *Pesahim*, 11B.

(23) For further reference: 'The Anathema of the Dead Mother', by S. LORAND, in *Psychoanalysis and Social Sciences*, Vol. I. (New York: Int. Univ. Press.)

(24) *Shabbath*, 118B.

(25) *Berakoth*, 56A.

(26) See: 'The Symbolism of Teeth in Dreams', by S. LORAND and S. FELDMAN, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1955, **36**, Part 3.

(27) *Berakoth*, 56A.

(28) *Berakoth*, 56B.

(29) *Berakoth*, 56B.

(30) *Berakoth*, 57A.

(31) *Berakoth*, 57A.

(32) *Berakoth*, 56B.

(33) *Berakoth*, 56B.

(34) *Berakoth*, 55A.

(35) FREUD: *Interpretation of Dreams*, Standard Ed., Vol. I, p. 97.

(36) *Berakoth*, 55.

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ON THE ORIGIN OF MAN AND THE LATENCY PERIOD[1]

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The latency period is a phase of human development which has in recent years become a much debated problem. While very contradictory views are expressed in psycho-analytic literature (1, 2, 4) as to its universal occurrence, the assumptions as to the course it takes are in close agreement.

Let us begin with a historical review of the theory of latency. In his *Three Essays* (7) Freud propounded the doctrine of *infantile sexuality* followed by the *latency period* until, finally, mature genital sexuality unfolds in puberty. He considered that these phases of development and their time sequence are determined biologically, i.e. by a hereditary tendency. The latency period is characterized by the relative regression of the manifestations of instinct. Strong intrapsychic barriers against infantile sexuality are erected in the form of shame, disgust, sense of guilt, and moral ideas. Later, the ' first flourishing period ' (*Blüteperiode*)—evoked by the erogenic zone—was known as the phallic period, and also described, in view of the object-relations, as the Oedipus phase. During this phase, there occurs a far-reaching co-ordination of the partial impulses under the supremacy of the genitals, i.e. of the phallus, and all sexual drives are directed towards a single person (10). The attitude to the father is ambivalent, the object drive towards the mother affectionate: this is the content of the simple Oedipus complex in the boy (9). But the relations are much more complex since the simple Oedipus complex is found only very seldom, and in most cases the complete Oedipus complex has to be expected. Ambivalence of the emotions towards both parents is probably the rule.

The Oedipus complex is, however, destined to extinction; in the boy, it is shattered by the fear of castration; in the girl, its fate is somewhat different. Here *latency* sets in.

Freud had ' no doubt that the temporal and causal relations described between Oedipus complex, sexual intimidation (the threat of castration), formation of the superego and advent of the latency period are of a typical kind ' (11). Anna Freud supplemented this causal sequence by representing the significance of latency for the development of the ego. She says: ' While the sex drives remain latent (latency period), the ego assumes superiority, directs the actions of the child, establishes the reality principle and effects the first real adaptations to the exigencies of the outside world ' (6). But even before the advent of actual latency, during the phallic period, many ego functions are already considerably developed and differentiated, among others the following: *postponement* of the discharge of instinctual energy in view of conflicts between instincts, the endurance of some *storing up* of libidinous and aggressive instinctual energy (tension tolerance), development of various defensive mechanisms. Though there are still many gaps in our knowledge of the specific connexions, there seems to be justification for the general conclusion that a definite differentiation of the ego, with its instinct-controlling, reality-testing, and synthetic activity, is a prerequisite in order for latency to occur at all.

As Lampl-de Groot (20) observes so aptly, ' . . . the ego has actually ', as early as the phallic phase, ' acquired a sense of reality, naturally in interplay with the instinctual development and under the influence of the environment. The ego has overcome magical thinking and the magical attitude towards the outer world to a considerable extent; it has developed its integrative powers, to such an extent that ambivalent attitudes are no longer directed towards one single object, but can be divided between father and mother; it has formed the necessary reactive and defensive mechanisms, which have transformed or warded off such instinctual tendencies as disturb the object-relationship.'

Thus we see, at the outset of the first phase of latency, between five-and-a-half and eight years,

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an ego which is faced with new tasks qualitatively and quantitatively of a high order. (i) It wages a defensive war against the instinctual impulses. (ii) It is exposed to the threats of the newly established superego, which is at first still rigid and harsh, and, for the present, forms a foreign body in the personality (1). (iii) The ego has a great integrative task to perform. It must co-ordinate the sadistic, aggressive, sexual 'imagines' of the 'primal scene parents' with those of the moral authorities (parents), which prohibit the instinctual impulses (16). The de-sexualized and de-aggressivized parent-images become the nucleus of the ego-ideal. During the latency period, the first permanent character traits are formed. Freud's original formula may therefore be supplemented thus: *the temporal and causal relations between Oedipus complex, sexual deterrent, ego development, establishment of a superego, and advent of the latency period are typical.*

In Freud's conception, the latency period—let me emphasize this once again—is determined by biological-hereditary causes in human ontogenesis, in the same way as the ontogenetic sequence of the other phases of development of the libido, the oral, anal, and phallic periods and puberty. Recently, however, various writers have cast doubts upon the inevitable occurrence of latency (Buxbaum (2), Devereux (4)). According to them, the latency period is not such a definitely determined fundamental phase of psychosexual development as the others. Devereux attempts to prove by the example of the Mohave community that where the community in general, and the parents in particular, are gentle, tolerant, and free from the sense of guilt in their own sexual relations, a 'behavioural latency' does not occur, and the psychological processes characteristic of latency are reduced, qualitatively and quantitatively, to a minimum, though they are not completely absent. It is not denied, however, that here too the Oedipus complex and the primal scene have a traumatic effect, even if only to a moderate extent, and evoke the known attitudes and phantasies which usually accompany latency.

From the fact that the Oedipus complex and the fear of castration are universal, while the latency period is not, these authors conclude that the emergence of a latency period depends on experiences during the oedipal period, and not on hereditary, palaeopsychological, or intrapsychic factors.

The occurrence of the latency period has, however, apart from its ontogenetic significance, also a phylogenetic aspect. Here too Freud has propounded a fundamental question. He has shown that the dichronous inception of sexual development, with a sexual latency period between, is specifically a human phenomenon, and it is questionable whether a corresponding period occurs among the higher animals (7). In later publications, Freud speaks still more plainly, postulating an inner connexion between the evolution of the latency period and the genesis of Man: '. . . the postponement, and the beginning twice over, of sexual life has much to do with the transition of humanity' (Freud (13), p. 121). Further: 'Here we come upon the fact that the onset of sexual life is diphasic, that it occurs in two waves; this is unknown except in man and evidently has an important bearing upon his genesis' (12).

The interest in the development of the human psyche from early animal stages, the attitude to the question whether there are transitions in development between man and animal, or whether, on the contrary, there are essential differences is, in this post-Darwinian age, still actual. As shown by a recent survey (22), differences in intelligence, symbolic function, and the dependence on the dominance of the instincts were cited as fundamental arguments, and interpreted sometimes as betokening essential differences, sometimes as differences of degree. But the only qualitatively new idea which Aristotle or the Fathers of the Church had not already mooted, is Freud's observation that the appearance of a sexual latency period is an exclusively human phenomenon. In any case, biology has not yet been able to answer in the affirmative Freud's question whether latency occurs in the higher animals. We may, therefore, assume 'that the formation of the latency period was the most essential phenomenon in decisively determining the difference between man and animal' (19).

Psycho-analysis, therefore, makes the *evolution of the latency period* the pivot of the question of Man's origin. There have been—so far as I know—three psycho-analysts who have made a biological investigation into the question of whether, and if so how, under the influence of what factors, the latency period emerged in the phylogenetic process of the genesis of man. The first was Ferenczi, who laid down the hypothesis that our ancestors must have lived in extremely favourable circumstances, and that this paradisal existence was shattered by a stupendous

geological upheaval, the irruption of the glacial period. But for the danger which the ice-age brought with it, Man's development would have been arrested (5). In a very recent publication, Hans Lampl (19) supports Ferenczi's hypothesis, and supplements it by saying that the change occurred *via* the endocrine system. He maintains that the physical inhibition imposed by the danger from without modified the endocrine development, and that this, in turn, led to the emergence of the sexual latency period. He traces the development through the following stages :

1. Uninhibited primitive man;
2. Glacial period;
3. Man who has evolved inhibitions of instinctual drives;
4. Hormonal changes;
5. Latency period and development of present-day type of man.

This evolutionary hypothesis, which recalls Cuvier's ' catastrophe theory ', has very significant gaps in it. (i) The fiction on which the hypothesis rests, to wit, the ' extremely favourable circumstances ' of the pre-ice age, is borne out by no anthropological or zoological data. (ii) Nowadays, we expect of an evolutionary theory that it should indicate more specific connexions between the different changes. The origin of man in general and the latency period in particular are characterized by the evolution of the human ego organization, with its inherent hostility to instinct ' (6), its capacity for equilibrating opposite instinctual tensions, of postponing discharge, of testing reality. It is not at all clear how an ice-age with its climatic conditions, bringing scarcity of food, could elicit just such psychical changes in the course of phylogenesis. But it is just these questions which an evolutionary hypothesis of the human latency period should tend to elucidate. Imre Hermann (14) differs from this view. He holds that '*the emergence of human latency may be traced to two elements : a psychosocial,* rooted in the essence of the primate (*dominance of the stronger*); the other a *biological, peculiar to the genus,* which arrests the recapitulation of the phylogenetic periods of maturity and *is connected in an intelligible manner with the formation of the super-ego.*'

Freud's view that there is an inner connexion between human latency and human genesis is one of those assumptions which has not since been followed up, and is backed by no factual evidence. Hermann's theory of psychosocial elements rooted in the nature of the Primates is, in my judgement, correct, but it too needs empirical material for its support.

The purpose of the following remarks is to specify the psychosocial factors, in so far as this seems possible at present, on the basis of researches and hypotheses dealing with the life of the apes (Primates). These studies lead to the conclusion—if I may anticipate observations to be discussed later—that the special physiology of the sexual function and the social life of these animals create conditions such that individual variability in certain psychical functions has a special relation to sexual selection, i.e. to the possibility of propagating the species. These psychic functions—varying with the individual —are the following : (i) to postpone *for a long time* the discharge of instinctual energy; (ii) to dam up libidinous and aggressive tensions: (iii) to control the aggressive impulse; (iv) to equilibrate conflicting instinctual tensions, to endure the permanent conflict, and to act with prudence . . . ' the primates . . . differ from all other mammals, in that the particular type of social conflict is an ever-present element in the life of several species. We can infer that, in the setting of primate society, this conflict has a pronounced selective action on the breeding performance of individuals within the group, and thus will have evolutionary consequences of a very high order ' (3).

In the following pages, the physiology and the social behaviour of the apes will be described, in order, finally, to indicate the evolutionary results of these relations on the development of the psychic functions described above and on the evolution of the human ego.

Mating behaviour

According to Zuckerman (26) there are three types of mating behaviour among mammals : (i) The male is potent at all times, and the female has several periods within the year. The reproductive cycle changes from anoestrus to oestrus, and the female is receptive to the male during the oestrus only. The animals mate when a male meets a female who is in oestrus. Mating is a relatively brief episode in relation to the life of the individual (e.g. rodents).

(ii) Mating depends on definite mating seasons, which begin and end almost simultaneously in the two sexes. The mating period is much shorter than the asexual interval. During

mating, the males fight (marine mammals, Ungulata).

(iii) The third type is characteristic of the anthropoid apes. The male is always potent, the female receptive, not only during oestrus, but throughout the cycle.

A further feature of this type is that the sexual attractiveness of the female is strongest when the mucous membranes of the outer genitals are swollen, and other anatomical changes occur. In the apes, this period of great attraction covers from a quarter to a third of the cycle; in the other mammals it is much shorter (about one-eighth). Among the apes who live in a community, the female usually mates only with a male with whom she is familiar and on friendly terms. Typically, these animals mate only when the female's genitals are swollen—including the time of ovulation. At other times, the male ignores the female sexually, or, if he approaches her, she usually repels him.

These diverse mating relations have far-reaching consequences for the frequency with which the males of a species are sexually stimulated—or, in other words, for the length of time spent in sexual excitement in proportion to the lifetime of the individual. The males are *sexually excited* when they are in a state of physiological readiness, and when they meet a female who is also in a physiological state of sexual attractiveness. The length of the period of attraction—in relation to the reproductive cycle—varies widely between the different species of mammals, as we have said before. No less variable is the chance that a male will meet such a female. It depends, among other things, on the number of females in proportion to that of the males, how densely the area is inhabited by the animals, and so forth. Among the animals who live in a community, the probability of such a meeting is, of course, greatest.

From the length of the period of sexual attraction and the chance of a meeting between the sexes, the length of time during which the individuals of the different species of mammals are sexually excited may be computed. Chance and Mead (3) have made such a calculation. It shows that the male apes living in a community spend about 80–90 per cent. of their lives under conditions of sexual excitement: those of other species of mammals, 20–24 per cent.

Social life

Their peculiar mating circumstances, their constant sexual excitement, set a distinctive stamp on the ape community. From the abundant material which Chance and Mead have compiled on the basis of Zuckerman's and Carpenter's investigation in the wild, I will here select only what is relevant to our present theme.

I shall seek to show that, owing to the changed relation between mating behaviour and fertility in the female, the capacity of the subordinate male to postpone for a long time the discharge of instinctual impulses and to control instinctual conflicts is the prerequisite for his taking part—in a later phase of his life—in the propagation of the species. The control of the instinctual life—the libidinous and aggressive impulses—acquires thus an evolutionary significance, for in selection those males are favoured who excel in these respects.

In the ape community, sexual attractiveness forms the ultimate bond which unites the individuals. ' The emergence of this feature to prominence in their behaviour has created primate society ' (3). According to Carpenter, this bond persists in the present-day species for long periods even without primary or overt sexual activity. If we bear in mind the facts retailed above, we are led to the assumption that something which recalls the human libidinous object-relations is already to be found at this phylogenetic stage.

The participation of the male in sexual activities, which comprise not only cohabitation but also ' courtship ', preliminary love-play, and all manner of sporting with the female, is regulated in almost every species by the *dominance relation*. The main effect of dominance is that the immature males are excluded from access to the females. The male may take initiative in sexual and non-sexual sporting of every kind (unlike the other mammals) during every phase of the female's cycle. Enmity may, therefore, flare up at any time between the males. The males are, however, the more excited to sexual behaviour—and, *ceteris paribus*, to conflict—the more females in the attractive phase are present. In general, the longer the interval during which attractive females are at hand, the more pronounced are the sexual initiative and the aggressiveness of the males. The females have the most exciting effect on the males when their genital mucous membranes are most swollen; but even less attractive females, that is, those less swollen, can have a provocative effect, if several are together.

The manner in which the males assert their

dominance over the others varies from species to species. Most conspicuous is dominance in respect of the attractive females. The approach to one of these by a competing male is an occurrence which provokes the instantaneous intervention of the proprietor. On the other hand, sporting with an unattractive lady, even coitus, is tolerated in some species. The 'beauties', that is, the swollen ladies, are, in all species, the preserve of the dominating male.

In spite of this, an actual battle is much rarer than one might suppose. The conflicts occur within spatial distances. When a male shows himself in the neighbourhood of an attractive female—within a specific circle—the dominant male assumes a threatening attitude and his menacing gestures become the more violent the nearer the rival ape approaches the female. The expression and attitude of the proprietor usually suffice to cause the intruder to withdraw from the enticing but dangerous domain. In this way a dominant male can maintain his supremacy for long periods, without actually having to fight for it.

In some circumstances, however, it may come to a fight between the ruler and a young 'bachelor', whether because the younger ape can no longer endure the sexual tension or because the balance between the suppression by fear and the stimulation of aggressive impulses —the regular result of threats—in him is shifted. If the battle ends in his victory, as sometimes happens, the stability of the group is as a rule maintained, the only change being that the conqueror takes the place of the conquered. Sometimes general battles occur within the group when the dominant male is not forceful enough to repel immediately any approach to his females. Chance and Mead (3) make the following concluding statement: 'It is possible . . . to show that the social relations of mature males are regulated by the dominance of one male over another in all species of infra-human primates on which observations have been made in the world or in comparatively free-ranging conditions. This dominance is exerted by threat, which in many instances is directed by facial expression, but which may also be expressed in the body posture of the high-ranking males.'

The existence of relatively prolonged periods of stable relations within the group must, therefore, be ascribed to the dominant relations within it, and this implies in turn that *one animal is suppressing his approach with respect to another.*[2]

We see, therefore, that the most decisive occurrences in the primal herd which Freud assumes and has transferred to the pre-history of Man, but which the anthropologists doubt (Kroeber, 1928, 1929), are real occurrences, even if—at least to-day—only at the infra-human stage.

After this survey of the sexual and social behaviour of the sub-human Primates, an attempt will be made to form some assumptions as to the *psychodynamics* underlying it. The sexual attractiveness of the female is counterbalanced by the threats of the more dominant male. Libidinous, object-directed impulses are thus inhibited by fear of another object. The sexual life of these organisms unfolds, and is obstructed in reaching its goal, within a triangular situation. Even after a male is fully mature, and has been so favoured as to become dominant, *his sexuality remains permanently within this triangle.* For the present, we cannot decide to designate this interplay of forces, which is analogous to the human Oedipus complex, as the Oedipus conflict of the sub-human Primates. But we certainly do not go too far in calling it *the animal preliminary stage of the Oedipus conflict.* The difference between the human Oedipus conflict and its sub-human preliminary stage lies in the different fates attending them: (i) the male ape remains his whole life long within this triangle; his whole sexual life is enacted within it, he must continually assert his dominance against his rivals. He never outgrows the triangle. The Oedipus conflict, which in Man is an *infantile* stage of development, represents, therefore, the human repetition of a *final* stage of animal development—if we regard the mature, and not the ageing, individual as the final stage of ontogenesis. (ii) There are no observed facts which point to the assumption that the triangle situation is in any way 'interiorized'. In order to check the object-libidinous impulses of a male, the spatial, visually perceptible presence of the dominant male is needed. We may supplement this statement by adding that all the modes of behaviour here described depend on the spatial distance from each other of the individuals within the triangle. For instance, the dominant male is quite willing to tolerate the spatial proximity of another male if the latter is far enough off from an attractive female. The psycho-

[2] My italics.

dynamic of this triangular situation is not so simple as at first appears. It is wrong to suppose that the inner psychic conflict consists in a struggle between object-libido and fear of the other, threatening male. The threat situation itself, as Tinbergen shows (24, 25), represents a compromise product between contrary instinctual urges : the aggressive tendency to attack the antagonist and the tendency to flee from him (fear).

The special *evolutionary significance of the behaviour of the young, not yet dominant male* depends upon three facts : (i) the progenitors of the species are the few dominant males, because they alone have access to the attractive or fertile females. The sexual play and coital intercourse of the subordinate, or younger, males with the females who are in dioestrus, have no procreative consequences. (ii) The extreme vulnerability of the young males. (iii) The fact that sexual maturity is reached long before the young male attains full stature and develops his physical strength. If, therefore, a young male is not quick enough in retreating from the dangerous area of the triangle, and so provokes the dominant male to attack him, his defeat is certain.

An unsuccessful battle with a dominant male has, however, grievous and fateful consequences for an immature male. Not only are his chances of getting the upper hand in later fights reduced, but his sexual potency is also jeopardized. ' . . . the immature male primate is not only in danger of failing to reach a sufficient degree of dominance, but also of serious impairment of its mating behaviour . . . ' if its behaviour in the conflict is ineffective, and it cannot keep its aggressiveness under control (3).

A fact important from the analytical point of view is that the threat of castration and castration itself constitute, though not an anatomical, nevertheless a functional reality. Whoever prematurely tries conclusions with the dominant male risks the forfeiture of his potency.

We must now ask the question : How does a young male become dominant; what is the condition of his ever rising to this status? The answer is brief : if he can wait. If, after attaining puberty, he can avoid all conflict with a dominant male, if he can keep away from the attractive females, contenting himself perhaps with those less enticing who are in dioestrus, if he is able to give battle to a dominant male only once, and then to win. This means, however, that he waits until his physical strength is fully developed and he is full grown, and that he chooses the opportune moment for battle, that is for challenging the ruler, for instance, when the latter is no longer in full possession of his powers.

In the Primate society, therefore, status and propagation are the prizes that go to those males who are most successful in controlling their libido directed towards the attractive females, those who can await the conflict with the dominant male, keeping their aggressiveness under control. ' This ability to withstand conflict arises out of the constant equilibrational component present in their movements within the society, their stances, postures and carriage, and the absence of fighting in their behaviour. This means that these animals possess ability to control aggressive responses under conflict.'

The widespread conception that, in the ape community, that male reaches the summit of the dominant hierarchy who strikes most brutally and utters the loudest cries (Révész, 21), is not warranted by the facts.

Summary

Our problem was to ascertain the psychological factors operating in the life of the Primates which, in the process of Man's genesis, were able to lead to the evolution of the latency period. I think it has been possible to throw light on this question from one aspect, and to bring it nearer to our understanding. If sexual selection always favours so consistently those male individuals of a herd who best succeed in controlling their instinctual tensions under permanent conflict, and postponing the discharge of their instinctual impulses and their action until the fitting opportunity, who can best master their libido and their aggressiveness, it becomes intelligible, within the compass of the modern theory of evolution, that the descendants of this herd may develop an ego organization, with its inherent hostility to instinct.

But now it has fared with us as often in the history of research. We have sought the answer to one question, and we have found the answer to another. We were inquiring after the psychosocial factors rooted in the nature of the Primates, which lead to the evolution of human latency, and we found the factors which contribute to the evolution of the human ego organization. But the question of how the genesis of the ego is connected with the dichronous inception of sexual development must, for the present, remain open.

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OEDIPUS AND SAMSON
THE REJECTED HERO-CHILD

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In his book *Primitive Culture*, written over seventy-five years ago, Edward B. Tylor warned against the application of narrow interpretations to the exposure myths of Cyrus and of Romulus and Remus. What mythological investigation needs, urged Tylor, ' is breadth of knowledge and of handling '; for if we ' look properly into the matter, we find these stories are but specimens of a widespread mythic group, itself only a section of that far larger body of traditions in which exposed infants are saved to become national heroes ' (1).

In *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (2) Rank applied some of the ' breadth of knowledge ' which Freud's researches had made available in the theory and practice of psycho-analysis. Rank sensed the importance of the element of rejection in these myths, noticing that the hero invariably wandered from one country, in which he was not recognized, to another in which he became a hero. He nevertheless expanded upon the notion that these myths were purely magical and cultic in origin and did not have a significant relation to actual events (2). Freud, in turn, influenced by Rank's later researches, likewise attached a purely symbolic meaning to the myths and stressed the element of fantasy. He noted, amongst other things, that exposure was usually, though not always, in a basket or box on a body of water, and concluded that the basket was the womb and the water the water at birth (3).

In 1948, in my paper *The Oedipus Myth in History and Psychiatry* (4) I examined the cultural aspects of the Oedipus and related myths and called attention to Freud's failure to take into account the details of Oedipus' traumatic exposure and early separation from his mother—an experience which could be expected to leave its mark on the life of an adult let alone that of a child. Lazarsfeld (4), *Did Oedipus Have an Oedipus Complex*, raised the same question.

My own researches (4) have uncovered some evidence that these exposure myths not only reveal an almost universal attitude of indifference and cruelty to children, but, what is more, a rationalization of this attitude into something of value. Thus it is maintained in these myths, and by their propagation, that the act of exposure started the hero on his path of glory and the society on its road to greatness. The hero is usually presented as virtual originator or one of the originators of his culture. It is as if the myth said: ' There is good in exposure and suffering, for that is how Cyrus became great and Moses became the founder of a new religion and a people.' In more modern times the same idea appears in fairy tales such as *Cinderella* and *The Ugly Duckling*. Many institutions would also appear to have originated in the same manner through the action of adults who placed in the way of their progeny an additional and often enormous obstacle to survival. Indeed, there is evidence to support the view that trauma and terror (5) are culture makers if the physiological implications of behaviour are given their full weight.

According to Malinowski (6) the myth is a practical statement of ' primitive reality which still lives in present-day life', and supplies a ' retrospect pattern ' of values, order and belief; there is a reliving of past experiences when the ' counterpart of the story is enacted '; the myth, studied alive, is ' not symbolic, but a direct expression of its subject matter '. To stop short at symbolic, cultic, or magical interpretation of these hero myths is, therefore, in effect to say that the human cognitive function is itself a *fait accompli*. Belief, however, is itself an expression of physiological experience which varies from time to time. Consequently belief is found in the dual rôle of fixing the facts, which are to be considered as existing in nature and society, and also as the channel for the diversion of arrested physiological experience through the exercise of the intellect and related functions as a way of life. The interpretative adventure here attempted has already produced some results which justify the notion that the origin and propagation of myths can be related, at least in many instances, to individual physiological experience.

The myths of Melkart, Hercules, Gilgamesh and Samson have previously been linked together by researchers. It is now suggested that the myths of Samson and Oedipus are related. However, the mere fact of their historical kinship interests us here only because of the further thesis that the two myths are also psychodynamically related and that their relationship is complementary—which serves

to illuminate also the nature of their respective cultural settings. This paper is not intended as a sortie into mythological speculation. It is rather an express attempt to evaluate the effect of different methods of infant and child exposure and rejection and thereafter to demonstrate how exposure and rejection leave their psychodynamic residues of cultural institutions, which are adopted by later generations as valued traditions. Thus a practical purpose of the hero myths was to make life more tolerable in an atmosphere of rejection. For early deprivation not only leaves its scars on the life of the child; the deprivers—parents and culture—then go on to condition the traumatized child to a rationalizing process which will convert the past harm into a present good. This process goes on interminably and deposits what I have chosen to call ' the cultural residues of rejection '—vast, unexplored deposits of institutions which began as individual distortions.

The story of Samson does not describe any actual physical abandonment. In the case of Oedipus there is an out-and-out physical abandonment when the three-day-old Oedipus is hung by his ankles on a mountain-side. *However, on a psychodynamic level there may be a rejection which is tantamount to abandonment even when the child is under the general surveillance of the mother.* In such a case, although great physical distance is not interposed between mother and child, there is nevertheless a physiological gap in the life of the child—and consequently a psychodynamic hiatus. For when the child is prematurely exposed to adult disciplines and restriction, exploitation of its individuality is already in process, and the atmosphere lacks the maternal climate which each infant requires after birth. The effect may, from a functional point of view, be as harmful as that of more obvious separation by physical exposure and physical harm. Proper mothering is not simply the child's due, it is a necessary condition for the development of adequate functional organization. ' Exposure ' in the psychodynamic sense—which must include all physiological implications—may be the consequence of many different experiences which would have the direct effect of depriving the child of adequate mothering; such, for instance, as premature separation from the mother, swaddling, feeding disciplines, ritual practices and others. In the case of Samson, who was a Nazirite, there could have been an additional factor, one frequently stressed by Moloney, namely, the transference of the mother's anxiety to the child. The climate of anxiety appears clearly in the account of the circumstances attending Samson's birth (Judges xiii), where the angel not only instructs Manoah's unnamed wife with regard to her child's upbringing but also gives directions with regard to her own prenatal behaviour as conditions for giving birth to a hero-deliverer (7). It is made plain that the rearing of the child is to be under masculine domination so as to fulfil the demands of a patriarchal culture. *From the instant of birth the child lives its life as belonging to an ideology—the mothering is secondary.*

The restrictions imposed on a Nazirite were more numerous than those outlined in the Book of Judges (see Numbers vi. 1–21). It can be inferred that, as the child became old enough to move about a little, he was forbidden access to part of the world about him. Thus the mother's attitude to the child would be determined by a constant effort to conform to outside commands with all the attendant anxieties for mother and child. As in the Oedipus myth we have here also a ' predestination '. Oedipus was doomed by the prophetic response of the Oracle of Apollo; Samson's life had to conform to all the commands of the angel who came to Manoah and his wife in a vision. Oedipus was prematurely ' adultified ' (I have had to coin this word for want of another) because he had to make functional adjustments, to which no child could be forced without serious traumatic consequences. Samson was prematurely adultified because he did not have a proper mothering climate and was compelled to be the yielding object of an artificial atmosphere of patriarchal discipline at a tender age when no child can be expected to accept such a discipline or to make the required functional adjustments from choice.

Moloney has stressed the fact that under ' the aegis of culture, tensions are uniformly denied primitive expressions ' (8). The spirit of the child, threatened by the adult, is broken so that he ' finds security in submissiveness ' (9). The child, in any contact with the outside world, can ' either swell or shrink '; he can either move against the reality situation or he can subside and allow it to move against him (10). I would supplement this by adding what I conceive to be of the utmost importance, namely that *while the child is shrinking from reality* he is also *moving against it but in a functionally distorted way.* To illustrate further by the physical space pattern, pressure at one spot leads to extension in another.

This functional distortion operated in one way with regard to Oedipus (11) and in substantially the reverse way in the case of Samson, suggesting ideological divergences in the two contexts. The essential psychodynamic differences in the two myths may be found in contrasting as nearly as possible the specific physiological distortions in each case. For it is now suggested that it is physiological accent or deprivation which largely directs in each instance the mode of activity of the adult hero. Indeed, it would be strange if it were not so, since it is now so well established that the surrounding circumstances materially affect the conditioning of animal and human. This should be all the more applicable in a context of physiological impairment.

By viewing the mythological and institutional material in this way greater objectivity is obtained, since we are less apt to interpret it indigenously as derived from our native cultural fantasies. By

tracing ideas and institutions to their physiological sources, difficult though this may be, we are more likely to divest the ideologies of their supervening influence over our thoughts. Even when error occurs, as is to be expected, its range will be narrowed.

Let us compare the cultural settings of the two myths, bearing in mind all the time that we are looking out for physiological facts and their mythological and institutional correlatives.

Early Greek culture as typified by Athens (Western) exacted less compulsive ritual adherence than Eastern cultures. The externality of the Athenians went hand in hand with physiological freedoms. Freedom of speech (oral expression) was an ideal in a rather confused democracy where the very confusion was a part of the atmosphere of free expression. Loquacity, oratory, oracles and dialectical philosophy derived from verbal communications, may be considered as oral accents which were supplemented by other physiological freedoms. Their belief in the anthropomorphic gods was a dedication to free expression and action since the gods were in a continual state of conflict and flux. Here we may point out again that speech and imagery are themselves physiological expressions, so that we have here a rather definite physiological accent on speech and thought communication, but fortunately considerable freedom within the ambit of the selected functionality.

Another side of Greek culture emanated from Sparta, which was much under the domination of Eastern influences. There was much emphasis in Sparta on muscular prowess and physical courage, which would indicate physical freedom, but this was offset by the fact that soundness of body was incidental to self-control and social compulsion for the benefit of the State. The cultural ideal, despite its emphasis on motor expression, was one of containment. It should be noted that Oedipus was essentially a Spartan. He is not the physical hero of the Greeks, but rather the one who overcame obstacles, was successful because he ' used his head '. The intellect is an organizational function, and where it is overstressed one may assume that there has been overstimulation of a function which is principally auxiliary to survival rather than a usual or selected channel of expression. Crippled in infancy by his exposure, Oedipus had to call upon his intellectual resources to a greater extent than would be the case with the ordinary child. He became prematurely independent with resulting intensification of the non-motor functions. Mastery may be achieved by physical feats, but the struggle for mastery is mainly intellectual and often authoritarian. Oedipus' authoritarian struggle is culturally recorded in the story of how he overcame the Sphinx by answering the riddle. When Oedipus has bested the Sphinx ' intelligence has replaced force ', as Bréal put it. Here, indeed, is the practical aspect of the myth, as it is also the practical problem of our own day. How may man function as a less capable physiological being? Oedipus showed how intelligence can replace force even if the replacement is often delusive. For authoritarianism is not the actual equivalent of force. Nevertheless the ideas of omnipotence and force came to be understood interchangeably, since the omnipotent one is considered the strong one, even when his supremacy is obtained and held by underhanded and indirect (forceless) means. Oedipus came through the same functional shift which Lord Macaulay noticed in Dr. Johnson: ' Under the influence of his disease his senses became morbidly torpid and his imagination morbidly active ' (12). Because Oedipus shrank in a physical way, as did Johnson, he extended in a mental direction.

Bearing this in mind we return to Samson. In the Eastern culture setting, from which the story is at least partly derived, religious legalism with all its compuslive features prevailed. While actual exposure of infants was quite common, so common as to lead to the use of it as a symbol of social and national rejection (Ezekiel xvi; Genesis xxi, the story of Ishmael), there was often exposure of a less obvious nature. Such was the exposure of infants and children in a procedural context usually designated as ' mental ', although this word does not tell the whole story. The ritualized child was not only subjected to mothering deprivations, but his experience included many inhibitions of physiological expression, oral, verbal, visual, aural, visceral, glandular, sexual, various motor restraints and others. There was also actual laceration, as in circumcision. He was dedicated to the ideology from infancy. Although intellectual achievement was stressed culturally, there was no longer any inner psychological need for such a child to extend in the direction of mental effort and the development of related psychic controls. This aspect of his life had already been over-developed. With mental saturation, Samson's mode of functional expression would naturally tend, as already suggested, through trial and error towards physical and motor outlets. Fortunately for Samson political rivalry between Israel and Philistia offered opportunities for actual physical prowess. Samson's heroics are physical feats. With one exception, which will be noted, there is no record of his mental achievements. In both myths the hero's reactions are megalomanic and authoritarian; Oedipus strives for political mastery through intelligence, Samson through physical domination. Although such a classification cannot be taken as hard and fast and there is in reality considerable fusion, the two different trends are clearly observable.

Symbolism, which is a phase of the intellectual process and is therefore only secondary in importance in reading cultural meanings, is itself the result of physiological accents. Rank and Freud did not go back far enough to the primary context which gave effect to the heroic symbols. Symbolism comes

down to us as collective thought; it cannot be understood until it is related to the psychodynamic experience which gave rise to its use. When this is done the symbolism may be read in much the same way as Egyptologists read the Rosetta stone. Otherwise obscure symbols begin to reveal the psychodynamic history of peoples as derived from the psychodynamic history of individuals. In other words, the methodology of the etymologists and philologists may be helpful in finding what we may call psychodynamic root identities, not only in words but also in other symbolic expressions. These in turn may prove to be valuable evidence of individual experience which is later reflected back to the ethnic group.

With this in mind we may examine some of the symbolism which links the two myths under discussion. Samson's name is such a link, for the name Samson derives from ' Shemesh ' meaning ' little sun ' or ' sun-like ' in Hebrew and cognate languages. Taken with other evidence, Samson appears as the central figure in a solar myth. For the name Delilah points in the same direction. Its root is Lilah, which means night. The related words *lail* (calamity) and *dalol* (to become feeble) as in *dalilah* (languishing), contrast the sun as the origin of strength and darkness as the source of weakness. In the Theban solar myth the name of Laius, the father whom Oedipus kills, is suggestive of Lilah. (In a number of the hero-myths the rejected and exposed child was ' doomed to bring ruin on his parents'. John Fiske, *Myths and Myth Makers* (Boston, 1893), p. 198, referring to Muller.) While ultimate conclusions may rest with etymologists and philologists, the context must be considered, and it does suggest that Delilah and Laius could be traced to the same root meaning. Nor is the fact that one is male and the other female a disturbing factor, especially since in patriarchal cultures the woman is depicted as weak and incapable and even evil. In the Oedipus myth, Laius, symbol of darkness, marries Jocasta, and so Oedipus is born. The word Laius is derived from the same root as ' Leto ' and ' Latmus ' (13), and is the symbol of darkness. Bréal's analysis of the Oedipus myth of Greece (14) traces it back to Vedic origins and links it also with cognate myths, through which he relates the Sphinx to the Chimera, the Gorgon, the Hydra, and other figures. To Bréal also there is revealed man's struggle against darkness. But the really remarkable core of Bréal's account is his suggestion that the word ' Laius ' is related to the Vedic *dasyu*, meaning enemy, and that the word ' Laius ', by its relation to *dasyu*, as it changed meanings first signified *crowd* or *mass* (*foule*) and later ' people ' and then ' nation ', which he points out is a remarkable fact in the history of Greek civilization (15). What especially interests us here is that the real enemy mythologically is *culture*, which enslaves and renders day into night! This is well borne out also by the Hebrew word עבד *eved* (slave), the variants of which are used to describe worship or ritual service to the deity, the idea being that man is a slave of the deity, who lays down the moral rules of conduct for the society. In this sense Samson, the Nazirite, would be a slave who tries to free himself from slavery by extending himself physically into space. The relationship between restraint and the idea of slavery is almost universal in ancient times, psychodynamically viewed. The exposure of Oedipus on the hillside is, according to Bréal, an emblem of the horizontal rays of the sun (16). The clouds, he suggests, are the young daughters of the Vedic account, who, while captive, are wives of the ' enemy ', but upon deliverance becomes wives of the day (17). The proverbial expression ' Oedipus has killed the Sphinx ' (18) indicates the burst of a cloud on the mountain when precipitated into rain. We see, then, that natural phenomena furnish a linkage in the myths, but that they are shot through with human connotations involving such institutions as marriage, kinship, polity and cultural restraints, which are considered as enslavements.

Ultimately all sun-myths must come back to an accent on the physiological function of seeing, which embraces the ever-present conflict between day and night. To the ancients it was a ubiquitous dichotomy. Thus, the rays of the sun and the hair of the head have been associated with serpentine myths, such as the Gorgon myth, on the ground that the rays of the sun resemble both serpentine forms and the hair. This idea would seem fantastic were there not ample proof to support it. That the serpent was a sun-god has long been known (19). Hercules, a counterpart of Samson, is a solar deity who, in early infancy, ' throttles the serpents of darkness ' (20). The Pythoness gave forth the oracles of Apollo, the deity of radiance. The fact that the serpent also appears as a symbol of darkness would not alarm a researcher into these early myths. It is therefore a reasonable conclusion from the above that Samson's hair is the sun's rays, without which the sun loses its power to give light (21). That bot Oedipus and Samson lose their sight is then an important point of concurrence between the two myths. Oedipus gouges out his eyes with his own hand or, according to Euripides' version, is blinded by his servants. Samson's eyes are put out by the Philistines. But what is more interesting in the divergences that have developed between the two myths is the fact that, in the Greek legend, darkness finally emerges as a man, whereas in the Samson legend darkness is a woman, just as in the Vedic legend the enslaved clouds are females.

The history of a legend may often reveal traces of psychodynamic experiences otherwise not apparent. For example, the remarkable Dr. Erasmus Darwin noted of the Egyptian Medusa that she is ' represented on ancient gems, with wings on her head, snaky hair, and a beautiful countenance, which appears intensely thinking, and was supposed to represent divine wisdom. The Grecian Medusa, on

Minerva's shield, as appears on other gems, has a countenance distorted with rage or pain, and is supposed to represent divine vengeance. This Medusa was one of the Gorgons, at first very beautiful and terrible to her enemies. Minerva turned her hair into snakes; and Perseus having cut off her head, fixed it on the shield of the goddess; the sight of which then petrifies the beholders' (22). Here again seeing is connected with a mother-figure whose cruel effect is to petrify the beholder. Note the ideological differences of culture preserved by the myths comparable to the differences already described as existing in the Oedipus and Samson contexts. Thus, the mother-figure in Greece is cruel (Jocasta was cruel to Oedipus), whereas the Egyptian Medusa, like Manoah's wife the mother of Samson, is allied to benign wisdom, which is as if to say that ideological deprivations are evidences of good motherhood.

If we heed Tylor's admonition, what may seem like mystery falls into the category of ordinary fact. The father and mother of the child do actually determine whether the new-born infant shall see or not. Indeed their neglect may, as is often the case, result in virtual murder of the child. But even short of killing, many factors in early infant-care bear upon the ability to see. The darkness which follows compulsion and exploitation by parents and culture is recorded in all these stories but not avowed. Both the Oedipus and the Samson myths therefore omit the parental and cultural causes of darkness and both conversely warn the child that the *consequence of acts directed against culture* is blindness and ultimately death. As Bréal puts it: 'Une fois que la lumière du jour est obscurcie Oedipe meurt'—When the light of day is once obscured, Oedipus dies (23). But in the story he does not die until later. Samson dies forthwith.

Further adventure into etymology and philology seems to bear out the argument. All the following Hebrew and Chaldean words appear to be historically related not only by sound, root, symbolic application, or cultural history, but also psychodynamically.[1]

Some years ago I advanced the view that 'one may speak of a psychodynamic compact between an infant and its mother, which later extends to take in other members of the family group and society in general. The mother gives it food, love and security, and the child in return responds with acceptable behaviour commensurate with the amount of love it receives . . . for the individual the origins of *precedent* formation may come from a "breach" of the first emotional "compact"—"fundamental law" if one prefers to call it that. Such individuals, who later may come into power in society, spend the rest of their lives attempting to gain from the whole of society what they have hungered for from their infancy, and employ the precedents of their infancy —which are but their emotional distortions—to achieve this delayed satisfaction.'[2]

שדה Sodoh—a breast; שדה Sodeh—a field (see Deuteronomy xxxii. 13); שדד Shodad—to lay waste, from which is derived שדה Shedah—a wife or mistress, and שדי Shaddai—omnipotent (God) or (Almighty). Note that שדד Shodad also means *plain* or *straight*, and that the plural שדים Shedim is spelt exactly like שדים—breasts (see Song of Songs, iv. 5). The relationship between שדה Sodeh —field and שדד Shodad—to lay waste and שדים Shodaim—breasts is rather clearly indicated. See especially Genesis, l. 25. שד Shed, a demon (Deuteronomy, xxxii. 17). The fact that the breasts and the fields are linguistically related is historical fact, since in the course of man's development the products of the field replace the milk of the breast. More puzzling perhaps is the fact that linguistically the *breasts* and *destruction* have a common origin. Eventually the word 'breast' comes to mean darkness and evil. Bréal and others, as already shown, have connected the female with darkness, i.e. the destruction of the day or light. Such a development of meaning would present a complete enigma were it not for the significant truth that a depriving mother actually injures the biological and physiological development of the child. Here as elsewhere mythology records individual psychodynamic experience and emphasizes individual values, but these are often obscured lest the rationalizing process in human relationships be pierced and the real disorganizing facts laid bare.

Another concurrence between the two myths already mentioned is that both Oedipus and Samson vanquish a beast. Oedipus indirectly overcomes a beast of mythical character, part human and part animal, which destroys itself. Samson's victim is all animal, a real lion that 'roared against him'. Furthermore Samson actually kills it; the beast does not throw itself over a cliff in a fit of frustration as did the Sphinx. Oedipus 'killed' the Sphinx with his mind by solving its riddle, but Samson kills the lion by physical force, so that in Samson's case we have a reversal of Bréal's comment—here force prevails over force. In the episode with the lion we have a first indication that Samson's training as a Nazirite would be functionally offset by powerful physical development. Hercules, another representative of the exposed hero figure, as a young man also killed a lion on Mt. Cithaeron. Ancient myths and religions would seem to vacillate between the idolization of force and the idolization of intelligence (24). Some degree of megalomanic drive, as evidence of intellectual pre-emption, is detectable in all ancient myths and primitive heroics, though the

[1] Definitions are taken from B. Davidson's *Analytical Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon* (London).

[2] A. J. Levin, 'Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life', *Michigan Law Review*, **44**, 1945, p. 262, in a discussion of the possible origin of the idea of the *social compact*.

psychiatric label must not be interpreted too strictly. Amongst primitive tribes the trickster (intelligence) often becomes a deity who combines force with low-grade intelligence as in the case of the Norse Loki. Such esteem for cleverness is also found throughout modern life.

The riddle episode is a further link between the two myths. In the Oedipus story the beast asks the riddle, which concerns the motor function of locomotion. It seems to say: ' How do you reconcile the impairment of man's motor functions with his intellectual supremacy? ' The solution of the riddle, as in the case of Pandora's box, leads to disaster. Actually the symbol of the Sphinx represents the conflict of intellect (human head) and force (animal body)—an animal with full use of its four legs. In the case of Samson, however, we have an individual who has been subjected to ritual and intellectual culturization and is driven to express himself physically. Some time after he had killed the lion he found a swarm of bees and combs of honey in the carcase. With this picture in mind he addressed his riddle to the Philistines (Judges xiv. 14): ' Out of the eater came forth meat and out of the strong came forth sweetness.'[3] Here also, as in the riddle of the Sphinx, it is the supremacy of the intellect which is established. For, if the beast is suppressed, life will be sweet. The value of strength is in its conversion into regulation. The hero is the strong one who brings sweetness (what is socially acceptable) to his people—the bees. So that here again, as in the case of Oedipus, a child whose functionality has been directed by his parents becomes a hero and deliverer. The riddle would not have been answered had Samson not been betrayed by his Philistine wife (not Delilah, who appears later in the story). The betrayal of Delilah was a second betrayal by a woman. The meaning of this double betrayal is not clear, but it is significant that in each case a mother-figure was involved. The rest of the story of Samson is too well known to need repetition here. Samson tries to resist telling Delilah the secret of his strength until finally he tells her truthfully that the secret lies in the fact that he is a Nazirite; that is to say that his tremendous strength was culturally induced ' from his mother's womb '. The Philistines can now overcome him, and they put out his eyes. In the case of Oedipus blindness is self-inflicted when Oedipus is confronted by his ' crime '. There is no comparable ' crime ' in the Samson story; in place of the ' crime ' there is the ' betrayal '.

Some further similarities between the two stories remain to be noticed, and one essential difference.

After Samson had lost his sight ' the hair on his head began to grow again after he was shaven ' (Judges xvi. 22). This meant his strength would return. During a feast, at which he was to be exhibited, Samson said to the boy who led him, ' Suffer me that I may feel the pillars whereupon the house standeth that I may lean upon them.' Then, in a spirit of revenge for the loss of his eyes, he took the two middle pillars in his arms—those upon which the house stood—and he bowed with all his might, saying: ' Let me die with the Philistines.' The house fell on all who were in it.

Now in Sophocles' play *Oedipus the King*, Jocasta, on learning of her incestuous marriage, takes her life. Oedipus in distraction crashes against the folding doors and, forcing the bolts from the staples, hurls himself into her room, where he sees her hanging by the neck. It is then, with a terrible shriek, that he puts out his eyes. As in the case of Samson there is divine intervention. The scene where Oedipus crashes against the doors and wrenches out the bolts is not exactly parallel to the scene of Samson's death, but it is close enough to bring the two stories together. Foundations and pillars have from most ancient times stood for authority and divinity.[4] Such were the pillars of Hercules, a fact that again links Samson with Hercules. The word ' Adon ', which in the Bible is used for foundation, is also used to describe the Deity—meaning Lord. Its well-known variant in the possessive is ' Adonai '. However, even apart from the correspondence of details, the overriding idea in these stories is that the individual must forever be resigned to the fact that he is *forced* by events to yield to authority—an idea which has prevailed to defeat freedom from the beginning of time.

In this connexion it is rewarding to pursue the etymological clues a little further. Wake suggests that the word ' Adam '—like other words containing the syllable ' ad '—is derived from ' ad ', meaning father, while the word ' Eve ' is derived from *Hevia*, which, in addition to its Arabic root meaning ' life ', means a female serpent. If Eve was the serpent mother, then Adam was also the serpent father (25): ' In Adam and Eve, therefore, we may have a reference to the male and female principles . . . the term *Adam* (in Egyptian Atum) was formed by the combination of the primitive Akkad words *Ad*, father and *Dam*, mother. It would thus originally express a dual idea, agreeable to the statement in Genesis v. 2, that male and female were called " Adam ". This agrees perfectly with the Persian tradition which made the first human beings androgynous. When the dual idea expressed in the name was forgotten, Adam became the Great

[3] Compare Plutarch who in his Life of Cleomenes (Dryden) writes that the Alexandrians gave Cleomenes the title of hero and son of gods 'till the philosophers satisfied them by saying that, as oxen breed bees, putrefying horses breed wasps, and beetles rise from the carcasses of dead asses, so the humours and juices of the marrow of a man's body, coagulating produce serpents. And this the ancients observing, appropriated a serpent, rather than any other creature to heroes '.

[4] In an earlier incident Samson (Judges xvi 3) carries away the doors of the gates of the city and puts them on the top of the hill that was before Hebron. Raglan notes that the usual setting for a ritual drama is a doorway or gateway.

Father, the mother receiving the name of Eve (*hhavvah*), i.e. living or life, although Adam in the generic sense of " Mankind " denoted both male and female.' In this interplay of male and female, it is to be expected that the greatest pressures of rebellion would be against the father—or authoritative principle—but that this would be disguised. The tearing down of foundations or pillars indicates a protest against father domination, i.e. culture. The root *Ad* is also part of the word *Adon*[5] meaning foundation, to which the word *Din*, meaning law or mandate, is related. Wake seems to have missed this point. We may therefore reconstruct the situation in this way. Rebellion is against the father authority, but the ' blame ' for this state of affairs would, under the taboos of masculine culture, be fixed upon ' the devils ', ' sheddim ' the ' shodaim ' —the breasts. There the ' blame ' belongs because of maternal rejection, although, as I have shown elsewhere, it was the male principle which was the beginning of cultural authority. If the Delilahs, the women, are in mythology the betrayers of men, then it is understandable why darkness is also derived from the female.

Another detail can be considered here, the shaving of Samson's hair. There is no equivalent of this in the Oedipus story, but a link is found in the myth of Hercules, to whom Oedipus is related as a sun-hero. Tylor says that the well-known modern interpretation of the myth of Heracles and Hesione is that of ' the Sun slaying Darkness '. One version of the story runs as follows: ' When the king Laomedon had bound his daughter Hesione to the rock, a sacrifice to Poseidon's destroying sea-monster, Heracles delivered the maiden, springing full-armed into the fish's gaping throat, and *coming forth hairless* after three days' hacking within ' (26). While it would appear that Samson was overcome by darkness when his hair was shorn and that Hercules was victorious, it should be noted that both were hairless while ' contained '. Samson was hairless while imprisoned by the Philistines, Hercules while imprisoned in the monster. The period of containment was, in each case, a period of darkness (27).

A further similarity between the two myths, which is not very obvious, is the occurrence of a plague in both. The plague in the Oedipus myth is of divine origin and fails on Thebes after Oedipus has married Jocasta and has reigned some years. The Oracle advises that it will continue until the murderer of Laius is discovered. It is most significant that the ' crime ' the Oracle complains of is *not Oedipus' incestuous marriage* but the failure to punish the murderer of Laius (darkness as the equivalent of culture). In the Samson story the plague is man-made, Samson ties torches to the tails of foxes and releases them in the fields of standing corn belonging to the Philistines (Judges xxxi. 4 ff.) thus ' burning the shocks, also the standing corn, with vineyards and olives '. Now it is indeed remarkable that this practice of letting loose foxes with torches tied to their tails (28) was also, as I have discovered, the concluding event of the feast devoted to Ceres, Roman goddess of the tilled fields and counterpart of the Greek Demeter, who presided over the Greek ' mysteries '. This links the rite with the fertility festival of the Thesmophoria, celebrated in Greece by women.[6]

Samson's act of revenge was provoked by the treachery of the Philistines, who had given to another man the Philistine girl promised to him after using her to answer his riddle of the lion. In short, Samson was deprived of a wife (mother-figure) by the forces of darkness, the Philistine enemies (culture). His rage is directed towards all mothers, symbolized by Ceres and Demeter, who dare to substitute the products of the soil for the milk of the breasts. Samson destroys the Philistine cornfields (the breasts, *shodaim*) of the Philistine daughter-mother (Persephone-Demeter)[7] he could not enjoy.

In ancient mythology fields and plains were identified with the mother. The Greek goddess Demeter was goddess of fruits and agriculture. Myths, which appear to be derived from Demeter amongst other mother-deities, attach a literal meaning to the idea of ' mother-earth '. Thus, according to Frazer, the woman who binds the last sheaf of corn in West Prussia is the Corn-Mother and is symbolized as a woman in travail; the grandmother acts as midwife and a child is supposedly born; in North Germany the sheaf is called the ' Harvest-Child '. *Id.*, p. 406.

This is quite important since, according to the view of the writer, the biological mother has under conditions of culture abdicated her functions which have been taken over in a number of particulars by men who have supplied from ' mother-earth ' what had been formerly supplied by the mother in the early stages of infancy and childhood. It is really the field and not the girl who gives birth to the symbolic child in the Germanic myths.)

In the incident of Samson's search for a Philistine wife we also have a hint of the theme of incest-avoidance. It is noteworthy, however, that the Samson story points not at the dangers of incest—if the term be used to include the collective cultural ideas of endogamy and exogamy—but rather the primitive idea of the *danger of marrying outside the group*. Taken with the fact already noted, that the Oracle denounced not Oedipus' incest but his parricide, we may fairly conclude that the Freudian explanation of the Oedipus myth in terms of an archetypic incest-taboo is essentially secondary (29).

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[5] Compare also Adonis as a sun god and the Egyptian Aton or Atum as sun god.

[6] On the significance of the torch in Greek mythology as a light-giving source see C. G. Jung and C. Kerényi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, pp. 154-5.

[7] James G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (abridged ed., New York, 1925), p. 420 ff.

A final point in the Oedipus-Samson-Hercules myths, which must be considered, relates to Oedipus' name. There is no counterpart to the implications of this in the Samson myth except perhaps by remote reference. Oedipus means 'swollen foot', and derives from the injury which he received when hung by his ankles as an infant. The emphasis upon this injury in the very name of the hero must be psychodynamically related to the idea of physiological impairment and distortion, which reappears in the blinding. Without subscribing to Alfred Adler's 'organic deficiency' theory it can be said that Oedipus' lameness could well have something to do with his authoritarian omnipotence. It should, however, be noted that such an inferiority complex in the Adlerian sense is secondary and not basic, because such complexes arise only after there has been a physiological shift or 'choice' which deflects functionality to the organizational or mental function. The deflection could just as well be in another direction under different circumstances. If an individual is a totality of functions, then any expression, which is the result of arrest, deflection, impairment, or deficiency, may be considered as a distortion even though the channelling be through the mental function.

But at this point I want to suggest that the Oedipus and Samson myths point beyond mere mental transmutations to anthropological facts which have baffled mankind. They describe actual and practical historical occurrences of great importance, namely that man as a biological being has undergone delimiting changes—at least by comparison with other animals in his general class. One such change has been the sacrifice of greater speed and manœuvrability in motor expression for greater emphasis on intellectually directed skill with the hands and on the application of so-called mental traits. Another is that speech and language communication have modified animal orality. These modifications, which biologically may be considered distortions, have placed a burden upon the organizational function hardly intended. Physical anthropology has been aware of such changes for some time (30). A change of this kind appears to be indicated with considerable emphasis in the riddle of the Sphinx, which Oedipus had to solve: 'What animal is it that has four feet in the morning, two at noon, and three at night?' To correlate this portion of the Oedipus myth with the story of Samson we shall have to make a wide detour.

The outstanding characteristic of the serpent which is both revolting to human beings and also a subject of admiration is its ability to move without legs upon its belly. It is an intellectual quality which is admired—the ability to attack without warning and to inflict mortal wounds with little exertion of force. This is preserved to our own day in the opprobrium attached to one who gains advantage by stealth and fraud—the word 'snake' is used to describe a low order of human being. Such psychodynamic evaluations which have come down to us through the ages must be understood and given due weight. Primitive man was no doubt impressed by the serpent's ability to achieve important results against men and animals notwithstanding its comparative lack of motor equipment. There was reason to idealize this strength in apparent weakness since man's own limbs had diminished in efficiency. Man, so to speak, learned a lesson from the serpent, and herein may lie the reason why the serpent has been considered the embodiment of wisdom. For wisdom must be considered the end result of functional deflection, of impairment or distortion *away from* the norm of powerful motor function by means of limbs, mouth, and other physiological expressions. One may speak of wisdom here as *functional trial and error*. Moreover this serpentine 'fall from grace' is supported by biological data. There are still snakes existing which have vestigial projections on the sides of their bodies, which are the remains of limbs. In ancient times the snake was considered as once having had legs, that is as having once been functionally whole (31). Wake remarks: 'It is curious to note that, according to Rabbinical tradition, Cain was the son, not of Adam, but of the serpent spirit Asmodeus, who is the same as the Persian Ahriman, "the great serpent with two feet".' The idea that the snake lost its legs is clearly confirmed in Genesis: 'And the Lord said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; *upon thy belly* shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' (Genesis iii. 14).

There are numerous other examples of man's preoccupation with functional impairment and development. To mention a few: the centaur with the human head, the winged horse, the winged serpent of Mexican mythology (32), the myth of Icarus, the whole mythology of angels with wings. These are not meaningless mental images. Man's preoccupation with the idea of locomotion represents an effort sometimes to accept, sometimes to perfect an inadequate functional structure, and is, therefore, a record of the reaction to biological frustration, with which both the myths here considered deal. In the field of art, Michelangelo's huge human figures with enlarged musculature are psychodynamically related. Such an analysis will, it is hoped, dispel any notion that the serpent is exclusively a phallic symbol, although without doubt it is a phallic symbol also (33, 34). Preoccupation with the phallic function, like preoccupation with the motor function, is largely part of the trial and error of functional direction and selection. If the mind developed as a result of functional emphasis, there is no reason to doubt that the same process would occur with respect to the sexual organs and their functioning. This was in fact the view of Charles Darwin, who observed in *The Descent of Man* that the sexual function received special

emphasis because *man developed in intellect and retrograded in instincts* (35).

Any attempt to interpret mythology only in sexual terms must, in consequence, prove inadequate, however accurate it may be within limits. This is true of the Freudian interpretation of the Oedipus myth with its emphasis on an archetypic taboo against incest, notwithstanding its correctness in certain respects (36). A taboo, or any institution for that matter, is a cultural product, a phenomenon which somewhere along the line and often in the far distant past has derived from some early conditioning in infancy, from exposure actual or ideological, from rejection, abandonment, traumatic injury, from the deprivation and deflection of function. As a secondary phenomenon incest cannot be used as a basic explanatory principle. For example, in considering the theme of exogamy in the Samson myth we may regard it as a variant of the incest taboo theme, but we cannot leave our explanation at that point. For exogamy represents also and more fundamentally an *aversion* for the mother as an object of sexual interest, and this would extend to include the group as a mother symbol, the aversion itself originating in the situation of rejection. It is therefore possible that the incest motif in the Oedipus myth, as in the other parallels, is an ideological turn essentially Greek and represents a return to endogamy during a period of stress and danger, a turning to the protecting helpmate mother such as Lazarsfeld suggests (37). Conversely, in the case of Samson his desire for a Philistine woman, expressed on two separate occasions in the face of group opposition, may represent a free expression of his aversion for the ideological indoctrination by his mother.

The meaning of ' culture ' as here employed emphasizes the institutionalization of human behaviour by physiological expressions of individuals whose practical experiences then become the residues of their activities which are acted upon by others. Often these are out-and-out traumatic experiences; at other times they are less obvious results of ideological pressures upon the person. We do not rely here on the notions of displacement or sublimation, since these assume what is to be tested; they presuppose a transmutation from the so-called instincts to the more desirable cultural values. Here we are concerned with tracing origins rather than measuring values.

The history of culture *wherever it is found* in primitive or civilized life is the story of arrest, impairment, or deterioration or overburdening of some organic function. Feet are no longer fleet, orality is inhibited and institutionalized, the sense of smell is diminished but becomes an instrument of aversion; and on the other hand the sexual function is greatly increased in influence, the ears are receptors of social directions and music, and the scope of visuality is immensely broadened. The vestigial functions are given great attention and social value as if to preserve what has been lost. Such is the case with athletics and dietary laws and other institutions. The intellect, which is really only the organizational function for a complex existence, is given a sort of separate identity as if it were independent. Such valuation is far out of proportion to the place of the intellect in the effort to make up deficiencies in other directions. It is the intellect which makes permanent irreversible values out of its own overburdened functions. Little wonder that disorders are so common.

The foregoing method of myth-interpretation demonstrates a procedure which gives proper effect to all that psycho-analysis has taught us about the developmental consequences of infant care. I have tried to show how the cultural residues of individual behaviour have left the record of their practical experiences, now obscured by centuries of rationalized interpretations. The universality of these myths attests to the overwhelming evidence of the intimate connexion between national origin and heroics and the atmosphere of rejection in which national welfare saw its beginnings. The theme is ubiquitous and provides a vast field for further investigations. Thus to Rank's, Bréal's and Taylor's list of exposed heroes we can add the British Lancelot, the Danish King Scyld (38), the heroine Semiramis, and many others. Lame Oedipus, lame Jacob, the lame gods of yet other mythologies and Achilles of the vulnerable heel can yield to this method of investigation an understanding of social processes in their primordial beginnings, as derived from individual behaviour, and enable us to appreciate the momentous consequences of our methods of infant and child care.

Myths may be fabrications but they are also psychodynamic evaluations and, therefore, records of primitive history. Myth-interpretation and history-interpretation are allied. But what is most important is to remember that all

cultural residues furnish ready-made channels of physiological expression by means of conformity and belief. The anthropological record is before all a physiological one. The products of intellectual pretension do not change this.

In the newer method here suggested two common denominators are looked for. First to meet the eye are the similarities of language, myth symbolism, and content in general, the actual record in which these are found. But this inquiry reveals only the residues of culture; important as this is, it is not enough. The second step must then be taken. These records of cultural communications must then be traced to their physiological origins until the emergence of the myth or institution as an individual experience or submission or acquiescence is detected. Here one must be on the alert for psychodynamic equivalents, since the psychodynamic uniformities and diversities of one group, period, or place may occur in another even though the specific event pattern is not repeated (39). This tracing of psychodynamic equivalents in the maze of anthropological facts is a challenge indeed. At this point an integrity of viewpoint is demanded so that partisanship may be diminished. But the objectivity attained is worth the effort since one is able to deal with spans of time, divergences of race, geography, and deluding records. Something of the same thing is required as in the dream interpretation of an individual, whose whole life span may be dynamically reviewed by recognition of the equivalence between the facts recorded in the dream record and the physiological experience of the individual.

A brief example by way of further illustration may serve as a conclusion. It is well known that after a heart attack nature detours the blood to other arteries. Something of the same thing has always gone on in human history. The difficulty has been that the detours have in fact been paths of survival, so that in time people have come to think of the detours as the main roads. The heroics of Oedipus, Samson, and many other great leaders throughout civilization have been detours of individual survival for the most part rather gullibly adhered to by their followers. There are many such detours recorded in the history of mankind. That often they began in infancy makes it all the more difficult to analyse their course, but attempt it we must.

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(1) Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York, 1877, 2nd Amer. ed.), Vol. 1, p. 281 ff. Neither Freud nor Rank mentions the work of Tylor. Bréal some years later also noticed the myth-pattern reported by Tylor. See Michel Bréal, *Mélanges de mythologie et de linguistique* (Paris, 1882), p. 182.

A collection and analysis of such myths including some not mentioned here will be found in Lord Raglan's *The Hero* in Chapter XVI. Raglan's theory of dramatic ritual origin of myths may be tenable but also is not basic.

A Rhineland variant of the exposure myth is the ordeal of exposure to prove legitimacy. Henry Lea, *Superstition and Force* (Philadelphia, 1866), p. 189. The author refers to an anonymous Greek anthology.

As to the practice of exposure and infanticide in general see Article 'Infanticide', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, **12**, 14th ed.; also William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York, 1940—published in 1906), Chap. 7, p. 308 ff.

(2) Otto Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (English trans., New York, 1941); also Rank, *Beyond Psychology* (Posthumous, 1941), p. 93 ff.

(3) Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York, 1939), p. 7 ff.

(4) A. J. Levin, 'The Oedipus Myth in History and Psychiatry', *Psychiatry Magazine*, **2**, 1948, p. 289.

See also earlier brief article by Sophie Lazarsfeld, 'Did Oedipus Have an Oedipus Complex?', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, **14**, April 1944, p. 226. The article calls attention to the 'many psychological facts left out by Freud'. It is significant that this article was not known to the writer of this paper and that the views of Lazarsfeld and of myself were arrived at independently.

(5) See comments on Freud's *Future of an Illusion* in A. J. Levin, 'The Fiction of the Death Instinct', *Psychiatric Quarterly*, **25**, 1951, p. 257 ff. On evidence of panic in Freud's childhood see Suzanne Cassirer Bernfeld, 'Freud and Archaeology', *American Imago*, **8**, 1951, p. 116 and elsewhere. The reference was furnished to me after the author had read 'The Fiction of the Death Instinct', in corroboration of the portion on Freud's childhood terrors.

(6) Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (London, 1926), pp. 123–124 and elsewhere.

(7) Dr. Doran, *Habits and Men* (London, 1854), p. 158, where the author recalls that the Puritan women wore green aprons while pregnant because this was presumed to be the colour of the apron worn by Eve. The Spartans, whose children were considered as born for the State, laid stress on the prenatal conduct of their women.

(8) James Clark Moloney, *The Magic Cloak*

(1949), p. 243. See also the same author's ' Planned Infancy and the Paranoid Block to Human Progress ', *American Imago*, **7**, 3, p. 19.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 227.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 280.

(11) *The Oedipus Myth in History and Psychiatry* (see note 4), p. 294.

(12) T. B. MACAULAY, *The Life of Johnson*. There are numerous sayings and proverbs which record this same observation. Compare, for example, the saying of the poet Blake: ' The weak in courage is strong in cunning ', from *The Prophetic Books*.

(13) H. A. GUERBER, *Myths of Greece and Rome* (New York: American Book Co., 1893), p. 318.

(14) BRÉAL, p. 173.

(15) *Ibid.*, pp. 178–179.

(16) GUERBER, p. 318.

(17) BRÉAL, p. 180. ' A symbolism is sometimes suggested, with Cinderella representing the dawn, oppressed by the clouds of night (harsh relatives), finally rescued by the sun (the handsome prince " Apollo ").' From *Bluebeard, Cinderella, and Other Tales*, by Charles Perrault, retold by Lloyd Smith, Little Blue Book No. 386, Haldeman-Julius Company, Girard, Kansas. See also JOHN FISKE, *Myths and Myth Makers* (Boston, 1893), p. 112. Herakles discussed at p. 117.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(19) C. STANILAND WAKE, *Serpent Worship and Other Essays* (London: Redway, 1888), p. 98 and elsewhere.

(20) GUERBER, p. 316. Sir John Lubbock thought the idea was acceptable for other reasons, hardly scientific. The ' one great charm ' of the explanation of the sun-destroying darkness is that we thus get rid of ' some of the revolting features of ancient myths '. *Origin of Civilisation and Primitive Condition of Man* (London, 1875), p. 329.

(21) I am informed by Dr. James Clark Moloney that some years ago the view was advanced in an article that the hair of Samson was to be considered as representing the rays of the sun. Such an article has not been located to date, though it no doubt exists.

(22) From note to line 218 of the poem *The Botanic Garden*, Canto I, Part I.

(23) BRÉAL, p. 182.

(24) ' For bodily exercise profiteth little; but godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.' (1 Tim. iv, 8.)

(25) WAKE, pp. 101, 126, 127.

(26) TYLOR, p. 339. Italics mine. I must disagree with Tylor who, without the benefit of modern psychodynamic researches, despaired of separating the solar and non-solar elements of the myth of Hercules. It is a task, he concluded, ' complicated with that all but hopeless difficulty which besets the student of myth the moment that the clue of direct communication with nature falls away.' *Ibid.*, Vol. ii, p. 294.

(27) James Clark Moloney has called to my attention a Japanese counterpart of the Hercules myth and the association of strength with light and darkness. The Sun Goddess, angered by the rude behaviour of her younger brother, shuts herself into a celestial cave with a door of rock. The gods try to restore light by inducing her to come out. The God of Wisdom dances a comic dance outside the cave to attract her attention. She opens the rock gate enough to look through the crevice. ' At that instant Tazikarao-no-Kami, the God of Physical Strength, sprang forward, and removing the great rock entirely, succeeded in bringing the Goddess out.' (NYOZEKAN HASEGAWA, *Japanese National Character*, Board of Tourist Industry, Japanese Government Railways, 1942, p. 61).

See Moloney's study of theophany and kenosis, (light phenomena) in ' Mother, God and Superego ', *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, **2**, 1954, p.120.

(28) OVID, *Fasti*, **4**, line 683.

(29) GUHL and KOHNER, *The Life of the Greeks and Romans* (London, 1889), p. 191. The marriage with a stranger was considered illegitimate and the children could not have their birthright.

(30) See article by WILTON M. KROGMAN, ' The Scars of Human Evolution ', who points out that man's skeleton was originally designed for four legs which has led to definite imbalances and consequent heavier burdens on the two legs and other important functions. *Scientific American*, **185**, p. 54 ff. (1951). As to cultural records of this struggle of man with his limitations as to movement see LEVIN, ' The Fiction of The Death Instinct ', *Psychiatric Quarterly*, **25**, 1951, p. 257 ff. (Discussion of Achilles' heel and of Jacob in the Old Testament who held on to Esau's heel.) See also EDWARD B. TYLOR, *Early History of Mankind*, Amer. ed. (1878), p. 369, for discussion of the lame gods in mythologies.

(31) WAKE, p. 101. The lichanura or rosafusca has small flaps or spurlike projections on each side of the end of his body, ' the remains of once-functional hind limbs '. DORIS M. COCHRAN, ' Our Snake Friends and Foes ', *National Geographic Magazine*, **106**, 1954, p. 334, at p. 364.

(32) *Encyclopedia Britannica*, article ' Central America ', 14th ed., Vol. 5, p. 134.

(33) J. G. FRAZER, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 18 ff. See also FRAZER'S *Golden Bough, The Scapegoat* (London: Macmillan, 1913), p. 302 ff.; BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (London: Kegan Paul, 1926), p. 80 ff., especially at p. 83.

(34) WAKE, p. 88. See also *Encyclopedia Britannica*, article ' Snakes ', 14th ed., Vol. 20, p. 849 ff.

(35) CHARLES DARWIN, *The Descent of Man* (New York: Hurst, 1894), p. 617. The whole chapter should be considered. In other editions this would be found in Chapter XX of Part III. See also LEVIN, MAINE, MCLENNAN and FREUD

Psychiatry, 1948, Vol. 11, pp. 180 and 186, where this observation of Darwin's is noted as of ' deep and far-reaching import '. On the subject of locomotion and the prevalence of four-legged locomotion in infants in Greece to-day see ' Quadruped Locomotion (Tetrapodisis) among Human Children ', by SAVAS NITTIS, M.D., in *Journal of Michigan State Medical Society*, April 1929. The author refers to the Riddle of the Sphinx. See also ERWIN W. STRAUSS, M.D., ' The Upright Posture ', *Psychiatric Quarterly*, **26,** 1952, p. 259.

(36) LEVIN, *The Oedipus Myth in History and Psychiatry*, pp. 291–292.

(37) LAZARSFELD, p. 229.

(38) M. I. EBUTT, *Hero Myths and Legends of the British Race*, Amer. ed., 1910. King Scyld was exposed and became a hero. See also MALORY's *Morte d'Arthur* for the story of Lancelot.

(39) A. J. LEVIN, ' Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life ', *Michigan Law Review*, **44,** 1944, pp. 64, 70, 289.

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AN IRISH LEGEND AS PROOF OF FREUD'S THEORY OF JOINT PARRICIDE

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Freud, in *Totem and Taboo* (2) says : ' I shall resist the temptation of pointing out these traces ' (i.e. the elimination of the primal father by the company of his sons) ' in mythology, where they are not hard to find.' It is a pity he resisted, for they are, surprising as it is, harder to find than one would expect. Still, there exists a fair number of myths and sagas dealing with primeval parricide. Mythology, as a matter of fact, is almost brimming over with them. But in nearly all the cases there is only one son-hero who commits the deed individually, and, more often than not, against the consensus of all the others concerned, as shown in Otto Rank's painstaking work on the incest motive (6). The only example of plural guilt to which Freud refers is not conclusive, as it consists in the myth of Dionysos, who was not a father to the Titans who slew him, but a more or less destitute child. Admitted that the Titans similarly revolted in common against Zeus, the father (who had once been a destitute child not unlike Dionysos), this myth would nevertheless be unconvincing without further proof. On the one hand, there is no incestuous event attached and, on the other, it was Zeus and not the wretched brotherhood of revolting Titans—who, by the way, were not his sons—who won in the end. The wrath of the father in mythology very often turns against his children; but on the one hand, it affects daughters and sons equally, and on the other, the reduplication motive has also to be taken into account; which means that emphasis in myth, as in dreams, is expressed rather frequently by reduplication. The tale of the merchant, for instance, in the *Thousand and One Nights* (3), who attempts to kill simultaneously his two sons whom he accuses of theft (incidentally, this is the only tale mentioned in which there are two sons involved instead of one) seems to employ reduplication as a means of emphasizing the wickedness of the father, like the consecutive infanticides committed by Uranos or Kronos in Greek mythology.

If, however, there are fewer instances of joint parricide to be found in mythology than Freud expected, this does not mean that his tenet has no bearing on social psychology, but simply that joint or group sin probably oppresses guilty social conscience more than individual sin can. The latter could always be argued away as an exceptional event, committed by an eccentric though heroic individual. So much so that even group sin would be telescoped into this single revolutionary hero—a process which is well known under the device of the scapegoat in other contexts. This would do its best to wipe out the traces of joint sin in myth through partial negation : admitting the fact of parricide but effacing the joint responsibility.

Yet we have to find at least some examples of true totem sin—namely joint responsibility for the sin—if Freud's thesis is to be taken as fully justified by mythology in its social aspect. Such examples will probably be found only in those mythologies which have been least tampered with and which have preserved to more than the usual degree their archaic and outspoken ferocity unadulterated by Christian or humanist censorship. They must be sought among peoples who have stuck obstinately to their heathen traditions, and preferably have also preserved their ancient tongue for the service of a pagan code, as Latin or Greek served the ecclesiastics.

These traits point imperatively to Celtic mythology, a rich yet so far insufficiently explored field for the purposes of analytic investigation, which would certainly yield many rewarding results if cultivated by anthropologists.

There is, as a matter of fact, a hint in *Totem and Taboo* itself which indicates the possibility

of discoveries in this domain, viz., that ' the ancient kings of Ireland were subject to a number of exceedingly strong restrictions '. This phenomenon, mentioned also by Hocart (4), unmistakably indicates that in Ireland the king—a sanctified derivate and perpetualized simulacrum of the primeval sire—revived and, so to speak, socially sublimated by the projection from the private into the public sphere, must as public dignitary have been treated in a highly ambivalent way. In other words, either the repression of the reminiscences of primal regicide must have worked somewhat inefficiently, the original impulse to parricide having been too strong, or special ethnic and historical circumstances must have prevented the old feud from fading away more smoothly.

Following this clue, we might well be able to trace an unusually long survival of the joint fraternal sin or its unconscious symbolic remembrance in myths through the symptomatic repetition, institutionalized in the customs regulating kingship.

One of the points indicating that these surmises would be well worth following up, and may prompt to further research is a finding which shows an exemplary neat specimen of parricidal myth, not only combined with clear-cut incestuous motives, but also relating to a company of brothers, who in this case do not seem to designate a merely reduplicating scheme as mentioned above.

The myth—or historical story—here alluded to, known as the story of Clothra or Clothru, is to be found in Keating's *History of Ireland* (5), Keating (1570–1644) held in deep respect all the old Irish historical stories he picked up and seems to have related them literally and without pragmatic criticism. It is this very circumstance which makes his chronicle the more valuable for us as a source of ancient mythological material. His translators and annotators, of course, scholars of the Victorian age, did their best to obfuscate the original sense wherever they did not find it sufficiently decent or decorous. It is a study in itself to follow the unconscious procedure of falsification, as it were, in the process of rationalization and embellishment of the texts. The story itself runs as follows.

King Eochu (or Eochaidh) Feidlech, son of Finn, had a daughter, Clothra, and three sons. The three brothers, called the three Finns or Finnemhna, Bres, Nar, and Lothar, cohabited with Clothra on the night before the day on which they wanted to fight their father. Next day, however, the father defeated (and killed) them. Clothra had become pregnant simultaneously by all three of them, in consequence of which miraculous union the body of her son Lugaidh bore a red circle round his neck and one round his waist, thus dividing it into three parts each resembling one of the joint male parents.[1] Clothra later cohabited with Lugaidh also and they had a son called Crimthann Niadnar. Although it seems that Clothra had not been violated, it is uncertain whether she seduced her brothers in order to procure an heir to the Finns, as is held by Keating's sources, e.g. the Welsh *Mabinogion*, or, as Mauss (7) holds, because she wanted to weaken them before the battle for the sake of her father (which would point to the implication of an incestuous relationship between father and daughter) like the Maoris he mentions who try to make persons they want to destroy commit a crime the previous night in the belief that these will then consequently lose in the fight. This would also correspond with Frazer's view (1), according to which sexual intercourse is tabu for warriors lest they should sympathetically infect themselves with feminine weakness.

Both Feidlech and Lugaidh bear a strong resemblance in character to each other and to Oedipus. Feidlech is called ' the longsighing '; ' . . . because he was for a long time addicted to sighing . . . since his sons were slain by him in the battle of Drom-Criaidh ', until he died. O'Mahony, annotating this passage, is of the opinion that ' Feidlech ' does not mean ' longsighing ', but ' Watcher ' or ' Vigilant '. He also disbelieves that Lugaidh's descriptive second name Riabh-n-derg (Reevenary : ' of the Red Circles ') would denote his disgraceful origin. He does not give any reason for his disbelief. Lugaidh, very much like his grandfather Feidlech, had a strong tendency to melancholy : ' . . . he ended by flinging himself upon his own sword; or, he died of grief for his children.' This passage makes it likely that there is a possible identity between the two figures.

Keating remarks, that, according to one version Lugaidh ' died of conceit he took of the death of his wife Dervorgil '. O'Mahony again steps into the breach by suggesting that Lugaidh

[1] Keating says: ' . . . the upper part of Lugaidh's person bore a likeness to Nar; . . . he resembled Bres between the two circles and . . . his lower extremities were like those of Lothar.'

probably died of grief 'about' her death. Now all this does not make sense (especially because Dervorgil does not play any part in the story), but it becomes clear at once if we establish the hypothesis that Feidlech and Lugaidh are but two aspects of the same mythological figure, who, like Oedipus, committed an abhorred crime, parricide and/or incest with his daughter and/or mother, for which he felt grief. The murder of sons could well represent the reverse process too; the interchange between the maternal and filial figures in Clothra already points in this direction. Feidlech/Lugaidh took conceit of the death of his slain sons/father(?) and/or of his committed incest against his daughter (denoted as wife).

O'Mahony, of course, does not believe that Clothra committed incest with Lugaidh; he cannot, however, efface Keating's naïve assertion. 'This fact', the latter says, 'is recorded in the following verse :

> Lugaidh Riabh-n-derg, of fair Crimthann
> The father was, though yet his brother;
> And Clothra of the comely form
> To her own son was grandmother.'

This verse has a certain emotional resemblance to the riddle of the Sphinx; and must, in fact, originally have been a riddle itself. Riddles nearly always denote promiscuity, and condensations in dream and in folklore are but a symbolic expression of a promiscuous tendency. Further, monstrosities like the Sphinx show (in a stationary form) the dynamic process of mixing ('adulterating'!) together incongruent elements distributed over a period of time. This, in the sexual sphere, would mean incest, as this seems to be the form of mating which in primitive society is regarded as a mixing—a 'promiscuity'—of incongruent and therefore forbidden elements.[2]

Clothra in this light *means* incest itself : incest with father, incest with brother and son, it does not matter which.[3] On the other hand, she does not feel guilt for the incest, as Feidlech-Lugaidh does, and it should not be forgotten that Jocasta likewise had no scruples. This means that there is either a less developed sense of guilt feelings arising from the sphere of incestuous significance in the female sex (perhaps the more lenient maternal superego accounts for it), or a clever projection of the male oedipal ego, which had not felt restraint and had not as yet been restricted by the post-oedipal ego, into the woman, after the post-oedipal ego took over. This question, however, would lead us too far from our original problem.

It has to be noted that the collective name of the three Finns is also full of meaning. Finnemha means, according to Keating, 'not separate' or 'not single'. This makes it plain that they could not have been simple reduplications, but were meant originally to symbolize a group of joint sin-committers.[4]

Now the reason why it is of great interest to psycho-analysis to pay attention to this myth is its complex nature, which offers us both the motives of incest, Oedipus situation, (attempted) parricide, and, at the same time, the plurality accentuated by symbolism, of the committers. In the story of Conchobar—another and more famous Celtic hero—we find the same setting of incestuous brother and sister relation as in so many of the Greek, German, or other myths but without plurality. On the other hand, in tales like the Hindu story of the Pandu princess Draupadi and her brothers, the Pandavas, there is an element of plurality present; this, however, is only in connexion with the incest, and no revolt of the sons occurs, neither do we find traces of any parricidal endeavours.

The only element referred to in Freud's *Totem and Taboo* which is missing from the story of Clothra is that of the totem feast, for the occurrence of which it does not supply us with any clue. It cannot serve, therefore, as conclusive (or even as acceptable) proof in this one regard. It is, however, by no means impossible that a deeper delving into Keating's *History* or other kindred source might bring to light some indication which would serve as a guide in the right direction in respect of this feature also.

This lack in no way depreciates the value of this otherwise flawless mythological example as supporting evidence of one of Freud's sociological hypotheses.

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[2] The question *why* exactly it has become forbidden does not enter into the scope of the question here dealt with. But forbidden things always assume later, with a 'petitio principii', the character of incongruent things.

[3] I do not think it at all impossible that the Oedipus myth may have had a previous (first) part, later lost, in which Jocasta committed incest with her father instead of, or apart from, committing it with her son.

[4] 'O'Mahony again senses danger; he says that deriving this name from 'amhaen' "is a ridiculous pun", and Keating, needless to say, disapproves of the interpretation.'

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BOOK REVIEWS

Principles of Psychoanalysis : Their Application to the Neuroses. By Herman Nunberg. (New York : International Universities Press, 1955. Pp. 382. $7.50.)

This book first appeared in German in 1932 as *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre* in the same year as Fenichel's *Spezielle Psychoanalytische Neurosenlehre.* The two books were thus complementary. Freud, in a foreword to Nunberg's book, declared it ' the most complete and accurate presentation we have at this time of a psycho-analytic theory of neurotic processes '. Thereafter Fenichel gave his book its new and final form, presenting the clinical subject-matter within a comprehensive theoretical framework under the title of *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (1945).

In the book under review the principles of psycho-analysis had always been in the centre, as exemplified in the neuroses. It has more particularly concentrated on the development of Freud's own thought and contributions, on which it is of the nature of a faithful commentary. More than that, it attempts to give a consistent account of this work up to date and to show that earlier and later views are but steps in the development of a systematic psychopathology of the neuroses. What Freud himself did in the third chapter of his *Introductory Lectures* (1917) is thus continued in this work.

Two new chapters have been added, one on ' The Dream ' (Chap. II) and one on ' Character and Neurosis ' (Chap. X). The former is by way of an introduction to the analytic concept of the Unconscious and to topographical and dynamic concepts. The latter includes an account of the libidinal types (erotic, compulsive, narcissistic).

In the comprehensive chapter on Instincts, the destructive instincts are treated as equal partners with the sexual instincts in accord with Freud's final formulations. This is one of the distinguishing features of this book, and is of considerable importance. Of particular interest is the paragraph on ' The Relation of the Destructive Instincts to the Phases of Libido Organisation ' and on ' Development of Object Choice and Restriction of Aggression (Fusion of Instincts) '. The chapter on the Psychology of the Ego is lucid and original, in particular the paragraphs on ' Magic and Omnipotence ', ' The Synthetic Function of the Ego ' and ' The Feeling of Guilt '. Here again ' the eternal struggle between the life and death instincts ' is for the first time adequately taken into a systematic account of psycho-analytic theory. Actual neuroses, anxiety, and the processes of defence are treated extensively and systematically.

The process of illness, causation of neurosis, and the theoretical principles of psycho-analytic therapy are reviewed in special chapters.

The book is still in mutual, complementary relationship to Fenichel's. Fenichel's is the more encyclopaedic and the more complete ; Nunberg's concentrates more exclusively on Freud, and its special merit is the full consideration given to the death instinct theory. Apart from Freud's own writings and those of Abraham, add the work of Ernest Jones, and you have the core of what is basic in psycho-analysis.

S. R. Foulkes.

The Selected Papers of Sandor Ferenczi, M.D. Vol. III. *Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis.* Edited by Michael Balint. Translated by Eric Mosbacher *et al.* (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis ; New York: Basic Books, 1955. Pp. 447. 30s. or $6.50.)

The English edition of this book is No. 48 of the International Psycho-Analytical Library. The American edition is Vol. III of the Selected Papers of Sandor Ferenczi. The texts are identical in every way (even the spelling) except that the American edition includes an introduction by Dr. Clara Thompson who, like Dr. Balint, was a pupil of Ferenczi and closely associated with him in his work. The print is slightly smaller in the English edition, which makes the layout a little more attractive, and the text is printed on better paper.

The Editor's note describes the papers as falling into three groups: (*a*) papers written after *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis,* (*b*) posthumous papers, notes and fragments, and (*c*) papers which were omitted from *Further Contributions.* This volume completes the publication in book form in English of all Ferenczi's important papers. What has been omitted is of slight interest from the point of view of psycho-analysis except for the as yet unpublished correspondence with Freud and the scientific diary which he kept during the last year of his life.

There is a very comprehensive bibliography which ' enumerates in chronological order all Ferenczi's papers published in English, giving in each case the volume and page numbers where the paper may be found ', and including references for the obituaries and appreciations of Ferenczi.

The index, equally comprehensive, also covers all books and papers by Ferenczi published in English.

The arrangement of the papers, etc., is chronological. The first group consists of thirteen completed and published papers, all of great interest. Three are concerned with Freud's importance for medicine and mental hygiene, one being an address to Freud on his seventieth birthdary. One is entitled ' Gulliver Fantasies '. One is concerned with education, and is entitled ' The Adaptation of the Family to the Child '. The remainder are concerned with psycho-analytic technique: ' Organ Neuroses and their Treatment ', ' Present-Day Problems in Psycho-Analysis ', ' The Problem of the Termination of the Analysis ', ' The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique ', ' The Unwelcome Child and his Death Instinct ', ' The Principles of Relaxation and Neocatharsis ', ' Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults ', and ' Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child '.

The posthumous papers are fully worked-out schemata for long papers, but are obviously not in what would have been their final form; they include papers on such topics as laughter, mathematics, epileptic fits. Although the papers were not completed they belong to the period before the publication of *Further Contributions*. The notes and fragments are day-to-day jottings on a very wide range of themes, many of which relate to analytic technique, and in particular to the clinical material with which Ferenczi was occupied at the time. The Birth of the Intellect, On Shock, The Technique of Silence, The Language of the Unconscious, Repetition in Analysis worse than Original Trauma, Fakirism, are the headings of a few of these.

The twenty-two papers in the third section are equally wide in their range of subject; all but five were written and published before *First Contributions*. They include ' Psycho-Analysis and Education ', read at the first Congress of Psycho-analysts in 1908, and ' On the Organization of the Psycho-Analytic Movement ', read at the second Congress when Ferenczi proposed the formation of an International Association of Psycho-analysts.

In the preface to *Further Contributions* Ferenczi wrote: ' It gives me great pleasure to lay my work once more before Anglo-Saxon readers, particularly because I have found that with their broad-mindedness they often strive to view such opinions as mine quite without prejudice, whereas elsewhere these are turned down *a limine* on account of their novelty or their boldness.'

Novelty and boldness are the right words—the ideas put forward in these papers read today with a freshness and a force that is lacking in much of the later writings on the same topics; and it is rather a reflection on those Anglo-Saxon readers that the work of collecting these papers together, translating and publishing them in English has waited until more than twenty years after the last paper was written, shortly before Ferenczi died in 1933, although they had been published in German in 1939 (*Bausteine*). We owe a great deal to Dr. Balint for his labour of love in the production of this book.

In his foreword to the Ferenczi number of this *Journal* Dr. Balint spoke of Ferenczi's jokes about himself as the ' enfant terrible ' of psycho-analysis, and of his interest in the myth or dream of the ' wise baby '. He went on to say that Ferenczi was ' essentially a child all his life ' and compared him with those mature adults, Freud and Abraham. Running through these papers is the sadness of that baby, wise before his time, who knew more than the adults, and yet for lack of further knowledge and experience could not substantiate his knowledge, convince the adults, or make his work fully effective.

Ferenczi died in 1933. Mrs. Klein's work began to be widely known and accepted during the last two years of his life, and in the preface to her book *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* she acknowledged her debt to him. Much that her work contains has been used and developed since then, especially by Winnicott and others, in ways that illuminate Ferenczi's later work, especially that on what he called ' relaxation and neo-catharsis '.

In his paper on this subject, and more clearly in the notes and fragments and the paper entitled ' Confusion of Tongues between Children and Adults ' one finds his realization that many links are missing. His patients regress to infantile states —' trances '—he ' adopts ' them, and then questions ' Yes—yet how to " disadopt " ? ', or ' But what happens in cases of helplessness or general hopelessness ? '

He was able to identify with his patients to an unusual degree (hence his extremely sensitive understanding of clinical material) and also to remain separate from them (hence his capacity for critical evaluation of the material, and for making theoretical deductions). His main difficulty seems to have lain in the impossibility for him of being both identified and remaining separate at one and the same time. He equated hate with destructiveness, and love with creativity. Had he had more understanding of the paradox of ambivalence, where the loved and hated person are found to be the same, and had he been able to accept his own hate and use it, many of his discoveries would have stood through time as *his* discoveries; they would not have needed to be discovered afresh and on a broader basis by others. He could be compared with early workers in other fields, those who believed in blood transfusion, for example, and believed rightly, but knew nothing of blood-groups.

' Often I envy my patients ', Dr. Thompson quotes his saying, ' I wish I could have had this kind of analysis ', speaking of his ' relaxation ' method. But to have helped him it would have needed at the very least someone standing at the farthest limits of what we know today. We can only guess what was the cost to Ferenczi of treating

patients as he did, when they were only a step or two behind him (or even sometimes in front), and dealing with the self-same problem as he needed to solve. Such was his personal tragedy.

Perhaps this inability to deal with paradox is the thing that was chiefly responsible for the measure of failure in both his life, his work, and his relationships. This volume as well as the earlier ones shows his failure to fuse his enthusiasms, his empiricism, and his subjectivity with his awareness of the need for caution and his objectiveness.

Ferenczi's work on education, on the relation of the child to the family, to the two parents in their relatedness to each other, the need of adults to adapt to children, his 'active technique' and his 'relaxation and neo-catharsis' are widely known. Less known, but of no less importance or interest, are his work on shock and its effects, splitting between psyche and soma, and the importance of body sensation and reactions in relation to memory —'Unpleasurable memories remain reverberating *somewhere* in the body (and emotions)'—and again 'The memory remains fixed in the body, and only there can it be awakened'. These topics recur throughout his writings; they seem to be themes too which he could develop just so far, but never to a point where they could become really useful or convincing, even to himself. But reading his papers now, in the light of later work, there is a wealth that can enrich us and much to stimulate our ideas and our understanding of our patients.

Such a man is at once stimulating and disappointing. He went further than his colleagues in ways that they found unacceptable for unconscious reasons, and therefore could not follow. His ambivalence and unresolved conflicts could not but arouse ambivalence in those who worked with him. Perhaps these were inevitable consequences of the coming together of his personality and psychoanalysis in the early stages of its development.

Freud's words in his obituary are most fitting: 'Where the path he had chosen would have led him we do not know, since he could not follow it to its end.'

Margaret Little.

Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought. An Exposition, Critique, and Attempt at Integration. By Ruth L. Munroe. (New York: The Dryden Press, 1955. Pp. xvi + 670. $7.50.)

This book was commissioned by the Dryden Press as one of its *Publications in Interpersonal Relations* to provide students, social workers, social scientists, etc., with accurate information and 'with help in forming an unbiased judgment among the clamorous, quarrelsomely different schools currently thought of as psychoanalytic'. The choice of author was fortunate in all respects. Ruth L. Munroe is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the City College of New York, with some fifteen years teaching experience behind her, and has a private practice of diagnostic testing for psychiatrists of many different schools together with consultation and guidance work. She is the wife of a practising psycho-analyst, Dr. Bela Mittelmann, and has herself some personal experience of both 'orthodox' and 'Horney' analysis. Thus, although she calls herself an 'outsider', her opportunities for acquiring information and making contact with workers in the differing 'schools' are unrivalled, and she has made the most of them. Each section of the book has been scrutinized by competent members of the 'school' concerned. The kind of précis-writing necessary in a book of this scope is never entirely satisfactory, but, judging by the treatment of 'Freud and the "Freudians"' (Part Two), the accounts given are sound and any errors are errors of inevitable omission rather than of commission. Her account of criticism received is significant: 'The few specialist readers who have read my account of schools other than their own seem to have two reactions: (1) My report of *their* school is good, so good that they become annoyed with me for not driving home the ideas they consider most important for any honest psychological science. If the report is this good, why can't it be still better—on their terms? (2) My account of the *other* schools is inaccurate, they say, because I read my own intelligence into them, with insufficient knowledge of their history and actual practice.' To which last her unanswerable reply is, 'It is the schools, not I, that have supplied the liberalizing intelligence of each presentation in some contrast to the narrow shibboleths by which they are often identified' (p. 19).

The book is divided into five Parts. Part One, 'An Overview', has a first chapter, 'An Approach to Psychoanalytic Thought', in which the author explains her own attitude to her task and the 'uniform broad outline of topics' according to which the 'schools' are presented, with the aid of terms which are 'neutral' to all of them. The five headings chosen are (1) 'The Terms of the Organism', the word 'terms' being 'intended to suggest a sense of the directions, conditions, and limits set by the organism'; (2) 'The Terms of the Milieu', of which the most important are the 'Social Factors in Personality Development'; (3) 'The Genetic Process', or how the emergence of personality is thought to come about; (4) 'The Dynamics of the Functioning Personality', ('What makes people tick?'); (5) 'Pathology and Treatment'. In the last the author has noted 'important differences in *emphasis* among the schools' but also 'extensive areas of overlap'. But, since 'the problem of treatment is essentially a medical problem', she suggests 'the chapters be considered more as information about what happens on the analytic couch than as material for judgment by readers who do not understand the treatment requirements of different types of mental disorder'.

The schools discussed are those which American ' outsiders ' have heard most about, with references to key ideas associated with other analysts not reported *in extenso*. The major classification is into libido and non-libido schools. At first this savours rather of the ' narrow shibboleths ' to which the author herself objects, but she explains that it was chosen for the practical reason that ' This was the topic about which the analysts seemed to be quarrelling in the most intransigent manner and on which my fellow " psychologists " seemed to become most heated . . . the fundamental problem that arises continually is *the rôle of infantile sexuality* in personality formation and in the unconscious dynamics of adult function ' (pp. 15–16). Hence analysts like Kardiner and Alexander, who continue to stress the importance of sexual and aggressive factors, are classified as ' Freudian ' irrespective of any modifications they wish to introduce into the ' libido theory '. The ' non-libido schools ' all emphasize the ' self ' as the ' primary factor in psycho-dynamics ' although their definitions vary.

The second chapter of Part One introduces ' Basic Concepts of Psychoanalysis '. Four are held to be accepted by all ' schools ', namely, ' psychological determinism, " the unconscious ", goal-directedness, a genetic approach ' (p. 68). A full account is given of the ' avenues of approach ', the ways in which information is obtained about the unconscious, including an interesting section on the projective method of psychological testing, in which the author herself specializes.

Part Two examines ' Freud and the " Freudians " ' according to the model noted above. Chapter Three, ' The Terms of the Organism ', contains a section on Ego Psychology which gives a very clear description of modern work in this field stemming from Hartmann, Kris, *et al.* Chapter Four includes an interesting discussion of Kardiner's psychosocial approach and methodology and his concept of ' social homeostasis '. Chapter Five, ' The Genetic Process ', includes a succinct account of the work of Melanie Klein.

Part Three contains five chapters dealing with the work of Adler, Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan according to the pattern outlined in Part One. The Horney, Fromm, and Sullivan sections are likely to be particularly useful to English and Continental readers who, as a rule, are less familiar with the details of their views than Americans, and incline to regard them as one loose group rather than as three distinct ' schools '.

Jung and Rank did not readily fit the author's topic model and so, in Part Four, a chapter is devoted to each in which an account is given of their essential views. In England, the Jungians have recently inaugurated a journal of their own, but both Jung and Rank have little clinical importance in the United States. The author says ' Although everyone knows their names and acknowledges their influence, and although some of their concepts have become part of a very general vocabulary, there is comparatively little interest in the detailed development of their theoretical systems among professional psychological groups in the United States today except, for Rank, in the area of social work. Writers, artists, and historians would tell a different story, especially for Jung. . . . Adler . . . is given more discussion not because he is more important in himself but because his position is closer to major developments in America ' (p. 17).

Throughout the book, critical comments, always stimulating though sometimes repetitive, are interspersed at suitable points; they are printed in smaller type and in double-column format to obviate any confusion with the factual descriptions of the main text. Each chapter is provided with an excellent summary. Part Five, ' Epilogue ', reviews both the cardinal features of the ' schools ' and the main arguments of the author's critical comments. Anyone familiar with the ' schools ' who does not wish to read the whole book can form a good idea of the author's approach and conclusions by reading the ' Overview ' and the ' Epilogue '. There is a selective Bibliography of the most important work of each author in English translation, and a useful Index.

The reviewer's impression is that the author has carried out a difficult task extremely well and has produced a book that could be read with advantage by members of all ' schools '. Its interest to analysts is not mainly in its provision of authentic information about different ' schools ' but in the author's attempt to see through the current diversities of opinion to possible bases of future co-ordination. This attempt is the more valuable in that the author limits herself to a general perspective and to suggesting ways of thinking that might facilitate synthesis. Thus, she says of new terms she uses, ' They are not intended as the permanent pillars of a new inclusive theory to be substituted for the theories reported but rather as a temporary rephrasing such as may help us to envisage common problems within a common framework ' (p. 21). Her suggestions and conclusions cannot be discussed adequately in a review and a few points only will be mentioned here. Her orientation is basically psycho-analytic but her approach is psychosocial. Though she considers the Freudian emphasis on infantile sexuality wholly justified and necessary, she wishes ' Freudians ' would now pay more attention to non-sexual factors in development, and is inclined to regard modern ego-psychology as a step in this direction. Her over-all perspective is succinctly expressed as a ' view of systems '. ' In summary, it avers that scientific truth lies in the progressive recognition of dynamic systems of different types and degrees of inclusiveness. No such system is universal in the absolute sense. Many have a quality approaching universality because

they are deeply rooted either in the biological equipment of man or in fundamental necessities of social living. The nature of man (born helpless with a unique capacity for flexible learning) is such that integrative systems between the organism and its milieu (the individual and his society) are inevitably of supreme importance ' (p. 601). This is entirely in accord with conceptions of progressive mental organization by the integration (or dissociation) of sub-systems. The author's point is that some important sub-systems tend to be neglected by all ' schools ' and many concentrate too exclusively on one (the error of ' reductionism '). ' Freudian ' theory is ' multidimensional ': it gives room ' for learning new things with some *separateness* rather than as variations on a single theme ' (p. 22). But concepts (such as Freud's ' structural concepts ') that are initially flexible tend to become ' reified '. A factor hitherto neglected which the author has found to be of considerable import is the development of the ' self-image ', itself a composite. The ' view of systems ' allows scope for the integration of contributions from different ' schools ', but the main plea throughout is for greater recognition by psychologists of ' the relative autonomy of the social groups and social trends *within which the individual functions* ', i.e. for a greater degree of ' psychosocial integration '. The reviewer certainly agrees with the need for the development of an adequate psycho-sociology, such as could result from the co-operation of mutually enlightened psychologists and sociologists.

Marjorie Brierley.

Freud and Religious Belief. By the Reverend H. L. Philp, Ph.D. (London: Rockliff, 1956. Pp. 140. 18s.)

This book is the most completely adverse criticism possible of Freud's views on religion. Many such have already been published, but presumably the author considers that with Freud's prestige the harm his views might do in the religious field is such as to call for yet another counterblast. The book is well written and gives on the whole a very fair account of Freud's writings on the subject. These are then criticized in full detail.

Dr. Philp expresses great admiration for Freud as a man, for his honesty and courage, but he holds that everything Freud wrote on the subject of religion was woefully mistaken. He made no contribution whatever to the psychology of religion. His main stricture on Freud's writings in this field is that Freud had a totally wrong conception of what religion really is: he confounded religious beliefs with religion itself. ' If what Freud described as religion covers all that religion is, it ought to be destroyed.' This is a strong statement. The beliefs that Freud suggested might be illusory, i.e. brought about by the process of wish-fulfilment, were: the belief in immortality; the belief in the existence of God, with the accompanying emotions of love, awe, and fear in relation to Him; and the Christian belief that a particular possibility had been offered men of salvation from their sins and sinful conscience. There were, it is true, other aspects of religion which Freud admitted to neglecting in *The Future of an Illusion*, but he made good this omission in his later writings. This temporary omission, however, seems hardly sufficient to warrant such an anathema.

Freud's conclusion that religion is an illusion Dr. Philp counters with the assertion that Freud's illusion was science. It is an attack concerning which Freud himself had a good deal to say, in his *New Introductory Lectures* and elsewhere.

The Totem book is dealt with at length, and Dr. Philp has no difficulty in finding anthropologists to quote who have expressed their incredulity about Freud's primal horde theory. Malinowski is fully quoted, but not my refutation of his conclusions. The close of this chapter runs: ' It is a fairy story, but if we believe his (Freud's) version of the origins of religion to be a fairy story, it follows that his basis for calling religion one has gone, and there is nothing in his argument left to answer '. So that is that.

It is, however, over *Moses and Monotheism* that Dr. Philp really lets himself go. The book is, of course, so full of debatable points and of hypothetical chronology which there seems no way to determine that it lends itself readily to the criticism of Biblical scholars. To begin with there are the opposing views about Akhenaton's monotheism. One school, to which Freud adhered, is full of admiration for his courage, his vision, and the loftiness of his ethical teaching, while another school sees in him a weak creature whose wife forced him to start a political schism of one set of priests against another. For the present argument it is advantageous to favour the latter view. A list of the suggested dates for the Exodus is given, all of which are incompatible with the idea of Moses being a *direct* adherent of Akhenaton, a possibility Freud had of course himself taken into account. Freud had asserted that the rite of circumcision was not peculiar to the Jews and had probably been acquired from Egypt. The first part is obviously true, but the second is more doubtful, since it is now known that the custom obtained among other Eastern nations. As for the murder of Moses, the statement is once more made that Sellin had later withdrawn his shocking suggestion, but none of the evidence available in Sellin's subsequent writings supports the truth of this statement. Freud's book is finally dismissed in the dictum: ' Facts of history, sound anthropology, convincing psychology in relation to the racial unconscious, evidence worthy of serious consideration or even solid argument—none of these is prominent in *Moses and Monotheism* '. One can only wonder why such a feeble blunderer

as Freud was worth the contradicting. How Dr. Philp must have yearned for a more doughty opponent.

The few psycho-analytical contributions in the book are not very happy. Freud's dream of the Pope being dead when the noise of the bells disturbed his sleep, a dream the infantile source of which is easy to divine, is interpreted as Freud's sleep being disturbed by his uneasy thoughts about religion, ' but for him the Pope had died long ago —perhaps when his nurse had been caught stealing '. That Freud learnt the latter fact only at the mature age of forty-five should surely have some relevance here. Then we are told that obsessional neurotics who forego their ritual cannot be compared with religious believers who do the same, since the latter may suffer pangs of conscience whereas the former are only aware of pathological anxiety—quite a different matter.

There are a few statements in the book that need direct contradiction. There is no truth at all in the assertion that ' For many years he had planned a vast work which would apply psycho-analytical theories to the whole of the Bible; *Moses and Monotheism* was the only part of it which he was able to complete '. Freud once read this story in a newspaper and was hugely amused by the fantastic supposition. Dr. Philp speaks of Freud's ' profoundly pessimistic nature '. Actually his nature was consistently cheerful, though he recognized that his sense of realism and his scepticism were often mistaken for pessimism. Then to accuse Freud of ' believing that he knew the nature of the limits of reality ' is a strange thing to say of that humble student who was possessed with a sense of boundless unknown surrounding him.

Ernest Jones.

Tribute to Freud. By H. D. (New York: Stratford Press, 1956. Pp. 180. $2.50.)

The author's initials, under which she commonly wrote, belong to an American poet, Hilda Doolittle, a poet of rare delicacy and distinction. She was analysed by Freud for some months in the years 1933–4, and they formed a friendship that lasted until his death. Nine charming letters of his, hitherto unpublished, form an appendix, and another one may be found in the text.

The book, with its appropriate title, is surely the most delightful and precious appreciation of Freud's personality that is ever likely to be written. Only a fine creative artist could have written it. It is like a lovely flower, and the crude pen of a scientist hesitates to profane it by attempting to describe it. I can only say that I envy anyone who has not yet read it, and that it will live as the most enchanting ornament of all the Freudian biographical literature.

Ernest Jones.

Psycho-Analysis Today. By Agostino Gemelli, M.D. (New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1955. Pp. 153.)

This misleading book, an English translation from the Italian, was written by one of the most distinguished Catholic intellectuals in Italy. He is among other things a priest, and the book is written from the standpoint of strict Roman Catholic orthodoxy. I call it misleading because it gives such a distorted picture of psycho-analysis that a practising analyst, familiar with his subject, would find it hard to recognize it as his own.

The first section of the book is entitled ' Freudian psychoanalysis ', the second, considerably longer, deals with Jung's psychology, and the third is a comment on various pronouncements by the Pope. In the last we are taught how dangerous and impermissible it is to allow sexual thoughts to emerge from the unconscious into consciousness; they should be allowed to remain in their previous state, the therapist hoping for the best.

It is not worth while to comment on the numerous misstatements in the book. Even the simplest historical facts are wrongly stated. Thus Breuer is said to have accompanied Freud to Charcot's Clinic, where Janet was laying the foundations of what was later psycho-analysis! There is an instructive slip of the pen whereby we are told that ' Freud maintained that the child and the preadolescent boy are not without *asexual* manifestations ' (p. 24).

Ernest Jones.

The Dilemma of Being Modern. By J. P. Hodin. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. Pp. 271. 25s.)

The dilemma in question is the sickness of the world produced by the ' crisis caused by science '. The author, a distinguished art critic, expounds this theme from many points of view, but it is one that does not directly concern us here. But there is a beautifully written chapter, twenty-six pages long, entitled ' The Cultural Psychology of Sigmund Freud '. The theme is the same as that of Thomas Mann's famous essay written on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday, but this essay surpasses Mann's in its clarity and depth of understanding.

The author is principally concerned with the outlook on life and the nature of civilization which Freud so powerfully influenced, and I know of no better exposition of this fascinating theme. Many passages of the greatest interest could be quoted, but I will content myself here with one. Speaking of *The Future of an Illusion,* which Dr. Hodin calls ' a work comparable to Plato's *Dialogues* not solely by virtue of its formal quality ', he writes: ' The single notes ring out as in a well co-ordinated orchestra: question and answer, theme and response in a symphonic whole. There grows up before us a new man who, freed from the shapes of

his own world of imagination, dares to take the step out of bloody chaos into a better future. Freud has not only freed his generation from a hypocritical sexual code, he has revealed to modern man the deep meaning in the old legend of Achilles, who was only vulnerable at the spot where his mother held him when she dipped him into the Styx. Freud is a mentor to those just taking the step from youth to manhood.'

Ernest Jones.

Der Traum und seine Be-Deutung. By Werner Kemper. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, 1955. Pp. 220.)

Werner Kemper's *Der Traum und seine Be-Deutung* has appeared in Rowohlts Deutsche Enzyklopädie, a series of pocket-books, which attempts to present scientific knowledge of today to the lay public. (L. S. Kubie's book *Psychoanalysis Without Secret* has appeared in the same series.)

Kemper gives a short introduction, summarizing attitudes towards the dream and its evaluation up to the time of the appearance of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and describing the scientific climate at the turn of the century, Freud's scientific background, and how his hypothesis of the unconscious led to his first concepts of the dream.

The main part of the book consists of five chapters: Source of the Dream, Dreamwork, Function of the Dream, Content of the Dream (inner and outer reality), and the (so-called) Dream-Interpretation.

The technique of dream-interpretation is convincingly demonstrated throughout. The presentation of well-chosen dream material from Kemper's own work shows the skill of the analyst and the experienced hand of a teacher and writer. The reader is very often put into the position of almost foreseeing the next step and so experiencing to some extent the co-operation which develops between analyst and analysand, and how inner and out perception widens.

The author decides against a dogmatic presentation of psycho-analytic theory. He hopes to clarify and prepare the way for future agreement by comparing concepts of different schools of thought. This wish may have grown through many years of enforced co-operation, when the Institute in Berlin was a place of some tolerance in spite of Nazi rule; but one is surprised that a task of such magnitude should be attempted in a book written for the lay public.

Many conceptual details are discussed lucidly, but Kemper's eclectic approach leads the discerning reader—if not Kemper himself—into contradictions. To illustrate the point: On pages 116–17 Kemper says that Jung, Maeder and Schultz-Hencke's concept of the compensatory function of the dream is akin to his own, which he formulates as follows (my translation): 'In the dream we try to regain our lost inner freedom by perceiving once more all the possibilities the interplaying forces of our life presented us with, but we try to avoid action to which we are compelled.' This view has much in common with that of Sully, cited by Freud (*C. W.*, IV, p. 60): 'When asleep we go back to the old ways of looking at things and of feeling about them, to impulses and activities which long ago dominated us'. Freud accepts this observation like many others, but continues (*C. P.*, V, p. 592): 'We have thus been able to find a place in our structure for the most various and contradictory findings of earlier writers, thanks to the novelty of our theory of dreams, which combines them, as it were, into a higher unity'.

Even if Freud's structural concept had received more emphasis, some of the contradictions in Kemper's book would not resolve themselves. On pages 194–5 Kemper argues Freud's point against Binswanger, Heidegger, Boss, etc., who wish to stress the manifest dream, which, in their opinion, Freud deprived of significance in favour of the latent dream-thought; he refers to Freud's reminder (*C. W.*, V, p. 506 note), that not the latent dream-thought, but the dream-work is the essence of the dream. Yet on page 119 Kemper accepts Maeder's view on the 'prospective purpose' of the dream, ignoring that in the very same footnote Freud argues against the 'notorious prospective purpose'. In a second footnote (*C. W.*, V, p. 579) Freud mentions Maeder and shows once more that thoughts during sleep are day residues in the preconscious of which unconscious wishes make use, but that the only function of the dream is the dream-work. Kemper's objection to Freud's term 'dream-thought' may have its root here.

Altogether one would have liked to see Freud's classical formulations quoted more fully, so that the reader might find the all-important source of our present-day knowledge.

The book manages to hold the interest of the reader over difficult passages. An extensive Bibliography is attached, arranged according to the language of the original.

For the German-speaking reader of this review it should be emphasized that the unusual spelling of 'Be-Deutung' is the author's, not the reviewer's choice.

Oscar A. Friedmann.

Essays on the Sociology of Culture. By Karl Mannheim. Edited by Ernest Manheim in co-operation with P. Kecskemeti. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. Pp. ix + 253. 28s.)

This book consists of three essays written by Karl Mannheim in 1933, before he was forced by the Nazis to leave Germany. The first paper, 'Towards a Sociology of the Mind', consists of a

closely reasoned approach to the study of the Sociology of Culture. In the second two essays Mannheim uses the tools which he has forged so carefully in the first essay, and applies them to the task of elucidating the two main theses of which the remainder of the book consists, namely the historical rôles of the intelligentsia and the problem of democratization.

In the first essay Hegelian Philosophy is shorn of its unrealistic overtones, and is used to further the author's penetration into the study of mental processes and their significance in their own indigenous social context. This paper is difficult to comprehend, and in some ways it is better to read it both before and after reading the second and third essays. In this way its essential usefulness as a conceptual framework can be more fully appreciated.

In the second essay, ' The Problem of the Intelligentsia ', the author begins by referring to the early outcropping of intelligentsia in certain cultural milieux. Both the frequency of such occurrences and the numbers involved have vastly increased in the past few centuries. Mannheim goes on to state that in his opinion a single human being becomes sociologically significant only through multiple involvement with various social groupings. The process of individuation takes place through the impact of conflicting social groups upon the person, the metamorphosis which thus ensues being analogous to that undergone by a metal when it is being tempered. Mannheim emphasizes the importance of the coffee house as a training ground for a somewhat different type of intelligentsia in the seventeenth century in Europe, but more especially in England, where the coffee house developed into an important social institution. In it the premium was on the spoken word, and thus a much greater flexibility and nimbleness of mind was engendered than was possible for those intellectual groups whose source of inspiration was confined to the written word. At one and the same time the members of an intelligentsia must be the spontaneous products of their own contemporary culture and also to some extent displaced persons from that culture. They differ from their fellows by their preoccupation with the study of themselves and other people and, being different, they epitomize the present age. Mannheim states that our epoch is one of growing self-awareness, and that it is not any fundamentally new faith which distinguishes it from other ages, but rather an increased consciousness and preoccupation with the study of ourselves. There has been a tendency, of course, for a broadening of the group of intelligentsia with the process of democratization, and this process itself has been aided by the heightened awareness on the part of the intelligentsia both of themselves and of the wider social environment.

The third essay, entitled ' The Democratization of Culture ', deals very lucidly with the development of democracy. This process reduces the vertical distance between various social groups and also broadens the basis of participation in government. There follows a fruitful welding of the practical and the theoretical aspects of living. The fact that equality of opportunity for the development of the self in its social context in a democracy should not be synonymous with the production of a featureless plateau of mediocrity is the main thesis of this essay.

In a final section the author makes the point that democracy is an outstandingly worthy objective, and that it can be attained only by accepting insecurity, adventure, and risk. On one side is the danger of chaos, and on the other the risk of a drab levelling-down process. The way ahead, however, is promising. By the indefatigable pursuit of Truth, the individual achieves a much more differentiated development of himself as an active participant in a broadly based and tolerant cultural environment.

A. Hyatt Williams.

Democracy and Dictatorship. By Zevedei Barbu. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul ; New York : Grove Press, 1956. Pp. vii + 275. 28s.)

A good deal of light is thrown by this book upon the psychology of Democracy and Dictatorship. The developmental or historical approach gives a convincing explanation of the structure of contemporary cultures in terms of human personality and character. Neither the predominant character of the people produces the culture nor the culture the main character type of the people, but the end-result is an interaction between the two.

The development of democracy in Western Europe is compared with and related to that first flowering of democracy in Ancient Greece. A comparison and contrast is made between the way in which democracy has been achieved in Britain and in France. The characteristics of the prevailing personality-type in a Democracy are explained as being the products of a cultural dualism. This dualism consists of a religious factor leading to the concept of the Ideal or Transcendental and a secular factor leading to an understanding of Immanence and Empiricism.

The outcome of freedom to develop under conditions of relative security has been a more integrated and differentiated personality characterized by flexibility, objectivity, and tolerance. Socially there is diversity with generally good reality sense, these qualities being the outcome of an easy balance between unconscious and conscious forces. *Pari passu* with this develops an internal controlling mechanism which limits the extent of personal freedom (in other words a tolerant but stable superego). With this clear differentiation of the boundaries of the individual, there is achieved a capacity for Group participation, but, when occasion demands it, also an ability to be relatively independent. The democratic character, therefore,

occurs where there is security to develop, whereas the totalitarian character, being the product of insecurity, is withered by regression.

Fascism develops when people have lost faith in a Transcendental Order and when faith in the Immanent Order is weak or absent. There is a return to a rather muddle-headed mysticism which helps the cohesiveness of such a regressive group, which projects its hatred and acts aggressively both towards non-members of the Group and towards other Groups. Ambivalence is intense, and usually there is a strict hierarchical 'pecking-order' with excessive submissiveness to superiors and ruthless domination of inferiors. The personality of Hitler is described in its paranoid aggressivity as the apotheosis of the Nazi-Fascist character.

Communism is said to arise in those periods and in those people in whom faith in a Transcendental Order of life has completely collapsed. There is a compelling need for order in life, order which is found in rigid ideological and social systems (it is not stated categorically, but it is implied that Communism arises only if the individuals of a group have not developed sufficient independence or integrity to be able to tolerate the loss of a transcendental belief without great trauma and chaos within themselves). Communist societies are characterized by suspiciousness, aggressiveness, compulsive activities, and completely exaggerated needs for identification with the Group. The need for belongingness is the operative dynamic. An attempt is made to explain Communism in terms of the personalities of Marx and Lenin, but with limited success. Of great importance, however, is the statement that a man is a Communist or Fascist long before he joins either of these parties.

This work deals in a most capable and scholarly manner with a subject which is at once difficult and important.

A. Hyatt Williams.

They Stand Apart. Edited by J. Tudor Rees and Harley V. Usill. (London: Heinemann, 1955. Pp. xii + 220. 21s.)

This book is a symposium about homosexuality, by workers in different fields, each of whom writes from his own particular standpoint. These different views are the outcome of the different ways in which the problem of homosexuality impinges upon workers trained according to those different disciplines. Sincerity of approach, and some perplexity, too, run through all the essays, which consider homosexuality in its relationship to the law, society, and to Christian morality, in that order.

Then follows a discourse upon the medical aspects of the problem, followed by an interesting section outlining the law as it relates to homosexuality in certain other Western European countries. This shows that there has been a gradual development of greater tolerance towards homosexuality between consenting adults, provided that such relationships do not outrage public decency. The seduction of young boys, however, is a much more knotty problem, and any easing of the stringency of the law has been curtailed because of anxiety lest the victim should be left dangerously unprotected. Medically the problem is complex, and the question arises as to whether or not all homosexuals are ill. Undoubtedly there are illnesses in which homosexuality may erupt as a symptom, and these illnesses have to be treated in their own right apart from the homosexuality. The problem in those facultative homosexuals who have the capacity to achieve heterosexual relationships is different from that in those who have not had even a flutter of heterosexuality. The rôles of uncovering the determinants of homosexuality and of supporting and strengthening conscious control over it are considered, but no fixed conclusion has been reached, nor could it have been in the present state of our knowledge. The section ends with an apposite quotation from the *Medical Press*: 'Those who lay down the law as regards sex seem to take it for granted that we know, in fact, what is normal and healthy, whereas we know only what is customary . . . we plead, therefore, for more research and for the recognition of the fact that the invert is not a villain to be punished but a patient to be studied —to our own ultimate advantage.' Despite such a very worthy statement, psychopathology in this book is not accorded due emphasis. It is somewhat ignored as *the* means whereby we may be able to understand this problem more thoroughly and eventually become capable of treating it more effectively. There is no mention of the relatively good prognosis which follows the uncovering of the determinant traumata in a certain class of homosexuals—namely those who repeatedly seduce young boys because they are themselves unconsciously impelled to repeat actively upon someone, in the image of themselves, that which they felt they had suffered passively at an equivalent age.

A symposium such as this cannot say everything, and I think it will achieve the worthy intention of the contributors by stimulating a large number of intelligent lay persons to think about the problems of homosexuality rather than to feel violently about them without thinking constructively at all.

A. Hyatt Williams.

ABSTRACTS

Contents:

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, **25,** 1956, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, **4,** 1956, Nos. 1, 2.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY **25,** 1956, No. 1

Géza Róheim. 'The Individual, the Group and Mankind.'

Róheim maintains that the pattern of a culture correlates more with what might be expected of it from the rearing experiences to which its children are subjected than with the needs of reality. He cites numerous examples, for instance the hoarding of food among the Melanesians of Normanby Island, where food supplies of all sorts are abundant but the children are subjected to repetitive withdrawal of the nipple during suckling. He concludes that the id and the superego, not the ego, play the predominant rôle in culture formation. If this is true then culture is the result of the prolonged importance of infantile characteristics in man, and it is not, as the sociologists maintain, that man's prolonged infancy is necessary to fit him to his culture. In fact the prolonged infancy of man is biological in origin, an example of that slowing down of the rate of development which is a universal principle of evolution.

Gustav Bychowski. 'The Ego and the Introjects.'

This is a condensation of three papers delivered to the American Psychoanalytic Association. The first deals with 'The Origins and Precursors of Splitting'. In the conflict of oral dependency and the destructive rage which arises when the object does not comply, the result is often withdrawal of erotic energy and decathexis of the object. This is achieved by neutralizing the libido with the aggression which has not been permitted to achieve its aim. The aggressive energy further strengthens the countercathexis and isolation of the introjected object. At the same time some of the libido cathects substitute objects, which are thereby idealized, or rendered omnipotent, and which continue to be reached out for. This is the primary basis of cleavage, and it opens the possibility of further repetitions of the same mechanism. When the process is sufficiently advanced the split-off primary identifications may seem to be non-existent both to the ego and to the observer. That such splitting is not always maintained, and that the introjects are readily projected, is easily understandable, since they also tend to retain some of their original instinctual charge, and there is therefore always the potentiality of restoring the original experiences and discharging some of the original cathexes. It is also understandable that such a transformation of relations within the ego and superego into relations between the ego and external objects has as its counterpart both libidinal and destructive acting out.

The second and third papers are concerned with the vicissitudes of such introjects, and their effect on the mental economy in 'The Construction of Male Homosexuality' and 'Advanced Stages of Splitting in Schizophrenia'.

Edward M. Litin, Mary E. Giffin, and Adelaide M. Johnson. 'Parental Influence in Unusual Sexual Behaviour in Children.'

This paper is along the lines of previous studies by Adelaide Johnson and her co-workers. She gives numerous examples of the influence in the development of unusual sexual symptoms and perversions of unconscious seduction and encouragement by the parents. Important aspects of her technique of combined therapy of parents and child are the separation of the child from the parents at the beginning of treatment if necessary, the refusal by the analyst to repeat the permissive attitude of the parents, and a long analysis for the significant parent which, by relieving the child of the seductive pressure, tends to shorten the child's treatment.

Otto E. Sperling. 'Psychodynamics of Group Perversions.'

Perversions can be induced in a group where a leader, usually with a spontaneous perversion, takes over the rôle of the superego. The possibility of the induction of a parasitic perverse superego depends on an original latent superego split in the members of the group, and there is therefore a continuum between induced and genuine perversions. In the spontaneous perversions superego influences are also of great importance. These emanate from the parents who unconsciously hold up the ideal of the perverse gratifications. The acceptance of this ideal is also favoured by the superego as a counterphobic defence against castration fear. The therapy of induced perversions carries the better prognosis.

Geraldine Pederson-Krag. 'The Use of Metaphor in Analytic Thinking.'

The author analyses some of the types of metaphor used in analytic thinking. Many of them have the advantage of evoking feelings to clarify a subject which deals with feelings. However, when we try to delineate the psyche realistically we find ourselves aligned with the physicists and using their methods of thought as an illustrative model. This contrast draws attention to both the advantages and the limitations of the use of analogy in psychoanalytic thinking.

Henry I. Schneer. 'Psychodynamics of Tinnitus.'

It is suggested from the brief therapy of two cases that the primal scene may be associatel with later auditory symptoms which bind anxiety, and substitute sounds which nevertheless retain their original significance. The first patient had a conscious recollection from early adolescence of an experience of hearing sounds which he attributed to parental coitus. For the second patient, the symptom was one of many conversion reactions, and may well have been partially induced by suggestion. (Author's Summary.)

Robert Seidenberg. 'The Dream of Exalted Parentage.'

The dream of having been born of noble or otherwise more important parentage connoted in one clinical instance not only the desire for the happier days when the parents were thought of as exalted human beings, as Freud suggested, but also served an integrative function of the ego in dealing with shame and helplessness from an unresolved oral fixation. After the point has been reached where these cravings can no longer be denied, they are rationalized by a fantasy of exalted birth which also sooner or later provides unlimited gratification. (Author's Summary.)

Alfred J. Siegman. 'The Psychological Economy of Déjà Raconté.'

With the aid of *déjà raconté* the ego of one patient could allow access to consciousness of material which had previously been overwhelming and therefore repressed. The trick of perceptual distortion aimed at reassuring him that the situation referred to had previously been mastered successfully. It is probable that *déjà raconté* is only evoked by material which is threatening to the ego. This theory would bring the explanation of *déjà raconté* into basic accord with Oberndorf's formulation of *déjà vu* as a reassurance to the subject that he is not entering a new field unconsciously associated with failure.

John Klauber.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY

25, 1956, No. 2

Gregory Zilboorg. 'Freud's One Hundredth Anniversary.'

Nancy Procter-Gregg. 'Schopenhauer and Freud.'

Sigmund Freud. 'Four Unpublished Letters.'

This number is in part commemorative of Freud's centenary. Zilboorg's essay on the impossibility of evaluating Freud historically in our time, Miss Procter-Gregg's imaginary conversation between the shades of Freud and Schopenhauer in which they compare their views, and the four unpublished letters of Freud himself are not really suitable for scientific summary; they are for reading in the original.

Suzanne Reichard. 'A Re-Examination of "Studies in Hysteria".'

The five patients of the *Studies* do not form a homogeneous nosological group. The conversion symptoms of Anna O. and Emmy von N. dealt with hostile impulses and were pregenital in nature. There was little evidence of genitality and these patients were in fact schizophrenics. The symptoms of the other three expressed oedipal wishes towards the father. There were true hysterics and the prognosis differed accordingly.

Hysteria should not be used as a diagnostic term for patients with conversions who have regressed from the genital level. However, it is impracticable to define an illness in terms of a conflict in the unconscious because of the time necessary to elicit the evidence for the diagnosis. It is therefore suggested that such patients should be described in terms of the nature of their symptoms and the degree and type of ego-defect.

Franz Alexander. 'Two Forms of Regression and their Therapeutic Implications.'

Freud described two types of regression, one to a more successful type of adaptation in order to avoid a later conflict, the other to a traumatic situation, in order to achieve belated mastery. Though the problems involved are not new Alexander believes that the therapeutic implications of the two types have not been systematically presented.

Both are expressed in the transference. In practice they are usually mixed, but the preponderance of either must be assessed by comparing the transference manifestations with the life-history. The interpretations should express this evaluation by the analyst, since the patient will tend to dwell on the type of material for which the analyst shows interest. Thus if an evasive regression from the Oedipus complex is interpreted with the emphasis on the attempted solution of pregenital problems the patient will continue to dwell on these prob-

lems, exploiting them as a resistance. On the other hand a return to unsettled conflicts in order to master them runs parallel with the analyst's efforts, and here the analysis of the earlier problems will contribute to the solution of the later ones.

The author concludes that chronological depth is not necessarily pathogenic depth, and that it is fallacious to find one general formula valid for all cases.

Robert Fleiss. 'The Déjà Raconté. A Transference Delusion Concerning the Castration Complex.'

While the psychological content of *déjà raconté* and *déjà vu* are comparable their form is not. *Déjà vu,* like other states of alienation, is a sensation which does not disturb the cognitive functions. *Déjà raconté* on the other hand does, and must therefore be classed as a delusion. Fliess quotes several cases which seem to show that the specific anxieties which *déjà raconté* seeks to master concern the fear of incontinence following castration as a punishment for infantile masturbation. They are dealt with by an acute regression to the oral state in which the patient compensates himself by his possession, and incorporation, of the breast. The breast is projected upon the analyst in the form of a mouth, and this is why the symptom concerns two mouths (the patient's and the analyst's) and why the refusal of the analyst to join in the *folie à deux* so markedly breaks the patient's bond with him. *Déjà raconté,* as a 'second-time' experience, also permits active mastery of the trauma originally suffered passively.

Leon J. Saul, Thoburn R. Snyder and Edith Sheppard. 'On Earliest Memories.'

Whether true or fabricated, earliest memories must be regarded as being shaped by the same forces in the personality as shape dreams. They may be compared with day-residues, but, being less influenced by the reactions to daily life, they reveal the nuclear emotional constellations even more clearly. Every detail is significant. They are indispensable in the diagnostic interview.

Martin H. Stein. 'The Marriage Bond.'

Because of its ceremonial and legal character, the marriage bond is readily represented in special instances by fantasies of anatomical attachment. These primitive fantasies serve as defences against fear of separation and annihilation. It is not, however, necessarily claimed that such fantasies constitute the historical source of the social institution of marriage.

One common fantasy is 'my wife is my phallus', which the author demonstrates clinically in a group of men who maintained sado-masochistic marriages with surprising tenacity, and among whom the fantasy represented a modification of their original narcissism and a partial approach to object relations. Their fantasy is highly over-determined, drawing elements from all libidinal phases. The predominantly oral factors are presented, but a more complete report would include many anal, urethral, and phallic determinants. None the less the oedipal phase is of crucial importance. Thorough understanding of such fantasies is a prerequisite for the analytic solution of neurotic problems in married people.

John Klauber.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY

25, 1956, No. 3

Catherine L. Bacon. 'The Rôle of Aggression in the Asthmatic Attack.'

One or both parents of asthmatics is usually a dominating person who makes the child feel guilty for 'defiant' excretory acts. Excretory fantasies then come to colour the whole later development of infantile sexuality, including the wish to grow up. These fantasies stimulate the excretory mucous membranes, and this in turn sensitizes the respiratory mucous membrane, just as physical stimulation of the excretory membranes stimulates respiration. The nascent excretory aggression arouses fears of excretory retaliation, but now upon the respiratory apparatus, which behaves as though it were really being assaulted with noxious substances.

Peter Hobart Knapp. 'Sensory Impressions in Dreams.'

This paper is partly statistical, partly interpretative. In general dreams are 'colourless, soundless, motionless, tasteless'; but when sensations do appear they appear in that order of frequency. The author includes an appendix on his method of scoring and assessment. These frequencies are consistent with the concept of a hierarchical structure in the organization of sensory experience, with a corresponding degree of availability in the sensory material. The reason for the absence of sensation in dreams is that sensation is loaded with affect and therefore promotes wakefulness. Sensation occurs in a dream as the harbinger of affect.

Ricardo H. Bisi. 'Dermatosis in a Case of Post-Partum Psychosis.'

A woman developed a severe facial acne and a severe psychotic regression after each of two pregnancies. During this time she injured her face by squeezing the pustules. Her symptoms are shown to have been motivated on all libidinal levels, with a turning against the self of the destructive impulses she felt against her mother and children. The receptive and excretory functions of the skin render it suitable for the expression of fantasies concerning the introjection and expulsion of objects, and their

operation is worked out in some detail with regard to these symptoms.

Edward Hitschmann. 'Freud Correspondence.'

Hitschmann's letter to Freud intended to be read on his sixtieth birthday, and Freud's characteristic reply.

Jule Eisenbud. 'Time and the Oedipus.'

This is another of the author's discussions of the use of the hypothesis of 'precognition' in psychoanalysis. As before (*Psychoanal. Quart.*, 1954) he treats later events resembling those in the manifest content of dreams as if they were day-residues, claiming added illumination of the patients' oedipal problems. The most neglected feature of the unresolved Oedipus complex is the patients' hopelessness about time, that is, about the distance in time which separates the child from the loved parent. The leaps across time which the author detects are motivated by the intense wish to catch up in time with the parents.

Leopold Bellak with M. Brewster Smith. 'An Experimental Exploration of the Psychoanalytic Process.'

Two patients' sessions were recorded for several months. Two analysts were asked to judge the material and two to predict future behaviour, according to a prescribed record-form. The results were then assessed statistically. A high degree of agreement was found among all the participants concerning the nature of the case. The ability to agree on the nature of short-range changes was not unequivocally demonstrated. None the less, in spite of the differences in conceptualization and focus of interest between the analysts, the overall agreement was impressive. The experimental procedure is discussed in detail, with its usefulness for the study and validation of specific hypotheses in psycho-analysis.

Peter A. Martin. 'Note on Inhibition of Scientific Productivity.'

The reasons advanced in one psycho-analytic society for the small number of papers read boiled down to the fear of criticism. This fear will reduce scientific productivity if it is experienced as a threat to castration. If an analyst is scientifically productive, on the other hand, this may be the sign that he is further resolving his castration anxiety.

John Klauber.

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4, 1956, No. 1

Charles Fisher. 'Dreams, Images, and Perceptions: A Study of Unconscious-Preconscious Relationships.'

In this paper Fisher describes his repetition of the tachistoscopic experiments of Allers and Teler (1924) with certain modifications of his own. Pictures were exposed to subjects for a period of ten milliseconds. In some of the experiments the subjects were presented with a word association test a few minutes later and in further experiments the test was not employed until some 72 hours after the exposure of the pictures. The subjects were asked to report and draw any images which might appear in their minds during the association test. Following the word association test the stimulus picture was gradually re-exposed at increasing time intervals until it was clearly perceived. The subjects of the experiments were male and female patients from the Department of Psychiatry at the Mount Sinai Hospital.

Five separate groups of experiments were conducted: the first to illustrate the appearance of preconscious percepts in image formation 72 hours after registration; the second to illustrate the process of condensation in image formation; the third to demonstrate how size and perspective relationships related to preconscious percepts are ignored in image formation; the fourth to illustrate the compulsive emergence of preconscious percepts during image formation; the fifth, to show the duplication or the multiplication of preconsciously perceived percepts in image formation.

The results confirm the findings of Allers and Teler that the memory images of preconsciously perceived parts of tachistoscopically exposed pictures subsequently appear in conscious images as can be observed during the word association test. Of particular interest was the observation of various degrees of compulsiveness which different subjects developed in making their drawings. The subject may intend to draw a horse's head in profile but find that the pencil draws a back view of the horse's head. Again the finding that the memory image of a preconscious percept can appear in a dream as long as 5-6 days after the original tachistoscopic exposure suggests that Freud's theory that a day residue cannot be older than 24 hours is possibly incorrect.

On the basis of these experiments Fisher suggests that the process of dream distortion commences in close temporal relationship to the laying down of the memory trace of the preconscious percept associated with the day residue experience. The unconscious wish and the primary process may invade and mould aspects of conscious imagery. Freud's belief that the division between the systems unconscious and preconscious was by no means a rigid one finds experimental support in Fisher's work.

Alexander Grinstein. 'The Dramatic Device: A Play within a Play.'

The dream within a dream is compared to the play within a play as it occurs in *Hamlet*, in *A Mid-*

summer Night's Dream, and in one of Shaw's plays. The dream within a dream generally deals with a reality event in the life of the dreamer which the dreamer wishes had never happened. The play within the play also deals with reality events as well as with psychic reality, including the conflicts and problems of the hero or whoever in the play represents an important facet of his personality. These conflicts which are distasteful to the ego are those with which the hero wishes he did not have to struggle. Like the dreamer he wishes they were not really so.

Earl A. Loomis. 'The Concurrent Presentation of a Rare Detail in the Dreams of Two Patients.'

On the one day two patients reported dreams of a goat and a goat-like creature with prominent scrotum and pendulous testes respectively. While thinking over the material the author realized that on the previous day he had heard from another patient a story to do with the castration of pigs. This had led to further associations which convinced him that the goat-scrotum theme had been present in his own unconscious. The problem was how the theme was conveyed to the patients. It suddenly occurred to him that both patients had attended a football game in which the Navy was a contender and that he had told the patients some days previously that he would not be returning to the Navy. A goat was the Navy team's mascot. The author was the goat.

Erik Homburger Erikson. 'The Problem of Ego Identity.'

This paper by Erikson is a comprehensive account of his concept of ego identity. It is very difficult to condense this long paper into a relatively short abstract without losing much of what the author wishes to convey. While this abstract can indicate some of the main headings a full appreciation of the article can only be gained by reading it in full. To obtain a total picture of ego identity it must be approached from a number of different angles. Erikson names three approaches —biographic, pathographic, and theoretical.

George Bernard Shaw is the subject chosen to illustrate the biographic method. The raw material which provides the genetic aspects comprises the impressions from daily life, observations of personality development in young children and observations on mildly disturbed young people. This material is used to demonstrate something of the genetics of identity. Erikson outlines a psychosocial programme of development which begins with the mechanisms of introjection and projection and leads to the later identifications of childhood. The end of adolescence is the time of an overt identity crisis. Identity formation neither begins nor ends with adolescence, but is a lifelong development. The individual has to find a means of integrating the psychosexual with the psychosocial aspects on any given level of development. Crises occur when changes in the former demand readjustments to maintain integration with the latter. Identity appears as only one concept within a wider conception of the human life cycle which envisages childhood as a gradual unfolding of the personality through phase-specific psychosocial crises. A diagram illustrates the various stages of psychosocial development.

The pathographic aspect or clinical picture of identity diffusion is provided by a description of a syndrome to be observed in disturbed young people. The time of breakdown, the problem of intimacy *vis-à-vis* isolation, diffusion of time perspective, diffusion of industry, choice of negative identity, specific factors in family and childhood, are some of the subjects discussed in detail in this section of the paper. In the concluding chapter entitled 'Ego and Environment' identity formation is considered to have both a self aspect and an ego aspect. It is a part of the ego in the sense that it represents the ego's synthesizing function in meeting one of its frontiers, namely the actual social structure of the environment and the image of reality as transmitted to the child during successive childhood crises. Until the matter of ego versus self is sufficiently defined to permit a terminological decision Erikson has decided to use the term identity to suggest a social function of the ego, which results, in adolescence, in a relative psychological equilibrium essential to the tasks of young adulthood. A final subject of discussion is the relationship between identity and ideologies.

Thomas Freeman.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHO-ANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

4, 1956, No. 2

Thomas S. Szasz. 'On the Experiences of the Analyst in the Psycho-Analytic Situation: A Contribution to the Theory of Psycho-Analytic Treatment.'

The aim of this paper is to ascertain the nature of the analyst's experiences in the treatment situation. Emphasis is not laid upon the problem of undesirable counter-transference, but upon revealing the irreducible and unavoidable satisfactions which constitute the 'realistic' counterpart in the analyst of the experiences of the analysand. Szasz notes that while the literature abounds in references to those aspects of the analyst's behaviour which might impede the analytical work there are few which are relevant to the theme of this paper. He singles out papers by Sharpe (1930), (1947), Low (1935) and by A. and M. Balint (1939) which make a point of underlining the gratifications which the analyst derives from his work which are neither 'altruistic' nor based on counter-transference.

Szasz proceeds to detail the psychological satisfactions which the analyst obtains, beginning with those mentioned by Sharpe (1947). To these four which are not specific to psycho-analysis he adds a further four. First, the pleasure derived from doing useful work. Second, the pleasure derived from being needed. Third, the pleasure from the mastery of conflicts in human relationships through verbalization and mutual understanding. This is unique to psycho-analytic therapy. Fourth, pleasure derived from contact with the patient as a protection from loneliness. When these eight factors are considered as an entity many differences between analysis and other situations (such as that between parent and child and doctor and patient) become immediately apparent.

Considerable resistance exists against recognizing the satisfactions which the analyst obtains from his work. The source of this resistance is considered to be due to the universal phantasy of the 'ideal' adult who gives but does not have any needs in his own right. The 'psycho-economic' implications of this theory are described at length. The final section of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the principal reasons for the persistence of such 'psycho-economic' derivatives.

Lucia E. Tower. 'Counter-Transference.'

The phenomena described under the term counter-transference have received a number of varying interpretations. As a rule comments have been of a forbidding type, the implication being that the analyst is consciously able to control his own unconscious. The author suggests that the term counter-transference should be used only for those phenomena which are transferences of the analyst to the patient. These are inevitable and often desirable. Such unconscious interactions between analyst and patient are frequently of vital significance for the outcome of the analysis. Thinking on the subject of counter-transference has become irrational. On the one hand candidates for training are selected on account of their potential libidinal resources while on the other hand every detectable libidinal investment made by the analyst in the patient is cause for criticism. Erotic phantasy and erotic counter-transference are ubiquitous and presumably normal.

Tower advances the theory that in every intensive analysis there develops a counter-transference structure, perhaps even a 'neurosis' which is an inevitable counterpart of the transference neurosis. Such counter-transference structures play an important rôle in treatment. Their understanding by the analyst may be as important to the working through of the transference neurosis as is the intellectual understanding of the transference neurosis. The development of counter-transference structures in the analyst will occur gradually and insidiously over a long period of time. Even under ideal circumstances there are bound to be certain drifts from the set course instituted by the analyst and changes in his understanding of the case. These are caused by unconscious responses in the analyst to hidden pressures and motivations from the patient and constitute the essence of the counter-transference structure.

The clinical material selected to illustrate the views described above comprises four patients who were in analysis for long periods.

Rene A. Spitz. 'Counter-Transference: Comments on its Varying Rôle in the Analytic Situation.'

Spitz considers it worthwhile to inquire whether the 'counter-transference neurosis' (such a concept being proposed by several authors) might not have its uses in treatment in the same way as the transference neurosis is utilized in analysis. On consideration Spitz feels that the effect upon the patient of the release of counter-transference affects would be undesirable. Under optimum conditions the analyst should achieve a counter-transference sufficiently sublimated to allow him brief periods of identification with the patient.

The psycho-analytic setting places the patient in an anaclitic situation. Spitz suggests that that rôle of the analyst be termed diatrophic, i.e. supporting. The diatrophic attitude is a facsimile of the identifications which the young child forms with the parental figures. While the reality aspects of the anaclitic relationship gradually recede and disappear during development the diatrophic attitude, beginning with an identification phantasy leads to a progressively closer contact with reality. In the analytic situation both anaclitic and diatrophic attitudes have to operate on the phantasy level: neither should be translated into action. The analyst not only has to face the danger of acting out the diatrophic attitude, but there is the temptation to succumb to the unconscious wish for an anaclitic relationship with the patient.

Much of the analyst's insight results from temporary ego-controlled identifications with the patient. If such ego-controlled regression is replaced by acting out, then the analyst loses his capacity for awareness of the derivatives of his own unconscious and cannot use them in therapy.

Jan Frank. 'Indications and Contraindications for the Application of the "Standard Technique".'

This paper reveals that a discussion of technical problems is inseparable from the consideration of certain aspects of ego psychology. The standard technique is hardly likely to help those patients whose personality is characterized by an essentially shallow ego organization—Frank calls them 'façade' personalities. For them the standard technique is an intolerable addition to their difficulties and proves valueless. Several case histories

are presented to show the problems involved in treatment and what can be achieved.

Allen Wheelis. 'Will and Psycho-Analysis.'

The gist of this paper is a re-examination of the concept of will in the light of psycho-analytic theory and practice. Current psycho-analytic theory underrates the rôle of will in bringing about therapeutic change. While the development of insight is an essential step along the road to mental health, alone it can achieve nothing. Will is necessary to translate insight into action. The author believes it wrong to assume that the unaided efforts of the psychoneurotic patient are always and necessarily ineffective. Much of psycho-analytic opposition to the concept of will derives not from ideas of the impotence of will but from its appearance as resistance. It must not be overlooked that the acquisition of insight may act as an obstacle to will and action.

A true appreciation of the rôle of will does not imply that the analyst should direct his attention towards anything other than the achievement of the maximum of understanding of his patient and the transmission of this understanding by interpretation. The paper ends by listing a number of positive implications once the value and rôle of will in treatment is recognized. There is a plea for discrimination on the part of the analyst when he is confronted with acts of will; not all actions should be criticized as 'acting out'. While some acts of will must be described as resistance others can be adaptive and problem-solving.

R. Ekstein. 'A Clinical Note on the Therapeutic Use of a Quasi-Religious Experience.'

This is a case report on a 13-year-old girl diagnosed as a borderline schizophrenic. During much of the treatment the patient's mind was taken up with religious ideas and experiences. It transpired that this phenomenon was a defence against the developing transference. These transference manifestations were not interpreted directly, the therapist preferring to make his communications within the context which the child offered, whether this was a religious parable, medieval phantasy, or a frankly delusional experience. The patient responded to this approach and did not feel threatened by the transference. Much later in treatment was this need of the patient's for distance from the therapist brought to her attention.

K. R. Eissler. 'Some Comments on Psycho-Analysis and Dynamic Psychiatry.'

A brief communication whose purpose is to show that 'dynamic psychiatry' is not a psychology parallel or equivalent to psycho-analysis. The essentials as well as the finer facets of the psychic apparatus are beyond the scope of dynamic psychiatry, which, while using haphazardly psycho-analytic concepts, is a crude, common-sense psychology.

Thomas Freeman.

INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

20TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

The 20th International Congress of Psycho-Analysis will be held in Paris from 28th July to 1st August, 1957, under the auspices of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris. The Congress will meet at Maison de la Chimie, 28 rue Saint-Dominique, Paris 7e.

An announcement referring to Panels and Individual Papers was made in this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXVII, November-December 1956, Part 6, p. 509.

All communications regarding the Scientific Programme should be sent to the Chairman of the Programme Committee: Dr. Edward Kronold, 17 East 60th Street, New York 28, N.Y., U.S.A.

REGISTRATION FORMS for the reception of all Congress participants by the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, on Sunday, 28th July, at 8 p.m. at Maison de la Chimie, 28 rue Saint-Dominique, can be obtained from: Dr. S. Nacht, Président du Comité d'organisation du XXe Congrès International de Psychanalyse, 187 rue Saint-Jacques, Paris 5e, France. All registrations should be received by the organizing committee before 30th April, 1957.